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Chapter 1
Introduction
Chapitre 1 : Introduction
Couvrant 71% de la surface de la Terre, l’oce´an mondial est un e´le´ment fondamental de la
vie sur Terre et de l’e´conomie du monde, car 90% du transport international de marchan-
dise s’effectue par voie maritime. Les utilisations humaines de l’oce´an sont diverses (peˆche,
marine marchande, plaisance, mise en place de ports, d’industries maritimes, chantiers
navals, entre autres), et des conventions internationales ont e´te´ e´tablies afin de re´guler
tout ou partie de cet ensemble.
Les Nations Unies ont mis en place diverses organisations internationales telles que
l’Organisation maritime internationale, le Tribunal international du droit de la mer ou
l’Autorite´ internationale des fonds marins. Des mesures propres a` la se´curite´ et a` la
suˆrete´ de la navigation maritime ont duˆ eˆtre e´dicte´es du fait de la densite´ du trafic
international. Des syste`mes e´lectroniques permettant aux acteurs d’avoir une meilleure
e´valuation de l’environnement maritime ont e´te´ de´veloppe´s. A` bord, ces syste`mes de´livrent
des informations sur l’environnement du navire et les pre´sentent de fac¸on graphique alors
qu’a` terre ces syste`mes donnent aux e´tats coˆtiers la situation maritime au large de leurs
coˆtes et ame´liorant la connaissance de la situation maritime. L’un de ces syste`me mis en
place est le syste`me d’identification automatique (AIS).
Ainsi, des actions telles que l’e´diction de nouvelles re`glementations peuvent eˆtre prises
a` diffe´rents niveaux, de l’e´chelle d’un port a` l’e´chelle mondiale. En France, l’Action de
l’E´tat en Mer a e´te´ de´finie, regroupant les moyens ope´rationnels existant dans les eaux
franc¸aises du monde entier, pour des proble´matiques environnementales et de de´fense.
Le syste`me AIS a e´te´ mis en place en tant que syste`me d’anticollision, mais e´tant un
syste`me offrant un grand nombre d’informations utiles sur les navires, il a e´te´ vite utilise´
comme syste`me d’enregistrement des positions et activite´s des navires. Le de´veloppement
des technologies satellitaires ont acce´le´re´ le processus, les positions des navires e´tant
de´sormais accessibles en ligne sur des sites de´die´s. Cependant, ainsi que pre´sente´ dans la
litte´rature, et malgre´ son importance dans la se´curite´ de la navigation, le syste`me pre´sente
un faible niveau de se´curisation, et la pre´sence d’erreurs, de falsifications et de piratage
des donne´es est ave´re´e par la litte´rature. Dans cette optique, il est particulie`rement
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important d’e´valuer les informations transmises par ce syste`me afin de s’assurer de leur
authenticite´ et de s’assurer que des de´cisions prises sur ces donne´es le soient avec une
bonne connaissance de l’authenticite´ de ces informations.
Cette recherche se base sur trois postulats qui sont : (1) Le syste`me AIS ne transmet
pas que des informations parfaitement authentiques, car des falsifications ont e´te´ montre´es,
(2) les falsifications du syste`me sont dues a` des eˆtres humains, sont imparfaites et donc
sont de´tectables et (3) les erreurs et falsifications de l’AIS peuvent avoir un impact sur le
monde re´el.
A` cette fin, trois hypothe`ses ont e´te´ propose´es, qui sont : (1) une e´valuation de
l’inte´grite´ des donne´es, rendue possible par l’existence d’anomalies, permet l’e´valuation
d’un message et de son information, (2) il est ne´cessaire d’effectuer des analyses sur tous
types de messages, afin de de´tecter des anomalies de toutes sortes, sans se restreindre aux
messages spatio-temporels et aux analyses spatiales et (3) une de´tection des anomalies du
syste`me permet l’e´valuation des risques associe´s au domaine d’e´tude.
Cette the`se a pour but de re´pondre a` ces hypothe`ses en de´finissant une me´thode pour
l’analyse des donne´es AIS comprenant une e´valuation rigoureuse des messages eux-meˆmes
et une e´valuation des risques maritimes pouvant e´merger du fait des erreurs, anomalies
et falsifications qui sont pre´sentes dans le syste`me. Il est donc ne´cessaire de mode´liser le
syste`me et ses possibles erreurs et falsifications, de conside´rer l’analyse de donne´es et la
gestion des donne´es dans de la donne´e non totalement fiable, de distinguer le vrai du faux
dans un flux de donne´es et d’e´valuer les risques associe´s. Tous ces objectifs ne´cessitent la
cre´ation d’un syste`me d’information pour la gestion des donne´es incertaines.
1.1 The maritime context
1.1.1 The human uses of the ocean
Covering 71% of the surface of the planet, the World Ocean is a major feature of the life
and the economy of the World. Most of its surface, 64%, is outside the sovereignty of
any state, and in the remaining 36% the sovereignty is divided between the countries in
several areas, the most famous one being the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
Several conventions exist in order to have an international coherence in this matter,
especially concerning straits and channels, which often have their own regulations. Con-
ventions on territorial sea, contiguous zone, international waters, continental shelf and
the fishing activities were established in Geneva in 1958 (United Nations, 1958). Then
in 1982 the Montego Bay convention established rules for archipelagic waters, EEZs and
seabed. Some local conventions also apply, such as the Barcelona convention for the
Mediterranean or the Noume´a convention for southern Pacific. Straits also have ad hoc
conventions, such as Gilbratar’s (1912) or Dardanelles’ and Bosphorus’ (1936).
In the coastal zones, the applicable law is the one of the coastal country while in
international waters it is the one of the ship’s flag, causing the problem of the flag of
convenience which fits out three vessels out of five. A certain amount of countries propose
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convenience flags such as, amongst others, Liberia, Cyprus, Bolivia, Panama, Mongolia.
The problems are mainly on the right of workers, the tax benefits and the low security
requirements for the seafaring of vessels.
As 90% of international transportation is done by the oceans, it has a central place in
the economy of the World. The crowded areas are often regulated by the use of traffic
separation schemes (TSSs) in order to prevent accidents. International goods transporta-
tion in cargoes is not the only activity at sea, as fishing boats (about 50 million fishermen
in the world), cruising boats, military boats and some specialised boats are widespread
all around the world.
The actors of the ocean are various, and include the fisheries, the merchant navy, the
boating and pleasure cruising activities, the ports, the industries at sea, the shipyards
and the specialised activities, such as Search & Rescue, tugs or icebreakers.
International organisations have been set by the United Nations, such as The Interna-
tional Maritime Organisation (IMO), the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea,
or the International Seabed Authority. As the international traffic is dense, safety and
security measures must be put in place. Electronic systems that enable people to better
understand their environment were progressively developed. On-board, they can provide
information about surrounding environment and display it graphically; on-shore, they
can give information to the coastal authority about the state of its own sea, improving its
maritime situational awareness. One of the currently used systems is the AIS, standing
for Automatic Identification System.
1.1.2 Maritime watch: actors and tools
1.1.2.1 Actors of the safety and security at sea
In order to increase the security and safety, actions are taken at several level, from the
global to the local. New laws of the sea can be set up, for instance, by the International
Maritime Organisation, for a global use. In the chain of maritime surveillance, several
organisations are in charge of the management and the surveillance of traffic, the aid to
mariners and the security interventions. Those means are set from the level of one port
(harbour master) to international level. In France, at a national level, the Sea-domain
State Action (SSA, for Action de l’E´tat en Mer) gathers the organisational means put in
place in the French seas all around the World for defence, environmental protection and
environmental safeguard purposes. Led by the French Prime Minister and its representa-
tive the maritime prefect (Pre´fet Maritime), the SSA embraces administrations such as
the French Navy, the French national Police force, the directorate of maritime affairs, the
customs, amongst others.
In the frame of the SSA, seven Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres (MRCCs) are
put in place along the French shores, in order to ensure the surveillance of strategic mar-
itime spaces. In addition to those control centres, research units specialised in maritime
accidents are dedicated to the study of past accidents in order to understand the con-
text under which the accident took place and learn lessons from them. Such units are
managed by coastal states, with the BEAmer (Bureau Enqueˆtes des Accidents de mer) in
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France or the MAIB (Maritime Accident Investigation Branch) in the United Kingdom.
In those groups, analysts have to study past data, among which manoeuvres of vessels,
geographical context, exchanges between the vessel and the control centre. A detailed
description of the archived moves and the condition of the vessels is led. The purpose
is to find the causes of the problem and to get from them recommendations and lessons
for the improvement of maritime security. Some papers such as (Lavigne et al., 2011),
(Glandrup, 2013) or (Riveiro and Falkman, 2011) underline the part of such experts in
analysis and modelling of risks and behaviours.
Some specialised organisations have been put in place by some governments, according
to the type of threat. For instance, the CeCLAD-M (Centre de Coordination de la Lutte
Anti-drogue en Me´diterrane´e, for Mediterranean area anti-drug enforcement coordination
centre), allows the struggle against illegal drug traffic, thanks to a collaboration between
intelligence agencies. Another example is EUROSUR for the surveillance of illegal im-
migration into the states of the European Union. All those actors of SSA and maritime
surveillance work together for the defence and the protection of the international maritime
space, and must use several tools and databases to successfully complete their missions.
Those tools will be the subject of the next section.
1.1.2.2 Tools for the security of navigation and maritime surveillance
In the surveillance domain, data concerning the movement of the vessels, acquired via
active or passive sensors, are used as basic data from which is extracted all relevant
information. The IMO set a system called Automatic Identification System (AIS), based
on the exchange of messages between vessels via VHF, including position messages with
route, cargo and destination data, coming from GNSS receiver working in DGNSS mode
and on-board sensors. The messages are sent on a regular basis and ensure knowledge of
the surroundings; however, all vessels are not fitted out with this system. Historically,
radar were the primary source of information for maritime surveillance and today it offers
complimentary information to other sources, such as AIS or LRIT, and can also detect
vessels that are not obliged to be fitted out with the systems. Similarly, AIS allow the
knowledge of some areas that could be masked by topography using radar.
Several data sources enable us to follow the maritime traffic in real-time, either from
a surveillance centre (Maritime surveillance systems, VMSs, VTSs) or from the vessels
(aid-to-navigation systems, anti-collision systems). In addition to vessel movement data,
cartographic data are required in order to know the geographic, topographic or regulatory
context. For this reason, electronic navigational charts (ENC), consisting of vectorial
charts, form a cartographic database for the display of maritime pieces of information
(bathymetry, regulated areas, amongst others), managed by the International Hydro-
graphic Organisation (IHO). Those charts can be visualised using the Electronic Chart
Display and Information System (ECDIS), which must follow norms put in place by the
IMO on representation of maritime databases. ECDISs provide position information of
nearby vessels, hazards, ephemerides and maritime traffic signals. Unfortunately, those
systems are often flooded with data, which makes their display complicated and their
understanding hard, if not impossible. Moreover those tools are not fitted with traffic
analysis features (Glandrup, 2013).
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The Web technologies providing open access to the public to AIS data enabled the
Maritime traffic surveillance tools. Websites such as marinetraffic.com, shipfinder.com
gather AIS data from all stations in partnership with them. Today, those websites only
offer visualisation features, and no movement analysis or movement interpretation with the
purpose of anomaly or hazard detection. In parallel, some maritime surveillance systems
have been developed with the peculiar purpose of finding out anomalies or hazardous
behaviours.
1.1.3 Maritime cyber-threat and cybersecurity
Since the inception of digital global networks, new threats have arisen as well, and the
means to provide and ensure security of digital communications is the cybersecurity.
This term covers all the policies, laws, tools, concepts for security in a digital environ-
ment, as well as the risk management systems, the risk mitigation practices, and all kinds
of action, good practices and technologies usable to protect people, electronic components
or larger organisations like businesses or states from harm from a cyber source.
Each day in the World, 144 billion e-mails are sent, each second 30 Gb of data are
generated, and information systems are now key elements of the World economy. On the
one hand this data carry innovative concepts and new opportunities, on the other hand
they represent a target and are responsible for new threats.
In 2014, the worldwide cost of cybercriminality was about 445 billion US$, and the
protection must be put in place to prevent any harms on people, assets and national
interests.
Systems can undergo several kinds of threat linked to cyberactivities, such as eaves-
dropping, denial of service attacks, malwares, trojans, acute vulnerability, computer-
related crime or viruses, to the benefit of activists, vandals, spying states, thrill-seekers or
criminals, with or without financial gain. Of course, the threat will vary according to the
target, and an individual at home or a military facility will face different kinds of threat.
At the state level, France created the National Cybersecurity Agency of France (ANSSI,
for Agence nationale de la se´curite´ des syste`mes d’information), an agency ensuring the
mission of national authority security of information systems. In this respect, ANSSI is
responsible for the proposition of rules for the protection of state information systems and
for the verification of the implementation of measures adopted. As for cyber defence, it
provides a monitoring, detection, alerting and reaction feature to computer attacks, par-
ticularly on the networks of the State1. At the European level, the European Cybercrime
Centre is in charge of the coordination of the international law enforcement for computer
crime facts.
In the maritime environment, telecommunications are important as they ensure a
proper knowledge of the surroundings of a vessel, particularly in conditions where the
naked eye is not sufficient (such as night, poor weather, wide range or physical mask).
It is particularly important to make sure that the information received by the vessel is
1from www.ssi.gouv.fr/en/mission/audiences-and-activities
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genuine, and that the information sent from the vessel is properly transmitted, i.e. to the
targeted locations and untouched.
It is therefore necessary to check the genuineness of the communications between the
vessels, as their importance in the World economy is huge, and the consequences of any
incident at sea can easily be terrible, from a human, economical or environmental point
of view. Rescuing people at sea, particularly in remote location, is a difficult task, and
distress calls are mainly made from electronic messages, which is another factor to consider
maritime cybersecurity of telecommunications.
Successful recorded attacks on maritime targets are few, but with the rise of the global
cyberthreat their number is expected to rise. One of them is the attack to the Antwerp
port by hackers during a 2-year period between 2013 and 2015, when they infiltrated a
cargo-tracking system and facilitated the importation of drug in container cargo from
South America to Europe (Marin, 2014).
1.2 Research problem
1.2.1 AIS vulnerability
As seen before, at sea, various systems enable the mariners and vessel crews to be aware
of their environment, and for the coastal states to be aware of the traffic incoming, leaving
and passing by, as well as being able to know where is located every single vessel bearing
its pavilion. One of those systems, the Automatic Identification System, was put in place
by the IMO at the beginning of the 2000’s (IMO, 2004). Albeit officially designed for
security purposes and anti-collision, the system, very powerful vector of knowledge on
vessel identity, vessel characteristics and vessel navigation with its numerous features, be-
came a tool used by on-shore bodies (ship owners, but also coastal states and surveillance
centres) as a control, surveillance and decision-support tool. The development of satellite
technology later enabled online websites to provide a picture of the worldwide maritime
traffic in near-real-time, as data sent remotely from any coast is stored in the satellite
and downloaded to coastal stations once the satellite reaches it.
The AIS system, despite its importance in maritime anti-collision awareness, is weakly
secured, and bad quality data have been demonstrated, such as error in the messages, data
falsification and data spoofing (Ray et al., 2015), with particular cases demonstrated such
as identity theft (The Maritime Executive, 2012b), disappearances (Windward, 2014), the
broadcast of false GNSS coordinates, the statement of a wrong activity (Katsilieris et al.,
2013), or the ex nihilo creation of made-up AIS messages (Balduzzi, Pasta, et al., 2014)
as shown in Figure 1.1. Those activities are performed with the purpose of misleading the
outer world and crews at sea, by the concealing of actual location, movements, activities,
the creation of ghost and fake objects, vessels, false closest point of approach triggers or
false emergency messages. According to a study done by (Harati-Mokhtari et al., 2007),
it is estimated that circa 1% of the vessel voluntarily broadcast falsified or concealed data.
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Figure 1.1: Spoofing case: ex nihilo creation of a trajectory, from (Balduzzi, Wilhoit,
et al., 2014)
1.2.2 Associated risk assessment for decision-making
As seen before, MRCCs are in charge of the monitoring of coastal navigation, the surveil-
lance of behaviours and the commitment of rescuing units, with the managements of
engaged means. In order to properly monitor the maritime traffic, those workers need to
have a clear understanding of what is happening at sea. Nowadays, the communication
systems enable several systems to be used, AIS, LRIT and radar, amongst others, provide
pieces of information to the workers, enabling them to assess the situation, judge the level
of risk associated with a given situation and mobilise the proper amount of people and
means to a given case, ensuring that several problems can be treated at the same time
by people and means management. However, those actions need a good maritime picture
to be taken properly. A distorted view of what is happening at sea can imply a poor
management of people and means, potentially leading to harmful situations.
In this scope, it is particularly important to assess maritime information in order to
check its genuineness and assist the decision-making process, so that the right amount of
people and means is used for each mission.
1.3 Hypotheses and objectives
In order to work on this research problem, some postulates are stated:
Postulate 1: The AIS does not carry perfectly genuine data, falsifications have been
proved.
Several cases have been reported in the literature and presented before, demonstrating
that the system has failures and can display non-genuine data, either voluntarily broadcast
or not.
Postulate 2: AIS falsifications are owed to human beings, are non-perfect and there-
fore are detectable.
A perfect falsification is not detectable, as it would pass through all integrity assessment
27
checks, however, it would require a tremendous mastering of the AIS and other systems
with which cross-checks can be performed.
Postulate 3: AIS errors and falsifications can have an impact on real-life.
The fact to emit false information, on purpose or by carelessness, can impact real-life
as other people or automatic tools receiving and processing this information might take
erroneous or biased ranging from the bad management of goods to the accident with
pollution or risks on human life.
In addition to postulates, hypotheses are set:
Hypothesis 1: A data integrity assessment, made possible by the existence of anoma-
lies, allows for the assessment of a message and of its data
Hypothesis 2: It is necessary to process analyses of all sorts on messages, in order
to detect anomalies of all sorts, without restricting oneself to spatial temporal messages
and spatial analyses.
Hypothesis 3: An anomaly detection of the system enables the assessment of the
risks associated to the field of study
Objectives: This thesis aims to answer these hypotheses by defining a methodology
for AIS data analysis incorporating a thorough assessment of the messages themselves
and an assessment of the maritime risks that can emerge because of the errors, anomalies
and falsifications that are present in the system. It is therefore necessary to model the
system and its possible errors and falsifications, to consider data processing and data
management in non-fully reliable data, to distinguish the true from the false in a data
stream and to assess the associated risks. All these objectives imply the fact to create an
information system for the management of uncertain data.
1.4 Research agenda
Although independent from other maritime surveillance tools, this work is inspired by
several common roots with other studies, with an operational purpose. The general
methodology is presented in Figure 1.2, in which can be seen the workflow derived from
the literature and selected points of interest.
First, a state-of-the-art study was performed in the scientific fields that are connex
to our interests, such as the notion of data, the notion of information, the typologies,
the ontologies, the maritime domain in general and the maritime domain security in
particular, the risk level determination and the anomaly detection.
This bibliographic step enabled the understanding of the research context in which
this thesis takes place, and to define hypotheses and objectives for the research problem,
refined by a thorough analysis of the AIS system performed in parallel. This first step led
to the second year admission committee, where the work was assessed and criticised.
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Figure 1.2: Activity diagram of the thesis
During the second year, a system for data assessment was designed, based on the
structure of AIS data and on the state-of-the-art bibliographic survey performed, that
underlined the use of data quality dimensions. Therefore, such dimensions were applied
to the peculiarities of AIS data, with the support of AIS specification and actual AIS data
received in the Brest antenna. This system was presented at the third year admission
committee, where it was evaluated and criticised.
During the third year, after the validation of the model by the committee, the model
was implemented in a prototype which uses AIS data as input and provides a risk level
assessment for several designated risks as output. The prototype uses Python language
and SQL language for the database queries of the Postgres/Postgis AIS database, extended
with some non-AIS data.
1.5 Document layout
In this first introducing chapter, we presented the applicative context of this thesis which
is the maritime domain awareness, and enabled us to understand the current limitations
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of this awareness due to the weaknesses of the Automatic Identification System. The
chapter 2 is a state-of-the art study of the concepts of data, information, the data quality
dimensions, the data formalisation methods and the knowledge discovery methods. Then
the chapter 3 is also a state-of-the-art chapter, but concentrating on the AIS.
Then the chapter 4 presents our proposition for the integrity assessment of AIS mes-
sages, in a formal methodology leading to the assessment of messages with respect to
falsification cases. Chapter 5 presents the implementation of this proposed methodology
in a program using real AIS data as study base, and finally chapter 6 treats the no-
tion of maritime risks, and more particularly the relationships between the results of the
data integrity assessment presented in chapter 4 and the associated risks for maritime
navigation.
Eventually in the conclusion we precise the contributions of our thesis to the domain
of maritime awareness and provide some prospects and perspective about it.
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Chapter 2
Data integrity assessment for
anomalous event detection
Chapitre 2 : E´valuation de l’inte´grite´ de la donne´e
pour la de´tection d’e´ve`nements constituant des anoma-
lies
Dans ce chapitre, des notions lie´es a` la de´tection d’anomalie sont pre´sente´es. En premier
lieu, les notions de donne´e et d’information, depuis la science de l’information jusqu’aux
dimensions de qualite´ de la donne´e, ouvrant la voie a` la de´couverte de connaissances et
a` la de´tection d’e´ve`nements a` l’aide de me´thodes de formalisation de la connaissance.
C’est dans ce domaine que l’on trouve la de´tection d’anomalies e´tant donne´ que la for-
malisation de connaissances est utilise´e, couple´e a` des me´triques pour e´valuer la nature
des informations donne´es a` l’analyse.
Aujourd’hui, la donne´e prend une place centrale dans nos socie´te´s, ou` le nume´rique
s’impose. Les volumes de donne´es augmentant, il a fallu faire face a` la gestion de volumes
de donne´es massives, appele´es me´gadonne´es. Traditionnellement, quatre caracte´ristiques
sont associe´es aux me´gadonne´es : le volume, la ve´locite´, la varie´te´ et la ve´racite´, le
volume e´tant en lien avec la quantite´ de donne´es a` traiter, la ve´locite´ repre´sentant la
capacite´ a` rassembler et a` traiter les donne´es, la varie´te´ couvrant les diverses formes que
peuvent prendre les donne´es (image, texte, signal par exemple) et la ve´racite´ te´moignant
du rapport au monde de la donne´e, de sa capacite´ a` correctement caracte´riser l’e´tat de
l’objet de´crit.
Dans la qualite´ de la donne´e, deux grandes familles peuvent eˆtre de´crites : la qualite´
interne qui est une qualite´ technique et absolue, permettant de de´terminer la qualite´
intrinse`que de la donne´e, et la qualite´ externe qui repre´sente l’ade´quation de la donne´e
a` l’utilisation qui en est faite, qui est donc relative e´tant donne´ qu’elle de´pend du milieu
d’e´tude. Diffe´rentes dimensions de la qualite´ des donne´es ont e´te´ se´lectionne´es pour
leur ade´quation a` notre e´tude, il s’agit de la justesse, de la pre´cision, de la fiabilite´, de
l’actualite´, de la comple´tude, de la cohe´rence et de l’inte´grite´.
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La de´tection d’anomalies s’effectue en trois e´tapes principales qui sont l’identification
des caracte´ristiques et des comportements re´currents, la de´termination de me´triques pour
le calcul de distance a` cette normalite´ et la de´termination de crite`res de seuillage pour
discriminer la normalite´ de l’anomalie. Les me´triques sont nombreuses et doivent eˆtre
adapte´es au type d’e´tude en question, ainsi, des distances de Minkowski peuvent eˆtre
utilise´es, ainsi que des distances moyennes, de Fre´chet ou de Hausdorff pour les trajectoires
spatio-temporelles, ou des distances d’e´dition pour des valeurs textuelles. Des mesures de
similarite´s peuvent e´galement eˆtre utilise´es a` cet effet.
Diverses me´thodes de formalisation des donne´es sont utilisables : les typologies per-
mettent d’e´tudier un domaine complexe en le subdivisant en sous-parties constitutives
mutuellement exclusives et collectivement exhaustives. En classifiant les objets d’une
grande classe me`re par rapport a` leurs caracte´ristiques, il est alors possible d’appliquer
des traitements similaires aux objets pre´sentant des catacte´ristiques similaires. Les on-
tologies enrichissent les typologies par les liens qui unissent diverses classes d’objets,
l’usage d’un moteur d’infe´rence permettant alors d’en faire ressortir les re`gles. Enfin, la
logique de description permet la repre´sentation des rapports entre des individus d’apre`s
une approche de´terministe ou` les concepts et les roˆles ont une description structure´e.
Introduction
In this chapter, notions related to tools for anomaly detection are displayed. In particular,
the notions of data and information, starting from information science all the way to the
data quality dimensions, that drive the path to knowledge discovery and to event detection
with a proper knowledge formalisation. Anomaly detection lies within this range as it uses
knowledge formalisation, enhanced by metrics to assess the nature of pieces of information.
The first section of this chapter is dedicated to integrity as a data quality dimension and to
information-related concepts, the second section is about anomalous events and anomaly
detection, the third part about knowledge formalisation methods and the last one about
knowledge discovery methods.
2.1 Integrity in the scope of data and information
concepts
This section focuses on the concepts of data and information, and in particular on the
importance of integrity as a data quality dimension that could be used for further data
assessments. First, the information side is deepened, with presentation of notions such as
information science and information theory. Further developments are done on the notion
of information coherence and on the trust in information. Then, developments on data
are presented, on the importance of data in modern-world societies, on the importance of
data quality and on the definition of dimensions with the purpose of describing the quality
of data. The determination of the quality of data is being done through data quality
dimensions, amongst which integrity has to be discriminated as particularly important.
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2.1.1 From the concept of information to information science
In this first section a focus is done on information, with etymological background and dic-
tionary definition, leading to a common sense perspective presentation. Communication
is then distinguished from information in the fact that communication is interested in the
link between the sender and the receiver, while information is raw. The various media
that can support information are then displayed, before an introduction to information
science with its story, its processes and its aspects.
2.1.1.1 Etymology
The word information comes from the Latin word informatio, onis, f. According to
(Gaffiot, Fe´lix, 1934), this word has two meanings:
1. Draw, sketch
2. Idea, design ; representation of an idea by the representation of a word ;
explanation of the meaning of a word by its etymology
In this latin word, we can see that the meanings put the stress on the idea of conveying
facts by drawing, sketching or describing, rather than embodying the proper facts, as the
word “information” does.
It must be noticed that the verb informo, as, are, avi, atum, also exists, but its
meanings: “to shape, to model, to describe” (Gaffiot, Fe´lix, 1934), do not differ so much
from the “informatio, onis” ones.
2.1.1.2 Definition
The word information, according to (Oxford, 1989), has two meanings:
1. Informing or being informed
2. (on/about sb/sth) facts told, heard or discovered (about sb/sth)
The dictionary also puts a definition of information science: “Study or use of processes
(esp. computers, telecommunications, etc) for storing, retrieving and sending information
of all kinds (e.g. words, numbers, pictures).”
The definition of the word is very simple, however, it covers a large amount of concepts,
presented hereinafter.
In general, information can be considered as being both the proper message to com-
municate and the symbols used for this communication to be understandable. The code
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used does carry a meaning, and this code is composed of letters, numerals, ideograms or
pictograms. Put together, elements of this code form sentences which interpretation is
left to the receiver. The context influences the way information is understood. A direct
implication is that the interpretation of information is unique to each person, despite the
fact that the piece of information is the same. Without the context, it only represents the
vector of data (as shown hereinafter in the theory of information). Information can both
be built, like a book, or self-made, as light is. Information is a means of organisation in
our human societies.
2.1.1.3 Discrimination between information and communication
On the one hand, generally speaking, information is only a part of general communication,
and that is why misunderstandings are so common in human interactions (Lautier, 2007).
On the other hand, the fact that information was for a long time rare and difficult to
spread put together the notions of information and communication. But the development
of technological means of communication, from the rotary press in the nineteenth century
to the Internet boom in the early twenty-first century, progressively reduced the time
between the production and the consumption of information, favouring the creation of
more information, mainly quantitatively.
Communication is interested in the relationship between the provider and the re-
ceiver, whereas information itself is only the raw juxtaposition of mutually intelligible
signs (Wolton, 2004).
Several means of communication can convey the same idea, those means having a very
wide range of length, quality and complexity. For instance, the same information can take
up one or several pages of a newspaper, 5 minutes in a news broadcast on television, one
article on the Internet and a given amount of signs in a tweet (140 as of 2017). Whereas
the antique ways of communication were efficient because of the difficulties to convey
information, the new ways of communication, far more easy, allow almost everyone to
communicate on almost every topic of its interest, and are therefore less efficient, the ratio
of brand new information (from the receiver point of view) having radically diminished.
As shown in the Introduction, the AIS messages are broadcast using VHF radio signals
that can be falsified or spoofed. The nature of the falsification or spoofing relies on the
medium, in this case an electromagnetic wave, but the deep nature of the action of falsify
does not rely on a sole medium, and specific ways to falsify information were developed
for previous media, are currently used for present-time media and will be developed for
the future media.
2.1.1.4 The information science
The information science finds its genesis in the important phenomenon of the transgression
of the limits of the traditional subjects of research. As some of the new work was done
by researchers who were external to the proper field, collaboration between scientists has
become necessary, leading to mutual enrichment and the sharing of a common goal: to
ease the improvement of knowledge and the evolution of humankind.
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After the second World War, the automation of research tools led to the creation of
the idea of finding the right document whenever needed. This encouraged the creation
of new methods of documentation, notably with the creation of the key-word (Fondin,
2005). In these years, with the beginnings of computer science, the scientific and technique
information increased dramatically.
The first definition of information science was proposed in a lecture organised by the
United States’ Georgia Institute of Technology, in 1961, which stated that: “Information
Science is a science that investigates the properties and the behaviour of information and
the means of processing information for optimum accessibility and usability. The processes
include the organisation, dissemination, collection, storage, retrieval, interpretation and
use of information”.
(Dragulanescu, 2003) proposed a model in three fundamental cyclic processes: the
construction of information, the process of information and the use of information. In
this paradigm, the construction of information aims to obtain or generate information and
to generate its supporting media, the process of information aims to obtain added value
from the information to the user and the use of information aims to spread and make use
of information the most usefully possible, in order to turn it into knowledge.
The current fields of research on information science are various. These domains were
divided by (Dragulanescu, 2003) into the seven categories, that can be then gathered in
three main categories: computer science (CS), human science (HS) and library science
(LS). Those seven categories are presented in the list hereafter with their corresponding
main characteristics.
• The need of information, the way information is used and spreads (LS)
• The structure of signs and their working in the communication processes, the lan-
guages and their automated or not analysis (HS)
• The classification, indexation and document analysis systems, the computer as a
storing machine, the structure of databases and the computerisation of libraries
(LS)
• The analysis and evaluation of the operations involving information (CS)
• The recognition of signs, analysis of speech and images, artificial intelligence and
signal compression (CS)
• The economic, legal and social aspects of information (HS)
• The instruction and the professions of information (HS)
In this frame, a model of information science similar to a Greek temple was proposed,
including the infrastructure of information science (the base), the instruments of the
proper language (the columns) and the effects expected (the roof).
The concept of documentation was a trending topic between the 1950’s and the 1980’s,
and became far less important with the wide diffusion of computers and the presence of
35
the Internet in many households. However, this situation could change, and the docu-
mentation aspect could become significant again with the forecast development of the
semantic web.
The information science gives priority to the practical and technical approaches of the
information transmission whereas communication science puts the stress on the speech
enunciation and the construction of information by the media. There are currently neither
strict boundaries to this subject nor consensus on its structure.
However, all the aspects of the concept of information are not studied by information
science, particularly those used by the mathematicians in the frame of the information
theory, which is the subject of the section 2.1.2.
2.1.2 Information theory
Mostly, the information theory refers to the theory developed by Claude Shannon in
(Shannon, 1948). His theory is a probabilistic theory enabling its user to quantify the
mean information content of a group of messages, when the computer code follows a given
statistic distribution.
In this theory, only mathematical and communication aspects matter, the form or
the cognitive content is ignored. Originally, the goal of this theory was to transmit
information, the faster and the safer way possible, by developing methods in order to
minimise the probability of error in the message recognition. It was then necessary to
put forward the notion of information measuring, from a mathematical point of view. His
postulate is that information has basically a mainly random nature, so there is a part of
uncertainty. It is this uncertainty which is taken as an indication of information. Notions
of information and uncertainty are combined, in this frame the more a piece of information
is uncertain, the more it is interesting in the frame of information theory-based studies.
The reasoning is done in a probabilistic point of view: a certain event holds no inner
information.
The measurement of the entropy of information for subadditivity is done using the for-
mula H = −p · log(p). The logarithmic measure is used because of its better convenience:
it is more useful (parameters tend to increase in ratio with the logarithm of the number
of possibilities), it is more intuitive and more suitable from a mathematical point of view.
The choice of the base of the logarithm depends on the utilisation: in computer science,
as binary digits are used, the base 2 is used whereas when decimal digits are used the
base 10 should be used.
A way to measure how uncertain is the outcome of an experiment, the notion of entropy
can be introduced. Having a set of n possible events of which probabilities are p1 . . . pn, the
entropy H would be computed as: H = −K ·∑ni=1 pi · log(pi), where K is the Boltzmann’s
constant, expressed in m2 · kg · s−2 ·K−1 in physical systems and normalised to 1
ln(2)
Sh in
information systems taking the logarithm base 2 and normalised to 1 nat in information
systems taking the natural logarithm. The higher the entropy is, the bigger the disorder
will be, obtained for a uniform distribution. Similarly, a well-known phenomenon would
have a close-to-zero entropy.
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A communication system as described in (Shannon, 1948) is made of five components:
• An information source: the message is produced here, it can be a sequence of letters,
a single function of time, a function of time and other variables, functions of several
variables, and various combinations signals.
• A transmitter, which takes the message from the information source and transforms
it into a signal suitable for a transmission by the channel.
• The channel, which is the medium of transmission. It can be a wire, a cable, a radio
frequency, a beam of light . . . .
• The receiver undoes the work of the transmitter, turning the signal into the message.
• The destination, which is the final operator, for whom the initial message is intended.
In a complete assessment of information, all parts of the information system must be
treated.
2.1.3 Information coherence
A common definition of coherence is presented in (Hartmann and Bovens, 2001) as “when
we gather information from less than fully reliable sources, then the more coherent the
story that materialises is, the more confident we may be, ceteris paribus”.
Some factors can affect the confidence we have in a piece of information. Three can
be distinguished: how surprising is the information, how reliable are the sources and
how coherent is the information (Hartmann and Bovens, 2001). For instance, if pieces
of information are both halfway surprising and halfway coherent, the global confidence
will rely on the reliability of the sources: we will be more likely to increase our degree
of confidence as the source is more referenced as truth-teller rather than randomiser.
Similarly, if the pieces of information are halfway coherent and come from halfway reliable
sources, we will rely on the surprise factor in order to assess the degree of confidence, which
will be as high as the piece of information is more rather than less expected.
As the construction of a model to define measures of expectance and reliability is quite
easy, it is far more complex to do it for coherence, as a quantitative measure of coherence
does not exist as such. In (Hartmann and Bovens, 2001), a measure of partial coherence
between information sets was defined, as well as for the first two factors.
The expectance measure is directly linked with the prior joint probability of the propo-
sitions, which is lower for less expected information and higher for more expected infor-
mation.
The reliability measure is directly linked with the likelihood ratio q
p
, p being the prob-
ability for a proposition for being true and q the probability for the same proposition to
be false. p = q in the case of randomiser and q = 0 in the case of truth-tellers. The
reliability can be defined as r = 1 − q
p
, being minimal for randomisers and maximal for
truth-tellers.
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The coherence measure is far more complex. S and S ′ being two information sets, S
is more coherent than S ′ if and only if fx(S, S ′) > 0, x ranging from 0 to 1, and fx(S, S ′)
being a difference function built as fx(S) = cx(S)− cx(S ′), x ranging from 0 to 1. Cx(S)
is a measure of the coherence of the set of information S with respect to a similar set in
which coherence of information would have been maximal. So cx(S) is a rate, defined as
cx(S) = cx(R1 . . . Rn) =
P ·(R1...Rn)
Pmax·(R1...Rn) = a0 + a0 · xn∑ni=0 ai·xn , where Ri is the ith proposition,
n is the number of propositions, ai is the joint probability of all combinations of the values
of the n R variables to have i negative and n− i positive values.
Another point of view of the information coherence concept is presented in (T. Wang et
al., 2010), where it is defined as following: “Coherence is a stationary process analog to the
traditional correlation coefficient, taking values between 0 and 1 at any given frequency”.
Coherence is seen as a measure of the linear dependence of two processes at a given
frequency. If it is equal to zero, it means that one process cannot be used to predict
linearly the other. If it is equal to one, it means that one process allows a full linear
prediction of the other one. A significant over-zero value means an association between
the two processes. However, coherence can be inadequate to measure a general association,
because it can be equal to zero when two series are related actually. This does not occur
for the coefficient of mutual information. The latter takes the value zero if, and only
if, two variables are statistically independent. This concept was introduced by Shannon
(Shannon, 1948), and consists of the amount of information that a random variable has
with respect to another random variable. Another model, called Lin-Lin model, allows an
identification of a causal linear relationship between two sequences of events. The causal
part was not supported by the previous methods.
Those three methods, pure coherence, mutual information and Lin-Lin are mathemat-
ically developed and compared in (T. Wang et al., 2010). As a result, it can be seen that
coherence is useful as a diagnostic process in order to detect associations when is con-
sidered the problem to whether or not a output series can be predicted through a linear
relation from an input series. Mutual information calculates the strength of the correla-
tion parameter between two series, independently from any statistical point of view. It
forms a test of dependence. The Lin-Lin model offers the possibility to determinate, be-
tween two processes, which one is driven by the other one, or if they are mutually driven,
or if they are both driven by some other process.
A subjective logic view for the coherence of information as seen in (Ceolin et al.,
2013) can be divided in four main components: belief, disbelief, uncertainty and a priori.
Belief value represents how much the statement is true, disbelief value summarises how
much the statement is false, uncertainty quantifies the correctness or the truthfulness of a
given statement, a priori represents the prior bias that the source has against one of the
possible outcomes. An a priori value close to zero means higher bias towards disbelief
and an a priori value close to one means higher bias towards belief. Generally speaking,
the uncertainty increases as the belief and disbelief decrease, however, in case the source
is known as being non reliable or potentially malicious, another operator (ad hoc, defined
by the user) can be used, which increases the disbelief rather than the uncertainty.
Another branch of the information coherence field is the developments on Scott infor-
mation systems (Scott, 1982), in which coherence of information is evaluated in (Karada´is,
2013). This is a part of the domain theory.
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2.1.4 Trust in information
Before the discussion about trust in information, trust in itself is assessed in the first
place, then, as information come from sources, and as it is an important subject since the
rise of computer science rose new concerns about it, the particular trust in information
sources is developed, with an additional part on the perception of trust in information
technology.
2.1.4.1 General considerations on trust
Trust is a widespread word, and can mean several things according to the point of view
of the user. However, trust was identified as playing a key role in capital investment,
sales, relationships, cross-cultural communication, cooperation and learning (Blomqvist,
1997). In this scope, trust as a part of human interaction can be considered as one of
its basic variables. However, a general conception of trust is hard to establish, because
of the number of disciplines in which trust is studied, each one defining it from its own
scope. (Blomqvist, 1997) develops the way different disciplines such as social psychology,
philosophy, economics, contract law and marketing perceive and study trust.
As stated in (Denize and Young, 2007), in the process of communication and decision
making, trust is thoroughly embedded. It gives people the possibility to open one’s mind to
others, and both develop personal and professional relationships. In human relationships,
trust plays a key role, as it includes a kind of calculation of benefits, costs and risks for a
given situation.
The concepts which are close with trust are as various as credibility, sincerity, com-
petence, confidence, faith, hope, loyalty or reliance (Blomqvist, 1997). In addition, trust
being considered as both a social and a psychological phenomenon, is located on four
levels: individual, interpersonal, relational and societal (Kelton et al., 2008).
On trust, as a whole, one can say that there is no clear definition of trust, as it must
be put into a context. Economists see it on rational points, philosophers adopt a more
attitudinal and ethical point of view, whereas social phycologists emphasise inter-personal
aspects. Generally speaking, trust is necessary to be trusted, and is critical to form and
maintain relationships. However, trust remains personal, and the scale of trustworthiness
of people can vary a lot from one person to another, the extreme examples being the naive
people, willing to trust and believe anyone on any subject, and the paranoiac people, who
are not willing to trust anyone.
2.1.4.2 Trust in sources of information
The notion of trust in the information source is important, as people demonstrate a lot of
attention on the trustworthiness of the different sources. Those sources can be a document
(oral or written), humans or virtual, easy or hard to access. The sources can also be first-
hand or be recommended by acquaintances. The simple access to the source is not enough
to assess trustworthiness, the way in which people access the sources must enable them
to assess its trustworthiness, because people need to form an opinion about the source
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(Hertzum et al., 2002). If the user cannot get information about the source, an absence
of trust or even distrust can appear.
With the development of computers and services attached like the World Wide Web,
people rely more and more on the Internet in order to find information. One can find
abundant information about a wide range of subjects, and the Internet is generally consid-
ered as a vast library in which the modern societies are more and more dependent. On the
Internet, a lot of information is available and sometimes some pieces of information hold
contradictory opinions with respect to other pieces of information about the same topic.
So people have to seek for hints to assess the trustworthiness of online information. They
will treat in different ways the message they feel coming from a person who have a strong
social relationship in the place where the message is written rather than the message
written by a person they feel having a weak social relationship (Pan and Chiou, 2011).
The perception of positive and negative messages also varies depending on their kind.
Ceteris paribus, a negative message tends to affect more strongly the information-seeker
than a positive message does. So when seen on an online opinion platform, costumers
trust negative information more than positive information (Pan and Chiou, 2011). How-
ever, the overall trust in information provided by other consumers will positively affect
the attitude of the consumer toward the product, in the positive or negative way.
As there are different kinds of goods, the consumer will not react the same way. Ex-
perience goods and credence goods are compared in (Pan and Chiou, 2011), the latter
having a weaker strength of the relationship between the statements (positive or nega-
tive) and the attitude for the consumer than the experience goods. Experience goods
being characterised by attributes that cannot be determined before the purchasing, and
credence goods are characterised by attributes that cannot be stated by the consumer
(for instance education). Another category is search goods, which attributes can be fully
determined before the purchasing. The purchasing of credence good is seen riskier than
the purchasing of search or experience goods, because of the lack of knowledge and the
lack of capacity for the evaluation of information attributed to these goods. When fac-
ing a risky situation, consumers will be conservative towards the online information they
receive and hence the effects of the use of this information is more important for search
and experience goods than for credence goods.
An example of application is given in (Frewer et al., 1996), where the trust in infor-
mation given about food-related hazards is compared: if sources are seen as self-serving
or biased, the pieces of information they provide will not be trusted. So the source
characteristics are important because the attitude of the receiver towards the source and
towards information provided will change. In this study, two dimensions have emerged as
being important for the trust determination: the competence, so the level of expertise in
the proper subject, and the trustworthiness, so the degree in which will the speaker be
truthful (Coste´ et al., 2016).
In (Frewer et al., 1996) it appears that trust is linked with perceptions of knowledge,
accuracy, and concern towards public welfare. Surprisingly, expertise and freedom do not
convey trust on their own. It also appears that distrust is associated with the source being
a provider of erroneous information and a perception of deliberate information distortion.
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2.1.4.3 The perception of trust in information technology
Trust is an intuitive notion for a man in his everyday life. Manifestations of trust happen
very often, but are actually noticed only when trust starts to lack. Its nature consists of
the tension felt by someone about another person or technical device to ensure oneself of
the performance of the other.
Table 2.1 lists the characteristics of trust and matches each one with the corresponding
characteristic in the field of trust in information.
Component Trust Trust in Information
Preconditions Uncertainty Lack of standards and controls
Vulnerability Potential harm from using poor information
Dependence Decisions, knowledge, writing
Development processes Prediction Experience with source
Attribution Confirmation with multiple sources
Bonding Evocation of emotional response
Reputation Authority, certification, reviews, references
Identification Resonance with style, arguments, objectives
Trustworthiness Competence Accuracy, currency, coverage, believability
Positive intentions Objectivity
Ethics Validity
Predictability Stability
Influences Propensity Disposition to Information
Context Relevance
Social Trust Recommendations
Elements Confidence Confidence, reliability, validity
Willingness Freedom to accept or discard information
Table 2.1: A framework for trust and information, from (Kelton et al., 2008)
With the development of digital technologies, people rely more and more on informa-
tion given by electronic devices, and behave towards them in a way close, but not similar
to, the one they would have behaved with another human being.
A person and an information technology can both act in predictable and consistent
ways. But for a person, it can be added that its behaviour is reliable, predictable or easily
forecast, whereas for an information technology, the system is predictable (by its nature)
and operates reliably, i.e. doing what needs to be done without unreasonable delays,
crashing or unexpected results (McKnight, 2005). As the capability is a common point,
the willingness is only for humans.
For the fundamental preconditions of trust, which are uncertainty, vulnerability and
dependence, trust in information matches the lack of standards and controls (leading to
uncertainty of the source), the potential harm from using poor information (leading to
vulnerability) and decisions and knowledge, which are equivalent to dependence. In the
trustworthiness part, predictability is linked to the stability of the information, and the
positive intentions in human relationship matches the objectivity of the trust in informa-
tion. In another scope, propensity to trust is equivalent to disposition to information and
the freedom to accept or discard information twins the willingness to trust.
2.1.5 Data in our societies
Data holds a central place nowadays, as computer science technology enabled the acquisi-
tion, storage and processing of tremendous amounts of data. Data is widespread and thus
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used in almost every aspect of our lives. In addition, the development of numeric devices
had created even more data, at a point where traditional methods (used for analog data)
could no longer be used. This phenomenon, called Big Data, changed the perception and
the modelling of data processing. In this section, the different uses of data are displayed
and an overview on Big Data issues is presented.
2.1.5.1 Etymology
The word data comes from the Latin word datum, i, n. According to (Gaffiot, Fe´lix,
1934), it is mainly used in the plural form (i.e. data) and means gifts, present. Its
meaning mainly stems from the verb do, das, dare, dedi, datum, which meanings are
numerous but is mainly used as “to give”. It is its supine form that led to the current
name.
2.1.5.2 Use of data
With the development of computer science, human societies rely more and more on data
stored in and manipulated in or by computers. As there is no clear definition of the word
data, it is not easy to define clearly what this word stands for. There are several fields in
which the word data is used, in which the word has its proper meaning.
For the determination of the relevance of each proposition of definition for trust, several
criteria must be assessed. (Fox et al., 1994) determined a number of six criteria, three
linguistic and three of usefulness, hereafter listed, about what data must be:
• Clear and simple, which is required for a good definition
• Should not mention information, in order to avoid a circular definition
• Agree with the common usage, so be coherent with the common idea of what data
is
• Approach both conceptual and representational facets of data
• Widely applicable, the range of data to which the approach can apply should be
wise, especially concerning databases
• Quality dimensions, suggestions of important dimensions for the quality of data
One possibility is to follow the Latin etymology and define data as a set of facts.
However, a fact is something that actually occurs, and is true by nature. Such a definition
would lead to consider data as being indisputably true. So data cannot, in the scope of
(Fox et al., 1994), be considered as a set of facts, but only that data is about facts.
Another approach tends to consider data as being the result of an observation or a
measurement. Observation and measurement are doubtlessly important sources of data,
however must also be considered data acquired by other ways such as assignment methods
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(for instance the name or the phone number are data assigned to people, and neither
observed nor measured). So data cannot be reduced to the means used to get it.
Another way to consider data is to define it as the raw material from which, once
refined, information is extracted. This point of view puts the problem of the circular
definition between data and information. Moreover, it is not clear whether to consider
where data stops and where the information begins, and what is the process that enables
one to turn into the other one.
A common way to consider data in databases is to define classes. Those classes can have
links with others, and contain entities (e) which have attributes (a). Those attributes have
a value (v), and it is the triplet value-attribute-entity (v− a− e) which can be considered
as data. However, the value of an attribute of an entity is not strictly speaking a datum.
A representation of data must be settled in order to standardise the possible input, as
the same datum can be represented in various forms. Alongside with the representation
of data, the recording of data is crucial to keep a record of it.
In this scope, data is defined by (Fox et al., 1994) as being triplets of value-attribute-
elements with recording and representation clearly defined.
2.1.5.3 On big data
Big Data is a concept that has emerged in the late 90’s, forecasting the stored information
explosion of the 2000’s, which is on-going in the 2010’s, and which is due to the devel-
opment of digital storage capabilities through servers, CDs and hard disks, with respect
to analog storage. As the processing of this data became interesting, ad hoc methods
needed to be implemented, as the traditional ones no longer worked with such an amount
of data. In a nutshell, “Big Data can be seen as all information that cannot be handled
with traditional techniques and hardware” (M. Chen et al., 2014).
2.1.5.3.1 The properties of Big Data Traditionally, four properties are associated
with Big Data, which are called the four V’s: Volume, Velocity, Variety and Veracity. The
Volume is in relation with the amount of data to be handled, for instance, it is estimated
that companies like Walmart collects more than 2.5 petabytes of data per day from their
customers, and the total amount of data created each day overcomes the exabyte (McAfee
and Brynjolfsson, 2012). The Velocity is the gathering and processing effectiveness, as
the velocity of gathering and exploiting data is even more important than the Volume, as
it is more applicative, enables researches to be done more quickly, or enable companies to
be more competitive. The Variety property covers the fact that data in Big Data takes
several forms, which can be images, text, messages, sensor data, updates on social media,
signals from networks (such as wi-fi or GPS), amongst others (McAfee and Brynjolfsson,
2012), and most of those data sources are mainly recent. The Veracity is a challenge as
it is not linked to the quality of the data but with its relation to the world. It represents
the fact for a datum to be truthful, i.e. to correctly depict the world in the way that it
is expected for it to do.
Other properties later emerged (Katal et al., 2013) (Jagadish et al., 2014), such as
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Variability (which are the inconsistencies of data flow), Complexity (which is the ability
to correlate and connect the relationships, the hierarchies and the data linkages between
data coming from various sources (Katal et al., 2013)), Value (which is the intrinsic
value of data, the value of data that can be extracted from it). Those properties are
associated with challenges, which are Scale, which is the ability to manage ever increasing
data volumes (Jagadish et al., 2014), Timeliness, which is the fact to process data real-
time, Privacy and Data Ownership concerns, as some valuable data are electronic health
records or location-based services having an unclear sharing of data. Last, visualisation
and collaboration methods must be developed properly as the end users are humans which
are only able to process little amount of refined data.
2.1.5.3.2 The challenges of Big Data The challenges of big data are numerous (M.
Chen et al., 2014) (Sagiroglu and Sinanc, 2013): data representation (as heterogeneity is
present, in type, structure, granularity, semantics, organisation) shall be efficient for an
effective data analysis; redundancy reduction and data compression, as datasets generally
display a high level of redundancy, in order to reduce the cost of storage and process-
ing, and data can be compressed to reduce the storage by orders of magnitude; data life
cycle management, in order to know if the data is up-to-date, as out-of-date data must
be discarded, for storage and computational reasons; analytical mechanism, which shall
process an amount of data (heterogeneous) in a limited amount of time; data confiden-
tiality, as some data are private information about people, or credit card numbers; energy
management, as storing, processing and transferring data will consume more and more
electrical power; expandability and scalability, as present but also future datasets must be
supported; cooperation, as the harvest of interesting data may require the simultaneous
work of experts in different fields (Claramunt et al., 2017).
The technologies related to the understanding of big data are cloud computing, the
internet of things, the concept of data centres (M. Chen et al., 2014). The collection
of data can be done via log files, sensing or network data acquisition methods (such as
in the Web). Before use and for a better processing, it is better to clean data and to
remove redundancies. According to (Franke et al., 2015), some strategies for Big Data
analysis are data wrangling (which is the fact to handle data in a convenient way for com-
putational tasks), visualisation, reduction of dimensionality, sparsity and regularisation,
optimisation, measuring distances, representation learning or sequential learning. Some
Data Mining techniques are presented in section 2.4.1.
2.1.5.4 From bad data and errors to quality
Bad data can be considered as a virus because one erroneous datum put into a database
at a given time will not only imply consequences on the future use of the proper database,
but as this database will be replicated, and perhaps used in dozens of other, this error
will carry on and can impact several databases in different fields (Huh et al., 1990). As
inspecting methods are not perfect, the best way to keep an healthy database is to prevent
bad data from getting into it.
Some errors can affect data. These errors are traditionally divided into two main parts:
acquisition errors and processing errors, those parts being afterwards divided in subclasses
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(Devillers, 2004). The acquisition errors can be collection or gathering errors, such as
calibration, experimental, precision errors, and the processing errors can be digitalisation,
generalisation, interpolation or format conversion errors.
At those errors can be added the errors arose from the use of data, or the misuse
of data due to a lack of understanding leading to a state of doubt for the operator,
equally called uncertainty. This uncertainty can be of four orders. In the first order, the
conceptual uncertainty is linked to the confusion during the ascertainment of an observed
reality; the second order descriptive uncertainty is linked to the lack of accuracy during
the ascertainment of the value of an attribute of an observed reality; the third order is an
location uncertainty, which is a lack of accuracy in the spatio-temporal ascertainment of
an observed reality; and the fourth order, which is a meta-uncertainty, i.e. the uncertainty
of the knowledge of the other uncertainties (i.e. the three first orders) (Devillers, 2004).
Quality can be defined as matching the requirements, a satisfaction scale for the need
of the user, and the fitness for use of all the characteristics of the product for the fulfilment
of explicit and tacit needs of the customer. So the quality of a set of data is not a unique
absolute value, but varies from one user to another.
2.1.6 Data quality and its dimensions
As data can be poor, as errors can be found in it, it is necessary to be able to define quan-
tities to describe data (so create data on data, i.e. create metadata). Those quantities,
clearly defined, enable the user to have a summary of the data considered as a whole,
so that the confidence in it can be defined according to the user’s frame and data used
with full knowledge of the facts. Those quantities are called data quality dimensions and
are introduced in this section. Notions on the assessment of the quality of data are also
presented, alongside with means for the improvement of data quality that can be used
and the problems which can be met with the use of poor quality data.
2.1.6.1 Internal and external quality
The qualities of a product can be divided in two parts, the external quality, which is
the quality from the point of view of the user and internal quality, which is the qualities
from the point of view of the supplier. External quality covers ease of use, robustness,
openness, reliability, accuracy, conformity to the expectations, among others, so external
quality can be considered as being the fitness for use. Internal quality lies on concision,
cohesion, clarity, generality and simplicity, among others (Devillers, 2004).
(R. Y. Wang and Strong, 1996) divided data quality into twenty dimensions, separated
in four categories:
• the accuracy of data: believability, accuracy, objectivity, completeness, traceability,
reputation, variety of data sources
• the relevancy of data: relevancy, timeliness, value-added, ease of operation, flexibil-
ity, approximate amount of data
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• the representation of data: interpretability, ease of understanding, concise and con-
sistent representation
• the accessibility of data: accessibility, access security and cost-effectiveness
In order to assess internal quality, a comparison must be done between two sets of
data. The first set is the set of data actually provided by the supplier and the second
set is a virtual ideal set the supplier would have produced (without any error), called the
domain of discourse. The identification of similar patterns enables the identification of the
same phenomena in the two sets. As an absolute comparison is almost impossible, some
criteria must then be chosen in order to assess the quality of data such as data genealogy,
spatial, temporal and semantic accuracy, completeness, or consistency (Devillers, 2004).
Data genealogy being the description of the history of a data, its life cycle if known, from
the acquisition or data input to its compilation with other data, and the varieties of its
current form (Certu, 2010).
For the transmission of data quality information, metadata are often used, however
their use and understanding is not easy, even for experts.
Internal quality can be described by answering the question: “how can I measure the
quality of my data and how can I signify it?” It is the intrinsic quality of a data set
established through rules. It is an absolute technical quality.
External quality can simply be defined as the fitness for use, which worth answering the
question: “what are the needs of the user on data quality and information quality and how
can I give it in order to prevent them from having an abusive use of them?”. External
quality is more difficult to assess because of the multiple and various needs, and the
purpose of linking data and their use, data producers’ concerns and users’ expectations.
External quality is the ability to fulfil a particular need, and is a relative use quality.
External quality is defined by (Pierkot et al., 2011) as “the suitability of the specifi-
cations to the user’s requirements. It is measured by the difference between the resource
wished for by the user and the resource which has actually been produced”.
It is a close concept to data relevance. On the one hand, a proper assessment of data
external quality requires some information about data usage, and on the other hand,
external quality can be defined “as the proximity between data characteristics and needs
of a user for a given application at a given time” (Pierkot et al., 2011).
In the literature, two approaches are used for an external quality assessment: the risks
of the use of inadequate data and the analysis of the use of metadata.
2.1.6.2 Quality dimensions of data
Considering an attribute a of an entity e, its standard value is v. The accuracy of a v′
value would be the degree of closeness of (v′ − a − e) with respect to (v − a − e). If the
value v′ = v, the accuracy is maximal and the value is said to be correct. As it is possible
to determine accuracy, it is also possible to determine inaccuracy, which would be the
degree of difference between the actual value and the correct value.
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One problem of the determination of accuracy is the notion of correct value. Some-
times, the correct value may not be defined in a unique way, or it can be undefined. Even
when a standard value is possible, the calculation of the accuracy may not be obvious, for
instance with the words, or the binary values. Sometimes the determination of accuracy
with numbers can cause some problems. So the quantification of accuracy or inaccuracy
of a value is a non-trivial task (Fox et al., 1994).
The precision of data does not directly refer to data but to the model in which data
is displayed. It is a measurement of the degree of detail of the classification of possible
values for data. For instance, when a temperature is measured, is the value rounded at
the unit level, or at the one-tenth of degree level; or when a height is measured, it is
using feet or inches; or when a colour scale is used, does this scale have 16 or 256 possible
values.
The reliability of data in a database is defined in (Brodie, 1980) as “a measure of the
extent to which a database can be expected to exhibit the externally-observable structural
properties specified for a database”. It is the process of validation that leads to reliability,
i.e. the checking that the values in the base obey to the rules defined in the outline. It is
a measure of robustness, which is the assessment of absence of system failures.
As for the currentness, a datum, by its nature, represents a value at a given time. As
most objects evolve with time, the value can evolve as well. A datum true at a given
time t is either up-to-date or out-of-date at another time t′. The change over time of a
value can create inaccurate out-of-date data in data, and the notion of currentness can
measure the degree of how far out-to-date the datum is (Fox et al., 1994). This property
can be expended to an entire database for the measurement of its currentness. False data
is neither up-to-date nor out-of-date.
A distinction must be done between data evolving by nature (such as the age of a
living person), data likely to evolve (such as a salary), data that may change (such as
name or address), data unlikely to change (gender or country of birth) and permanent
data (date of birth, blood type).
Given the age of a datum, the probability for it to remain up-to-date after a certain
time will depend on which category it belongs, among other parameters.
The completeness of a database represents the proportion of triplets where a value
which is supposed to exist is actually filled in. It can be seen in a binary mode, i.e. yes if
every single possible value is filled in and no otherwise; or in a measure of completeness
by measuring the fraction of filled in fields with respect to the highest possible number of
filled in fields (Fox et al., 1994).
In databases, a special element called null is used when an attribute in non-applicable
(maiden name for a male person), when the attribute is of unknown applicability (the
name of spouse field requires the marital status), or when the attribute is applicable but
the value unknown (for instance the marital status, always applicable).
Completeness is linked to the fact for a database to contain all the relevant data (Huh
et al., 1990) for a given use.
The duplication is the fact, for a database, to have identical triplets, or to have triplet
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with the same entity and attribute, but different values (Fox et al., 1994). Some of
those triplets can be irrelevant. The proportion of duplicate values can be measured as a
characteristic of the database.
In a database, the values of the different terms must agree. The consistency is part
of this agreement. A consistent database should have consistent values within, as well
as unnecessary null values should be avoided. The consistency of the database can be
measured in a binary yes/no mode, and the database will be consistent if all the constraints
are fulfilled. A measure of the consistency can also be done by the measure of the fraction
of consistent triplets in the database. The development of data dictionaries is one part of
the consistency improvement, helping to the creation of translation rules between different
representations of the same data or of closely linked data (Huh et al., 1990).
Moreover, the data can be accessible (the user can get access to the data, or not),
interpretable (understandable from a syntax and semantic point of view), useful (for a
user to be used in a decision process) and believable (R. Y. Wang, Reddy, et al., 1995).
Data integrity involves the recording of insertions, deletions and modifications of items.
The quality dimensions of external quality are different from the previous ones, are
presented in (Pierkot, 2010) and displayed as follow:
• Intrinsic quality: determination of credibility, precision, objectivity and reputation
that one can allocate to data.
• Contextual quality: verify if the data are suitable (relevance, added value) and
sufficient (completeness, data volume) for the expected use.
• Representational quality: for the notions of interoperability and understanding of
data
The last criterion is about the accessibility and the security of data. The use of
metadata for the description of the user, its work and the material the user have to work
is a perspective for improving the external quality.
2.1.6.3 Assessment of the quality
To assess the quality of a database, a method in four steps is proposed by (Huh et al.,
1990). This data tracking method provides a measurement of the quality level of the
process, a better control of the process due to the expertise about the database and
an opportunity for improvement by identifying errors and inconsistencies. The goal is to
identify the place where the error occurs in order to prevent future errors from occurring in
the same way. Indeed, only the incoming data is assessed. The assessment of data already
inside the database is made through audits of data (that can estimate error rates). The
four steps are the sampling, the tracking, the identification of errors and quality control.
The sampling is done randomly in order to reduce the total amount of data to inspect.
The tracking consists of giving a unique identification number to a field, so when the
value of this field changes it can remain tracked. The identification of errors mostly
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consists of changes in fields, which are a good indicator. The quality control consists of
the verification of statistics by a comparison with objectives. Some process modification
can be implied by the analysis of those statistics (Huh et al., 1990).
According to (R. Y. Wang, Reddy, et al., 1995), an assessment model of data quality
should take into account when sources are original or intermediate. The authenticity
and believability of data can be improved by certifications and inspections. The quality
indicators must clarify data semantics when different databases which have the same
values within do not share the same semantics. A better interpretation of null values is
also possible, in the same scope.
It is sometimes difficult to assess the quality of digital data (Gervais, 2003). Unless
physical data, digital data do not decay in a visible way, the use of remote computers
prevent the users from giving oral warning about the quality of transmitted data. This
difficulty is the source of errors, as people could choose to use an inappropriate set of
data for a given purpose without knowing if the set is actually relevant to this use. It is
a big issue for the quality of the work done on those sets of data, as the eventual quality
of work is closely linked with the quality of original data.
The problem of the ideal set of data in the comparison made to assess internal quality
is the proper definition of an ideal set. Depending on the field of work, the norms differ
and can even be inconsistent within a field. The method of data specification can be
defined by ISO norms for instance (such as ISO 8000 on data quality, ISO 19138 on data
quality measures in geographic information, ISO 19157 on data quality in geographic
information, ISO 21707 on data quality in intelligent transport systems, ISO 25012 on
data quality models in software engineering or ISO 25024 on measurement of data quality
in systems and software engineering), which tend to standardise such comparisons and
internal quality assessments.
In order to improve this assessment, some tracks can be followed (Certu, 2010). The
idea of a simplification of rules and norms can be put forward, with the risk of a weakened
control. A major problem is the lack of data specifications directly from the sources, be-
cause of lack of time, of competence, of experience, of knowledge of customs. In this case,
the solution would be to inform, train and help people in charge of those specifications by
organising trainings, writing guide books, provide technical assistance and raise awareness
among them.
So the question is also to determine if a threshold of minimum quality requirements
should be put in place for the diffusion and the use of data, potentially constrained by
law. Those threshold requirements could only be applied if an appropriate certification
body is created alongside the rules.
The data producers should understand that the quality of the data they produce is
linked to the actions built on the analysis of this data, and that erroneous data can lead
to serious repercussions, involving up to the life of people trusting this data (Certu, 2010).
The users also have a responsibility in a suitable use of data, and in the integration of the
notion of uncertainty of the data they use. In order to do so, the awareness of the users
should be raised on these problems.
What is the value of a decision based on data of which the quality is not known or
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misunderstood by the users? As this is the cornerstone of the fitness for use concept, it
is important to help the decision-maker to assess the external quality of data (Vasseur
et al., 2005).
The notion of external quality, as previously stated in section 2.1.6.1, comes from the
area of industrial production, and is defined in the world of geographical data quality
since the 1980’s as the ability of a set of intrinsic characteristics to fulfil requirements.
Few progress was made since that time and the assessment of the quality remains in the
hands of the final user, who will judge on an intuitive way, based on the experience of the
final user and on available information on the datasets, which are the metadata, which are
a common means used for the assessment of the degree of fitness for use. However, notions
of uncertainty visualisation become more and more important, being standard-based (on
ontologies) or risk-based (on decision trees).
The fitness for use is an unclear, changing and complex concept. It evolves as the
needs of the user do evolve, depending on the changing situation, and as the best quality
is reached when difference between the actual condition of the data and the need to fulfil
is minimal. Some characteristic are unclear, and depend on the people and the situation.
For instance, up to what extent can data be considered as old? The usefulness of data
is a concept which is difficult to define, as it varies from one user to another one, and a
comparison would require a common frame (Vasseur et al., 2005).
Standards, such as ISO, help in the assessment of external quality from a qualitative
as well as from a quantitative point of view. However, as those standards come from talks
and agreements between institutions (often specialised), they offer a partial and possibly
biased perception of reality.
2.1.6.4 Improvement of the quality
The quality of data is linked to the problems caused by heterogeneity in data represen-
tation, which lead to data misinterpretation. As the semantics for data is heterogeneous,
they cause quality problems to this data.
When the same information is displayed in several forms in several databases, data
quality indicators can decrease when those databases are merged because the heterogene-
ity of the semantics implies a non-matching merging, even though the data representing
the same attribute have the same absolute value.
According to (Madnick and Zhu, 2006), the heterogeneities can be representational
(i.e. the representation differs in different sources, e.g. the representation of the date, the
different currencies, the metric or imperial scale), temporal representational (i.e. a repre-
sentation that varies through time, e.g. when a country changes its currency), ontological
(i.e. when two concepts slightly different are defined by the same term), temporal onto-
logical (i.e. the meaning of a term, that can change over time), aggregational ontological
(i.e. what does a term semantic implicitly embraces, so how far should the extent of this
term go).
As the big data problematic becomes prominent in the society of information, it is
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important to assess the quality of semantics in order to improve the general data quality.
2.1.6.5 Problems with poor data quality
The poor quality of the data can be a factor of risk worsening for some activities, and
lead to disasters. As the decision one takes is based on available information, if data is of
poor quality, so are likely to be the decisions based on this data.
In industrial databases, it is estimated in (Fisher and Kingma, 2001) that error rates of
30% are common, and can go up to 75%. In a certain environment, data quality is linked
to the fitness of use, which is relative, whereas most of the characteristics are absolute.
The format presented to the user and the relevance of this data has consequences on the
value of the fitness of use. Moreover, (Agumya and Hunter, 1998) underline the strong
link existing between the acceptable risk, the fitness for use and the risk response.
Some variables can influence the use of information by decision-makers: information
overload, their experience level and time constraints. Information overload happens when
the amount of information is too important for the time available to respond. When there
is not enough time for processing the incoming data, the global quality decreases. The
variables affected are the completeness (problems of filtering), accuracy (for erroneous
responses given) and timeliness (outdated data can be entered in the base).
The experience level of the decision-maker has implications, as an experienced one
would compensate the problems on intuition based on his prior experience. They are
also more aware of the differences of quality in information they receive and deal with it
more easily. However, they tend to rely too much on their feelings on the data, and they
tend to take easily intuitive-based decisions, whereas the novices take more care of new
information, and base their argumentation on more factual elements.
Time constraints often happen when the perceived granted time for a particular task
is shorter than the time usually required. Decision-makers tend to be more selective, use
only a subset of data or simplify the rules they use to follow in normal conditions.
When people have unsuitable data, they tend to reduce the uncertainty of information,
reduce the harshness of loss in case of occurrence of an adverse impact, reduce the degree of
utilisation of this data, higher the acceptable risk by taking further risk response measures
(Agumya and Hunter, 1998).
In this section the concepts of information and data was discussed, leading to the def-
inition and assessment methods of data quality dimensions. The use of those dimensions
can be done in a study of data for various purposes. One of those purposes is the definition
of normal or nominal behaviour for data, and thus the discovery of data that might not
fit the normal, nominal or expected behaviour. Those events are called anomalies and
their definition and their detection is the purpose of the section 2.2.
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2.2 Anomalous events and anomaly detection
The anomaly detection is an important part of every data-related study. However, prior
to any study, as the assessment of an anomalous thing is a relative assessment, a normality
must be established and a distance (which is not required to be a metric) must be chosen
for distance computation and thresholding criteria must be put in place for an actual
discrimination of anomalies. This section presents the preliminary steps, some anomaly
detection methods, as well as the purposes and limits of anomaly detection.
2.2.1 Definition of an anomaly
In general, an anomaly is defined as a deviation from a norm, and by extension as a
measure of this deviation. It can be a oddity, a curiosity, an abnormal or anomalous
thing, or an exception to the rule (Roy and Davenport, 2009). From an external operator,
an anomaly will be a result which does not fulfil the frame of the results as expected by
the operator, and considered as normal by this operator.
2.2.2 An introduction to anomaly detection
The goals of methods such as data mining, machine learning or statistical analysis are to
drag all information within that are not explicitly delivered but which can nonetheless be
found with a deep analysis, enabling the discovery of knowledge. More peculiar problems
such as prediction from data, generalisation or synthesis of data can then be arisen.
Anomaly detection raises slightly different questions, and consists in a study leading to
knowledge discovery as well as to classification, class description or relations dependency
description. Then, on a dataset, the purpose is to ascertain which pieces of information
do not belong to the norm and which ones show appeal for a further deeper study.
Anomaly detection is used in a great number and diversity of contexts, from the
detection of unusual images from motionless video surveillance images to the identification
of defects in materials, including data cleaning. In the case of AIS messages, we are
interested in this last application, however in most cases, the method remains the same,
with the same elementary steps (Davidson, 2001) which are:
• The identification of the ’normality’ characteristic by computation and the deter-
mination of data classical behaviour signature
• The determination of measures for the computation of the distance from the classical
behaviour
• The determination of thresholding criteria, enabling to decide the normality, the
abnormality, the degree of normality, the degree of abnormality of a datum, with
the computation of the distance to the norm computed with the chosen measure.
For each of those steps, there is a multitude of possibilities, more or less suitable for
data analysis according to the application area to which data belong.
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The fact to find out the characteristics of data, the signature of the data, consists in the
discovery of its model, which constitutes its normality. Methods for the determination of
what is legitimate from what it is not widely varies according to data type and application
area. Similarly, criteria for the determination of whether or not a datum belongs to the
norm is peculiar to the application domain. In some cases, data in which only one variable
differs from the norm will be considered as anomalous whereas in other cases, a given
difference to the norm, even of all variables, is tolerated and the given piece of information
will not be considered as anomalous. However, it is necessary to note that the measures
used for the determination of the distance from the norm (and thus the normality or
anomalous characteristic of the datum) widely differ according to the application domain
and the type of data, and it is necessary to ever relate to this application domain for
all kinds of comparisons. Then, some exclusively numeric data will only undergo some
statistical methods or Minkowski-like distance types, whereas others will need to use,
given their non fully numeric condition, some techniques of character strings distance
measures, or on some numeric pieces of information that do not stand for a physical
quantity. A semantic metric would then be used.
2.2.3 A preliminary step to anomaly detection
The purpose of those steps is to have available an understanding of the situation, or some
pieces of information on the situation that would enable to have the more complete and
the more continuous possible view (at once in temporal continuity and in density). Those
steps are information acquisition and information fusion.
Anomaly detection largely lies on information gathering, as well as on intrinsic quality
and amount of data. A part of anomaly detection work can be done at this level, with
the finding of extreme values or non consistent data.
As different sources can disagree with each other, fusion is a challenge for correlation
and association of data coming from different sources, taking into consideration their
respective levels of confidence. Large discrepancies between sources can be considered as
an anomaly.
Moreover, the nature of input data is various, and is generally a collection of several
instances (referred as record, object, point, vector, event, pattern, case, sample, entity or
observation), each instance being represented by a set of attributes (referred as features,
dimensions or variables). The attributes themselves can be of different kind, binary,
textual, continuous, numeric representing a physical quantity, numeric representing a
choice in a given list or categoritical.
Several anomalies are distinguishable: the point anomalies, where an individual in-
stance is considered as being anomalous with respect to the rest of data; the contextual
anomalies, where an instance is not anomalous in a general assessment but which becomes
anomalous when the context is cleared; the collective anomalies, where the data consid-
ered separately are not anomalous by themselves, but their occurrence together makes an
anomalous collection (Chandola et al., 2009).
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2.2.4 Several methods of anomaly detection
As seen before, pattern discovery is crucial in anomaly assessment, as a pattern is by
definition built of recurring elements the repetition of which is predictable (Martineau
and Roy, 2011). The terms of anomaly, nonstandard, outlier or unusual will be used for
all piece of information out of the frame, that does not belong or seem not to belong to one
of the clusters formed by the pattern analysis. Such a pattern can be a succession of events
as a sequence, a cluster or a statistical distribution. If this pattern evolves over time, it
follows a dynamic model, otherwise it is said static. Several main kind of methods are
distinguishable, among which statistical methods, neural networks and machine learning.
Statistical methods are simple to implement but have the disadvantage to see their
application restricted to peculiar problems. For instance the processing of the speed of
vessels is simple because extreme values are likely to be anomalies. Those techniques tend
to have a high rate of false positives due to the difficulty in the choice of a correct threshold
between normal and anomalous values. If anomalies are de facto uniformly distributed
in the sample, statistical methods are ineffective. A discrimination is done between the
parametric methods, unsupervised and where anomalies follow a law of distribution and
the non-parametric methods, used for automatic anomaly detection where no hypothesis
is done on anomalies repartition, and where additional resources are needed.
Neural networks are particularly well adapted to hidden patterns, and are able, in the
data, to find out classes with complex boundaries. A stage of leaning is necessary before
the right operating of the neural network as a classifier. However, data must be processed
several times by the system before a convergence towards a solution occurs. Moreover,
their operating is often arcane (of black box type), and very sensitive to the learning stage
(Martineau and Roy, 2011).
The principles of machine learning are to discover complex structures and take deci-
sions based on data in an automatic way. Those methods are numerous and include deci-
sion trees, genetic algorithms, Bayesian networks, neural networks or clustering, amongst
others.
2.2.5 The importance of the context in the hazard assessment
During the determination of the normal or abnormal nature of a datum, it is useful to
take into consideration the environment (Martineau and Roy, 2011). Indeed, a situation
can look anomalous whereas external information can explain such an abnormality. In
the same way, a datum looking normal can become anomalous with the study and use of
external pieces of information. Those additional pieces of information are of paramount
importance for the contextualisation of data, and their understanding, paired up with
their use, can increase the total degree of understanding of the environment. However this
study, often quite complex, must generally be done or supervised by a human operator.
It is nevertheless necessary to note that an anomaly does not constitute a danger in
all cases, and that anomaly detection is only one of the tools in hazard detection. The
definition of what is a hazard is not unique, but some behaviours in the maritime domain
such as terrorism, piracy, trade of illicit goods (such as drugs or weapons), areas violations,
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pollution, illegal military manoeuvres or illegal fishing manoeuvres can fill this definition.
In order to process the hazards in precedence order, a machine can help an operator to
classify those hazards, by assigning to them levels of hazard (such as harmless, minor,
weak, potentially hazardous in the long term, potentially hazardous in the short term,
hazardous or highly hazardous). The importance of the designation of vessels of interest
shall not be ignored, because the machine enables the operator to concentrate his work
on a limited number of suspicious vessels or which might become a target due to their
cargo. It is then a preventive detection of potential risks.
It is important that the machine displays information to the human operator in such
a way that he or she can understand it easily, quickly and unambiguously. The generated
warnings shall be concise and clear in order to bring the awareness of the operator on the
situation as high as possible.
2.2.6 The purposes of anomaly detection
Operator’s productivity shall be maximised as the maritime traffic ever rises, and the
number of operators in charge of surveillance decreases. Thus, the fact to use the compu-
tation power of computers can enable a fast processing of the entirety of available data
in order to smooth down the workload and provide to the reasoning capabilities of the
human brain only the tasks that are non doable or non desirable to be done by the ma-
chine. The machine is then exploited for its brute force computing capabilities and the
human operator for a subtle analysis of peculiar situations.
As the total amount of data is far too important to be handled by a human operator,
only the relevant data shall be displayed to him or her, in order to offer him or her
the best possible conditions for his or her choices to be right and justifiable, leaning on
facts rather than on intuition (Martineau and Roy, 2011). Moreover, with respect to the
humans beings, the computers are not subject to tiredness, and their capabilities do not
vary over time.
As it is desirable to detect potentially problematical situations as early as possible, an
alert shall be triggered from the moment where the situation, contextualised with available
environmental data, can lead to a hazard in a plausible way. Similarly, all possibilities of
hazard detection according to a sequence of events shall be taken into consideration as
soon as the first steps of the sequence have already taken place.
2.2.7 The limits of anomaly detection
In the case of AIS messages, the environment of study which is the maritime environment
is very complex, with a great amount of elements consisting of a great amount of agents,
of which the capabilities are restricted. For instance, vessel tracking is an essential task
for the understanding of maritime environment, and is relatively well developed. This
tracking is in general based on the fusion of data from several sensors such as imaging
devices, AIS and radar signals, but the coverage area of each of those devices is limited and
varies (masks, weather) and thus limits the global knowledge of the situation. However
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the perception of some elements that can be hazardous is limited (cargo, identities of
mariners, identities of passengers for instance) which implies a limit of anomaly detection,
because an hypothetically perfect analysis would require a full knowledge of the numerous
components enabling to base the anomaly detection on a perfectly known interpretative
framework.
As a conclusion to this section, we can say that once data has been labelled as more
or less likely to be either normal or anomalous, the processing of data is not over, as
the determination of patterns requires knowledge formalisation methods in order to be
more efficient. Those methods allow data to be fitted into boxes so that patterns of
anomalous data belonging to the same boxes could be highlighted in a more obvious
way. The knowledge formalisation methods, which can in some cases run the processes
by themselves, are presented in section 2.3.
2.3 Knowledge formalisation methods
In this section, two main knowledge formalisation methods are presented and distin-
guished: typologies and ontologies. Typologies divide domains of which data is about in
subdomains in a tree-based pattern. There is no restriction of the number of layers (of
granularity) but this method remains basic as it only offers data labelling. Ontologies,
although they look alike, are not typologies as they are based on the concept of concepts
and relations between the concepts, so classes and links between those classes, the links
representing a given relation. As their structure is far more formalised than typologies,
ontologies enable inference engine and the discovery of rules within data.
2.3.1 Typologies
The typologies are a family of methodological approaches for the definition or the study of
a field, made in order to facilitate the analysis, the classification and the study of complex
realities. The types contained in the typology constitute the elements which divide the
main type into families that are generally mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive.
Typologies can apply to domain as various as anthropology, theology, linguistics, ar-
chaeology, psychology or statistics. As long as there is a need for defining types from
a greater phenomenon, typologies are useful. Such a classification of people or things is
done on the basis of commonalities or by certain differences or particular features classified
objects might have.
The use of typologies is useful in the sense of definition of families. By classifying
objects according to their characteristics, it is possible to gather objects having similar
characteristics in order to apply to them similar treatments. In addition, the fact to
seperate the objects according to their characteristics enables, when a new object comes,
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the fact for this object to be classified with respect to those elements, and to assign this
object other functional characteristics derived from its belonging to a given type.
In each field of study, typologists define the main characteristics of the fields, i.e. the
elements which will serve as a basis for types discrimination, the types being defined as
being a “holistic, schematized structure arising from a cluster of properties that exhibit
preferred connexions among them” (Shibatani and Bynon, 1999). The connexions in
question having to be defined by typologists (according to their school of thought), leading
to the drawing of the structure.
2.3.2 Ontologies
In this section, ontologies are introduced with first some definitions, their role and their
typologies. Then their construction is evoked, with the various characteristics of ontologies
to take into consideration. The used piece of software and the application of ontologies
to our domain is then assessed.
2.3.2.1 Definitions
Ontologies arose from the thought that knowledge representation was important and that
information shall no longer be considered only through the prism of data. Thus ontologies
are today considered as an essential paradigm in the frame of semantic interoperability.
We are interested in the ontologies as a tool for artificial intelligence, so as to formalise
knowledge integration within computer systems and lead to an automatic semantic han-
dling of information, far away from the philosophical area to which ontologies traditionally
belong to.
The generally admitted definition is the one of (Studer et al., 1998), which defines
an ontology as “a formal and explicit specification of a shared conceptualization”. The
formalisation needs a standardisation to be manoeuvrable by a machine, the explication
needs a declarative definition of the concepts and the constraints, the conceptualisation
embraces the non-ambiguity of the terms and the abstractive side of the ontology, while
the sharing part engenders the fostering of a consensual knowledge.
In a simplified way, ontologies can be considered as constituted of five elements: the
concepts (representation of an actual object, of a notion or of an idea), the relations
(possible interactions between concepts), the functions (connections in which an element
is defined with respect to others elements), the instances (represent the subjects that
constitute a tangible instance of the concept to which they belong to) and the axioms
(statement true by definition on the subject).
2.3.2.2 The role of ontologies
In the case of information systems, ontologies have a function of unifying frame and
knowledge repository. (Hepp, 2007) highlighted three fundamental points which gather
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the interest for ontologies: communication (between humans, between machines and be-
tween humans and machines), computer-based inference (for representation and handling
of pieces of information as well as for the analysis of the inputs, structures, algorithms and
outputs of a system) and knowledge reuse (in the frame of an ontological structuration of
an area).
Ontologies can be used at several levels as they are a medium of knowledge dissemi-
nation for all the components of a system. (Guarino, 1998) tallies seven of them, going
from the analysis of the system (beforehand) to the processing of queries (afterwards),
and going through maintenance or interoperability. In short, the role of an ontology is to
specify a common language and a knowledge corpus about a given area.
2.3.2.3 Typology of ontologies
Ontologies types are numerous and list them is not much of interest. However the two
typologies hereafter presented enable us to have a good overview of the different possi-
ble representations of ontologies, which are the discrimination according to the level of
formalisation and the discrimination according to the subject of conceptualisation.
As for the level of formalisation, four types can be discriminated: informal ontologies
that are expressed in natural language and easily understandable by the users, semi-
informal ontologies with a linguistic semantic more structured and limited, semi-formal
ontologies with an artificial language and formal ontologies which have a formal language
and semantics.
A typology according to the level of conceptualisation can be defined by seven cate-
gories that match with the four levels initially proposed by (Guarino, 1998), plus the three
additional ones proposed by (Go´mez-Pe´rez, 1999). They are the high level ontologies (for
the more generic concepts), the task ontologies (for a specific activity aside from all do-
main), domain ontologies (that describe the vocabulary peculiar to a given domain) and
applicative ontologies (for the modelling of the concepts of a given domain in the frame
of a given activity). In addition to them, the three categories proposed by (Go´mez-Pe´rez,
1999) are the knowledge representation ontologies (that describe the generic concepts for
the knowledge formalisation), meta-ontologies (with a lower level of abstraction with re-
spect to high-level ontologies, allowing their reuse in several domains) and task-domain
ontologies (for a peculiar task in a peculiar domain).
2.3.2.4 Representation languages
Under the impetus of the W3C (World Wide Web Consortium), standardised languages
arose and heralded the semantic web. However from the 1990’s some ontological languages
were created, such as Ontolingua, Cycl, LOOM or Flogic. Some new Web-linked languages
emerged since the rise in importance of the Web, up to put ontologies as one of the
bases of the development of the semantic Web, foreshadowed as the future (or one of
the futures) of the Web. In the late 90’s, the Resource Description Framework (RDF) is
the first standardised language created in the purpose of being a basis of the semantic
Web (Berners-Lee, 1998). The principle is to use diagrams with subjects, predicates
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and objects, with interconnections between those entities. An unified language exists
although several syntaxes are coexisting, and a diagram-based representation was also
created. However since the language is simple, its expressivity is not high enough to
describe complex situations. That is why the W3C decided on the creation of a more
expressive language: the Web Ontology Language (OWL).
The OWL is based on basic primitives describes by the RDF language, and brings
all the needed semantics for the knowledge description (for instance for class compari-
son with mechanism such as equivalence concepts or symmetry). Three sub-languages of
OWL with increasing expressivity are available: OWL Lite (which is RDF with the con-
cepts of equivalence and simple constraints that can be specified by the user), OWL DL
(addition of concepts such as disjunction or upgrading of some others such as cardinality,
DL standing for description logics) and OWL Full (the most advanced version, kept for
applications where a high-level of expressivity is primordial, at the risk of no longer secure
the completeness of computations.
A rule-based language for the Web, the Semantic Rule Web Language (SRWL) uses
OWL predicates so as to add rules that can be built or be produced by an engine.
2.3.2.5 Reasoning based on ontologies
Reasoning based on ontologies is done through an inference engine. It is a piece of software
which has the purpose to verify the consistency and integrity of the ontology, to query
the ontology or to deduce new pieces of information and new rules on the basis of a study
of the knowledge base. Four inference engines (Fact++, KAON2, Pellet and RacerPro)
implement the Description logic Implementation Group (DIG) protocol, which enables to
get rid of the peculiarities of the different engines thanks to an unified communication
interface based on HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) queries.
2.3.3 Description logics
A knowledge-based system is done in order to solve a given problem by reasoning on a
applicative domain, using various methods. The knowledge of the applicative domain is
represented by entities which have a syntax-based description to which is associated a
semantic meaning. In this frame, description logics have been built on predicate logics
and semantic networks (Amedeo Napoli, 1997).
In the description logics formalism, a concept allows the representation of several
individuals, whereas a role stands for a bilinear relationship between individuals. A
concept stands for a generic entity of an applicative model, and an individual represents
an instance of the concept, a peculiar entity.
Concepts and roles have a structured description, to which is associated a semantic in
order to handle those concepts and roles. There are two levels where knowledge is taken
into consideration: the terminological level for the representation and the handling of
concepts and roles, and the factual level for the description and handling of individuals.
Subsumption relationships allow the organisation of concepts and roles according to their
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generality level and hierarchy of concepts (Amedeo Napoli, 1997). A whole A subsumpts
a whole B if A is more general than B, so if all individuals in B are also present in
A. Description logics play an important role in the description of topological relations
(Roussey et al., 2013).
The syntax has several layers of complexity, as presented here, and is noted according
to prefixed notation (known as German syntax). The first layer of complexity stands for
the simplest concepts, and gathers the constructors representing the union (name: AND,
symbol : ∪), the negation (name: NOT, symbol : ¬), the universal quantifier (name:
ALL, symbol: ∀), the existential quantifier (name: SOME, symbol: ∃), the universe
(name: TOP, symbol: Ω), the empty whole (name: BOTTOM, symbol: ∅).
The second layer of complexity will gather constructors such as the True statement
(name: TRUE, symbol: >), the False statement (name: FALSE, symbol: ⊥), the in-
tersection (name: INTER, symbol: ∩), the cardinality in the roles, the disjunction of
concepts. The third layer is necessary for the predicate logics application: it is the union
of elementary assertions, that can be represented by a pipe.
Other symbols exist, such as the equality or numerical identity (=), the inequality
or numerical restriction (≤ or ≥), the role transitivity, the fact to belong (∈), the role
complement or the role composition (◦) (Lefranc¸ois, 2016).
Those concepts, roles and constructors gathered in a syntax enable the deductibil-
ity of systems by providing assertions that are understandable by machines and make
unambiguous statement on the outcome of data treatments.
The combination of anomaly detection and knowledge formalisation methods provide
labelled and assessed, their combination facilitate the use of knowledge discovery methods,
presented in section 2.4.
2.4 Knowledge discovery
Knowledge discovery methods consist in the extraction of pieces of information from raw
or partially refined data. In this section, data mining deals with high amounts of data,
distances and similarities are presented and the determination of alert grades is proposed
as a tangible implementation of knowledge discovery in the way people is led to behave.
2.4.1 Data mining
2.4.1.1 Overview
The machine learning methods can be of several kinds: deductive (mathematical modelling
of the world which models, the description of which is computed) and inductive (use of
past information). Inductive methods are twofold: top-down ones which base themselves
on human experience and bottom-up ones which base themselves on the analysis of data
(in databases or not).
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The methods of data analysis are diverse (Idiri, 2013): statistic-based, visual, by
clustering (of events or of groups of events, such as trajectories), and diverse as well
are the modelling types: by inference rules, using ontologies, using Bayesian classifier.
Associations are used in traditional data mining and exploratory (monothematic) and
decisional (multithematic) methods are use in spatial data mining. Trajectory clustering,
with anomaly detection methods such as distance computation, angular analysis, periodic
pattern detection (Idiri, 2013) is used in moving objects data mining. The number of
parameters to take into consideration for the computation is large, and can vary largely
if the world is open or if there is a constraining network.
2.4.1.2 Machine learning methods
As stated in (M. Chen et al., 2014), “Traditional data analysis means to use proper
statistical methods to analyse massive data, to concentrate, extract, and refine useful data
hidden in a batch of chaotic datasets, and to identify the inherent law of the subject matter,
so as to maximize the value of data”. The analysis can be done real-time or offline. The
real-time one needs the adaptation to constantly changing, rapidly analysed data, with
short to very-short delayed analyses. The next paragraph presents some methods (M.
Chen et al., 2014) that can be used.
Cluster analyses are statistical methods in which objects are grouped and classified ac-
cording to some features. The categories in which are divided the objects are the clusters
such as the objects which are in the same cluster will display high homogeneity while ob-
jects in separate clusters will display heterogeneity. It is an unsupervised method without
training data. Factor analysis is the fact to group several closely related features into one,
in order to reduce the number of variables to take into consideration. Correlation analysis
is an analytical method in which the dependence relations and the correlations, in which
fluctuations of similar shape are recorded through several objects. Regression analysis
is a mathematical tool for the revelation of correlations between one given variable and
several other variables. A/B testing, or bucket testing, is a method in which comparisons
between groups are done by applying different analyses to the same sample. Statistical
analysis, as stated before, is also used, based on statistical theory, with phenomena such
as randomness or uncertainty modelled, done for summarisation of datasets (in descrip-
tive statistical analysis) or give clues for a subject in which random variations occur, and
lead to a decision (in inferential statistical analysis). Last, data mining algorithms are
a process for the extraction of information that can be potentially useful but which is
hidden or unknown. Some of them are k-means, Apriori, Naive Bayes, amongst others.
They are used for all important problem solving cases, such as clustering, classification,
statistical learning, association analysis, linking making or regression.
2.4.1.3 The curse of dimensionality
Nowadays, highly dimensional data is widespread, and in data pre-processing, feature
selection is one of the most important steps (Kumar and Minz, 2014). It consists in
the fact to detect the relevant features and to remove the irrelevant, noisy or redundant
ones. The principle is in general to find the subset of features that presents the best
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commitment with the number of features and the coverage they offer. The computation
time highly relies on the number of dimensions, and it can go exponential with them, that
is why dimension reduction is often needed in order to avoid what is called the curse of
dimensionality, which leads to the impossibility to carry out the analysis.
The general procedure for such a selection has four steps which are subset generation,
subset evaluation, a stopping criterion for subset generation and evaluation loop and a
result validation. In order to assess their relevance, relevancy criteria must be put in
place, with an evaluation of degree of relevancy and thresholding for the selection.
Six methods are proposed by (Kumar and Minz, 2014) such as relevance to the target,
strong relevance to the samples, weak relevance to the samples, relevance as a complexity
measure, incremental usefulness and entropy relevance.
For feature selection, a general procedure is defined, with the search organisation being
described as being either sequential, exponential or random; the successor generation is
done with five main operators: forward, backward, compound, random and weighting.
The evaluation of the subset can be done using different criteria: distances, divergence,
uncertainty, probability of error, dependency or consistency measures can be used.
A selection of algorithms is proposed in (Kumar and Minz, 2014) taking into consid-
eration the search strategies (exponential, sequential or random), the data mining tasks
(classification or clustering) and the evaluation criteria (distance, information, depen-
dency and consistency).
2.4.2 Distances and similarities
This section displays some useful distances and similarities. What distinguishes distance
from similarity is that distance is a value quantifying the value between two points in a
given metric while similarity is a value of how much data look alike (same values, same
evolution, same ordering, amongst others).
2.4.2.1 Distances
As stated previously, the anomaly is defined as a distance to normality, and the compu-
tation of this distance needs the use of some metrics adjusted to the study frame. This
section, inspired by the work of (Etienne, 2011), proposes an overview of some available
metrics.
2.4.2.1.1 Minkowski distances Minkowski distances are particularly well fitted for
the computation of quantitative data distances. Those distances are linked to a norm,
which is an integer superior or equal to 1. Thus the distance in the p-norm between two
vectors of data (the elements of which are the variables representing the quantities to
compare, i.e. position or speed) is computed as the pth root of the sum of the norms put
to the power p of absolutes values of the differences of the values. The obtained result can
enable the creation of a similarity between the two vectors of data. The most used norms
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are three: norm 1 for Manhattan distance, norm 2 for Euclidian distance and norm ∞
for Chebyshev distance.
Let p ∈ N∗ be the norm, let n ∈ N∗ be the coordinates vector dimension, let i ∈ J1 ; nK,
let A and B be two points, let xA ∈ Rn be the vector of coordinates of point A, let xB ∈ Rn
be the vector of coordinates of point B, let dmk be the Minkowski distance, let dM , dE et
dT be the Manhattan, Euclidian and Chebyshev distances,
dmk(A,B) =
(
n∑
i=1
(|xAi − xBi |p)
)1/p
dM(A,B) =
n∑
i=1
|xAi − xBi|
dE(A,B) =
√
n∑
i=1
(|xAi − xBi |2)
dT (A,B) = max
i
(|xAi − xBi |)
Manhattan distance is induced by norm 1, it consists of the simple sum of the absolute
values of attribute values differences. Euclidian distance corresponds to norm 2, and
matches to the widest common and mainstream definition of the term distance in the
reasoning in 1, 2 and 3 dimensions. At the limit, in +∞ , Chebychev distance is the Max
of absolute values of the differences of attribute values.
The AIS transmits positioning data in the geodetic reference frame WGS84. In this
case, we have two possibilities: compute the distance directly from latitudes and longi-
tudes or use the cartesian coordinates and compute a Minkowski distance (Euclidian in
general) in the plane.
Let A and B be two points, let (ϕA, λA) and (ϕB, λB) be the latitudes and longitudes
of A and B in rad, let R ∈ R be the radius of the Earth, in meters, a, b, dortho ∈ R3
then ∀(ϕA, λA, ϕB, λB) ∈ [0; 2pi[4, the distance dortho of the minor arc of great circle
(orthodromy) linking A and B can be computed as:
dortho(A,B) = R · b
a = sin2
(
ϕB−ϕA
2
+ cos(ϕA) · cos(ϕB) · sin2
(
λB−λA
2
))
b = 2 · atan2(√a,√1− a)
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2.4.2.1.2 The Mean Distance The mean distance is about two lines, or two trajec-
tories. The actual trajectory and the standard trajectories for instance, can be compared
this way. Its computation is not unique but a widespread version consists in the fact to
consider one of the lines as a reference, draw segments between the extreme points of
the lines and divide the area of the surface between the two lines by the length of the
reference line. The result is expressed in units of length and represents the mean distance
of the second line with respect to the reference line. A graphical representation of the
mean distance is displayed in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Mean distance computation by area method, from (Etienne, 2011)
The applicability of this distance is nevertheless limited to spatiotemporal trajectories
and to trajectories for which the footprint are similar (in order to have a distance that
makes sense).
2.4.2.1.3 Hausdorff Distance Hausdorff distance is the maximum distance between
two lines, as defined by the following formula:
Let LA and LB be two lines, let pA and pB be two points such as pA ∈ LA and pB ∈ LB
let d(pA, pB) be the distance between the two points, whatever the norm used, let dH ∈ R
be the Hausdorff distance, computed as:
dH(LA, LB) = max
(
max
pA∈LA
(
min
pB∈LB
(d(pA, pB))
)
, max
pB∈LB
(
min
pA∈LA
(d(pA, pB))
))
We can define its determination as follow: let L1 and L2 be two lines. Amongst all
points of L1, which one is the farmost from any of L2 points? Let name it p1. Amongst
all L2 points, which one is the closest to p1? Let name it p2. Let D1 be the distance
between p1 and p2. We can determine D2 by reversing the respective roles of L1 and L2.
Hausdorff distance will then be Max(L1, L2), as presented in Figure 2.2.
In order that Hausdorff distance makes sense in a spatiotemporal analysis of trajecto-
ries, and as it is shown in Figure 2.2, it is necessary that compared lines have quite similar
footprints and quite similar shapes. Indeed, this distance is a bad indicator for very twist-
ing and turning lines, close spatially , due to the fact that the notion of homologous points
in the trajectories are not taken into consideration.
2.4.2.1.4 Fre´chet Distance Fre´chet distance is a distance corresponding to the max-
imal distance between two spatiotemporal lines. It is defined as follow:
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Figure 2.2: Hausdorff distance calculation sketch. Up: with similar footprints. Down:
With different footprints. From (Etienne, 2011)
Let S be a metric space, let d(a, b) be the distance between two points a and b ∈ S2,
whatever the norm used, considering a line as a row of points being equivalent to a C0
function of S, let a, a′, b, b′ ∈ R4 be as (a < a′), (b < b′), let the line LA be depicted by the
continuous function f : [a, a′] 7→ S, let the line LB be depicted by the continuous function
g : [b, b′] 7→ S, let dF (f, g) be the Fre´chet distance, the expression of which between two
lines LA and LB is as:
dF (f, g) = inf
α:[0,1] 7→[a,a′]
β:[0,1] 7→[b,b′]
(
max
t∈[0,1]
(d(f(α(t)), g(β(t))))
)
An illustration of this distance can be done with the analogy of a master going for a walk
with his dog. The two lines are then defined as being the ends of a lead of length l. The
Fre´chet distance L is then defined as being the lowest value of l allowing the movements
to occur. The computation of this distance suffers from the representation of continuous
spatiotemporal trajectories, making its computational complexity quite important, as
O(Na ·Nb · log2(Na ·Nb)), Na and Nb being the number of segments of the two lines, which
restricts the computations. Some similar distances exist, such as the discrete Fre´chet
distance, hereafter presented, or the mean discrete and partial discrete Fre´chet distances.
The discrete Fre´chet distance is an approximation of the Fre´chet distance enabling
to reduce the computational complexity to O(Na · Nb). The trajectories are discretised
under the form of M and N points, respectively. Thus each point of a trajectory is paired
to a point, the closer, of the other trajectory (homologous points). It is then formed
R = Max(M,N) couples of which the Max is the discrete Fre´chet distance.
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2.4.2.1.5 Edit Distance This distance is used in the case of character strings, and
the value of the edit distance between two character strings is the number of elementary
operations necessary in order to change one string into the other one. There are different
types of edit distances, giving more or less weight to the different possible operations
which are the insertion, the removal and the substitution.
The Levenshtein distance is one of the most famous, giving the same weight of 1 to
all three operations. The distance between two sequences of length i and j is computed
according to an iterative formula and has a computational complexity of O(i · j).
Let A and B be two character strings, let i, j ∈ N2 be the respective lengths of A and
B, let dL(A,B) be the Levenshtein distance, computed as:
dL(A1...i, B1...j) =

j if i = 0
i if j = 0
dL(A1...i−1, B1...j−1) if i, j > 0 et i = j
1 + min
 dL(A1...i−1, B1...j−1)dL(A1...i−1, B1...j)
dL(A1...i, B1...j−1)
 else

2.4.2.1.6 The longest common subsequence This distance measure compares two
successions of elements and counts the longest succession of common elements. It can be
computed on textual elements as well as on numeric elements provided that a thresholding
is done on the latter in order to be able to consider slightly different elements as being
equals in this computation.
2.4.2.2 Measures of similarity and dissimilarity
(Goshtasby, 2012) sums up some similarity and dissimilarity measures that could be used
in our study.
A similarity measure must produce a higher value if the dependencies between the
values in the series increase. A metric similarity must satisfy the following properties:
limited range, reflexivity, symmetry and triangle inequality.
A dissimilarity measure must produce a higher value as the corresponding values in
the series are less dependent. A metric dissimilarity must satisfy the following properties:
non-negativity, reflexivity, symmetry and triangle inequality.
A similarity or dissimilarity measure can be effective without a metric, although it is
desirable. There is a large number of similarity or dissimilarity measures, each having its
advantages and its drawbacks.
2.4.2.2.1 Similarity measures The Pearson correlation coefficient allows the com-
parison between two sequences of numbers. Its range goes from −1 (which represent a
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perfect negative correlation) to +1 (which represents a perfect positive correlation).
r =
n∑
i=1
(xi−x¯)·(yi−y¯)(
n∑
i=1
(xi−x¯)2
)1/2
·
(
n∑
i=1
(yi−y¯)2
)1/2
The Tanimoto measure is a measure between two vectors X and Y and is defined as
follow, where the numerator represents the inner product of the vectors and the denomi-
nator represents the inner product plus the square Euclidian distance between the vectors.
XTdenotes the transpose vector of X.
ST =
XTY
‖X−Y ‖2+XTY
The stochastic sign change is done in case one of the two vectors contains noisy in-
formation, if they are similar, their differences tend to change sign often. The larger the
number of sign changes, the higher the matching between series will be.
The deterministic sign change is a similarity measure which is similar to stochastic sign
change except that this time the noise is voluntarily added in one of the two series. The
amplitude of the noise must be chosen based on the results or on the standard deviation
of the series.
The Spearman’s ρ represents a rank correlation: the values within the vectors are or-
dered (according to an ordering law), ties for discrete values are broken. Then the Pearson
correlation formula is used replacing the values by their ranks in order to obtain Spearman
rank correlation. Compared to the Pearson correlation coefficient, the Spearman’s ρ is
less sensitive to outliers. Assuming that R(x) represents the rank of the value x, once all
values are ordered, the formula is:
ρ = 1−
6·
n∑
i=1
(R(xi)−R(yi))2
n·(n2−1)
The Kendall’s τ is another measure of similarity. In the two series that are compared,
a large number of pairs can be done. The sign of the corresponding pairs in the two series
are either the same or different. If the sign is the same, the pair is said to be concordant,
if the sign is different the pair is said to be discordant. Kendall’s τ is then defined as
follow, with representing the number of concordant and discordant pairs, respectively.
τ = 2·(Nc−Nd)
n·(n−1)
The mutual information is another form of similarity measure, linked to the entropy.
As there are different kinds of entropy, there are different kinds of mutual information,
such as Shannon’s, Re´nyi’s and Tsallis’. The value, assuming that p(x, y) is the joint
probability distribution function of x and y and where p(x) is the marginal probability
distribution function of x, is:
I(X;Y ) =
∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈X
p(x, y) · log
(
p(x,y)
p(x)·p(y)
)
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2.4.2.2.2 Dissimilarity measures The Manhattan, Euclidian and Chebychev norm
seen above are dissimilarity norms. In the case of Manhattan and Euclidian cases, instead
of taking the sum of the absolute value of the differences, it is possible to take the median of
the absolute value of differences, for the two measures called median of absolute differences
and median of square differences (Goshtasby, 2012).
MAD = medni=1|xi − yi| MSD = medni=1(xi − yi)2
The rank distance is defined as the Manhattan norm of rank ordered (according to a
ordering law) values of both vectors, and ties are broken. Rank distance ranges from 0 to
1, and the distance will be as small as the dissimilarity between the values is low. It is
computed as follow:
Dr =
1
n
·
n∑
i=1
|R(xi)−R(yi)|
The exclusive information is a dissimilarity measure linked to the concept of entropy,
and goes up as the mutual information goes down.
2.4.3 Modelling and determination of risk levels
This section presents the various ways in which it is possible to set risk levels and alerts,
with first the definition of an alert, and then the way alert levels are produced.
2.4.3.1 The alert
An alert is a warning given to someone in order to be on the lookout, it is a notion
supplied by a source entity notifying to the target entity a piece of information that could
be of interest and bearing the fact to be on the lookout with respect to an event of which
the occurrence is considered. Source entities can range from a single individual to an
ad hoc structure, e.g. a piece of software, a computer program automatically displaying
alerts when given conditions are gathered; and target entities can as well range from a
single individual to the whole population, passing through intermediate elements such as
a group of individuals selected according to relevant features with respect to the domain
in question (feature criteria can be geographical, sociological, political, ethnic, amongst
others).
The alert aims at the establishment of means allowing the wanted response to a peculiar
warning to be organised. Yet, in order to adjust the proportions of the means to the actual
situation, alert levels can be set up, as levels enable a gradation of the risk and an adjusted
response.
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2.4.3.2 Production of alert levels
The production of the standards leading to alert levels is important in the establishment
of a graduation, and some elements must be taken into consideration during this estab-
lishment. Those elements are the Why, the How, the Sources, the Determining of the
right level of action and the element to consider for the announcements.
2.4.3.2.1 The Why The Why is about the purpose and the targets. It is necessary to
ask oneself what is the purpose of the establishment of alert levels, and build those alert
levels with these objectives in mind. Similarly, the establishment of alert grades must
take into account the recipients, and their implementation will vary with respect to the
target audience (for professionals or mainstream for instance). The grades of alert must
be clearly understood by the targeted audience, with unambiguous alert grade labels,
and the description of actions to do, if necessary, must be precise and concise. Pieces of
information for the attention of targeted people must then reach those people undamaged,
with clear actions to do in order to reduce the risk of feared event occurrence.
2.4.3.2.2 The How The How must underline the importance of the graduation, and
the granularity of the graduation. If indeed some cases will need a great amount of alert
levels, some others will only need few of them. In general, the production of alert levels
needs on the one hand events which will lead to the triggering of an alert level and on the
other hand measures for risk mitigation. Thus, the number of levels must be chosen in
line with several parameters: the evaluation of how much parts (or levels) can the events
be divided into can be done, with the purpose of proposing a number of levels enabling
the coverage of all the spectrum of gravity of this event and at the same time displaying a
significant difference between those levels, such as the doubts that an operator could have
according to the right level for any on-going action would be reduced at most; and it is
necessary that the measures needed are different enough so that the existence of several
levels is legitimate.
2.4.3.2.3 The Sources The sources of the events leading to the production of alert
levels are numerous, and their diversity must be taken into account during the process
of this production. Three main categories are distinguishable: hazards, threats and ac-
tivities. Threats are events in which the will to harm is declared, typically the terrorism
lies within this category. The activities are the events for which the action taken can
have harmful impacts such as street demonstrations, meetings in stadia, area occupa-
tions. Hazards are events for which risk is pending but which do not result from any
human action, such as earthquakes, tidal waves or storms. The causes of those events
being diverse, the response provided in the alert levels must be adapted to the considered
case. This adaptation needs the a priori knowledge of the target audience which will
actually use those alert levels.
2.4.3.2.4 The Determining of the right level of action The determining of the
right level of action is a key element linking the causes leading to the application of a
given alert level and the actions taken to mitigate the risk. In particular, it is important
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that the actions are in line with the events they are supposed to mitigate. To fulfil this
point, it is important to avoid the phenomena of under-protection and over-protection.
Over-protection is the fact to use actions that are too important for the situation, and this
must be avoided for financial reasons, because of the inefficiency and the uselessness of
the taken measures and the possible obstacles to normal operations that those measures
can bring. However, over-protection must not be confused with precautionary principle,
as the precautionary principle applies in a predefined frame. On the contrary, under-
protection consists in the deployment of insufficient measures to mitigate the risk of a
given alert level. This can impact directly the security and safety of normal operations
and an distorted vision of the reality by the target audience. A case of under-protection
can be a proof that a problem lies in the mechanisms leading to a rise of the alert level.
The cost of the decision must also be taken into consideration, assessed and if possible
roughly set in advance, so that the operator is aware of the cost of the choice he or she
makes.
2.4.3.2.5 The elements to take into account for the announcements The ele-
ments to take into account for the announcements encompass all the characteristics the
knowledge of which is useful for an efficient communication. For the audience, it must
particularly target people for whom the knowledge of the information is primordial, and
secondarily people for whom the knowledge of the information can be of interest. It must
avoid the communication of pieces of information to people for whom those pieces of infor-
mation would be useless and as much as possible giving priority to people for whom it is
of some interest. The way the message is formulated is important in alert levels messages
as the target audience is possibly to be in an urgent situation, with no time for processing
information. Thus it must be short, concise, clear, with no room for ambiguity. Last, the
definition of communication means is important as it is the conveyor on which the pieces
of information are transmitted. This conveyor must take the environment and the target
audience into consideration, must transmit the pieces of information without degradation
and its reliability must be, if not maximum, at least known.
Conclusion
In this second chapter, we saw the origins of information concepts and the various data
quality dimensions that are used, and in particular integrity, noticed as especially impor-
tant in anomaly detection cases. Anomalies were defined and anomaly detection steps
displayed as well as the methods, purposes and limits of anomaly detection. The knowl-
edge formalisation methods presented the typologies, ontologies and description logics
and the knowledge discovery methods highlighted data mining and distances for metrics
determination, necessary for thresholding anomaly detection cases. The modelling and
the determination of risk levels was presented, as detected anomalies can be assessed from
the point of view of risks associated with those anomalies.
This second chapter consisted of a presentation of information systems in general,
as well as means to study, assess and classify them. The next chapter will present a
peculiar information system, the AIS, which is the one we are interested in for our system
assessment and risk analysis.
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Chapter 3
The Automatic Identification System
Chapitre 3 : Le Syste`me d’identification Automatique
Mis en place par l’Organisation maritime internationale dans la version de 2002 de la
convention pour la sauvegarde de la vie humaine en mer, le syste`me d’identification au-
tomatique (AIS) concerne de fac¸on obligatoire tous les navires de plus de 300 tonneaux
engage´s dans des voyages internationaux, tous les navires de charge de plus de 500 ton-
neaux ainsi que tous les navires a` passagers. Cependant tous les navires peuvent eˆtre
e´quipe´s d’un e´metteur-re´cepteur AIS, qui sera dit de classe B dans le cas d’une trans-
mission non obligatoire, alors qu’il est dit de classe A dans le cadre d’une transmission
obligatoire.
La transmission de l’AIS s’effectue par messages radio dans la bande des tre`s hautes
fre´quences (VHF) de´die´es aux communications maritimes : deux fre´quences sont mondi-
alement de´die´es a` la transmission des messages du syste`me, il s’agit de 161,975MHz et
162,025MHz. L’e´mission des messages est effectue´e au sein de cre´neaux temporels de´finis
de 26,67ms, chaque message occupant entre un et cinq de ces cre´neaux. Pour chacune
des fre´quences, il y a 2250 cre´neaux par minute, et afin d’avoir un agencement ordonne´
des messages, des protocoles ont e´te´ mis en place. Le plus utilise´ de ces protocoles est
l’acce`s multiple par re´partition dans le temps auto-ge´re´ (SOTDMA), fonctionnant sur le
principe de la re´servation du prochain cre´neau de transmission dans le message pre´ce´dent,
permettant un arrangement local des transmissions, le meˆme cre´neau ne pouvant alors
pas eˆtre re´serve´ par une autre station ayant e´te´ mise au courant de cette re´servation. Ce
syste`me permet ainsi la limitation des conflits d’e´mission.
Les messages AIS ont une fre´quence de transmission qui leur est propre, et qui varie
en fonction du type de communication et de la vitesse du navire, les messages de report
de position e´tant envoye´s avec un intervalle allant de 2s a` 3min. Cette fre´quence de
transmission e´leve´e implique un fort volume de donne´es qui est estime´ a` 5 millions de
messages par jour, envoye´s par 200 000 navires. Le trafic peut eˆtre observe´ en ligne sur
des sites spe´cialise´s, permettant d’avoir a` tout moment une image du trafic maritime
mondial.
L’AIS a e´te´ conc¸u pour transmettre des messages de divers types, chacun portant une
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information qui lui est propre. A cet e´gard, 27 types de messages diffe´rents ont e´te´ de´finis,
chacun ayant sa disposition de champs de donne´e, et ses propres champs de donne´e variant
en fonction du type d’information transmise. Le message nume´ro 1, qui est le message
de report de position a` cre´neau re´serve´, repre´sente a` lui seul plus de la moitie´ de tous
les messages AIS envoye´s. Les grandes familles de messages sont les messages standard
de positionnement ou d’informations statiques sur les navires, les messages d’aide a` la
navigation, les messages temporels, les messages de se´curite´, les messages d’informations
binaires, entre autres.
Cependant le syste`me souffre de faiblesses, soit internes dues au syste`me lui-meˆme,
soit externes dues au de´tournement ou a` la mauvaise utilisation du syste`me. Les faib-
lesses intrinse`ques regroupent les donne´es manquantes (les navires disparaissent parfois
des cartes du fait de la couverture coˆtie`re limite´e) et la collision de messages, ces colli-
sions e´tant dues aux proble´matiques lie´es au protocole lui-meˆme, au chevauchement des
messages, aux collisions de messages (notamment quand des envois simultane´s ont lieu)
et aux proble´matiques de re´ception ae´rienne, ou` les re´cepteurs peuvent couvrir plusieurs
zones auto-ge´re´es et donc s’exposer a` de multiples collisions.
Les vulne´rabilite´s externes concernent les erreurs constate´es au sein des messages
(champs mal renseigne´s, par exemple le champ destination), les falsifications du syste`me
(comprenant l’usurpation d’identite´, le masquage de destination, les disparitions volon-
taires) ou les piratages du syste`me (couvrant plusieurs activite´s telles que la cre´ation de
navire fantoˆme, le forc¸age de fre´quence, saturation du canal de transmission l’e´mission
d’une fausse aide a` la navigation ou d’un faux bulletin me´te´orologique).
Malgre´ ces faiblesses, l’AIS est largement utilise´ car il permet d’acce´der a` une quantite´
massive de donne´es de navigation maritime, et les applications couvrent la connaissance
de la situation maritime, la de´tection d’anomalies, l’analyse de trajectoires, la de´couverte
de connaissances, la pre´diction de comportement de navire ou encore la fusion de donne´es
maritimes.
Introduction
This chapter presents the Automatic Identification System in all its aspects that are in-
teresting for our study. In a nutshell, it is an information system for vessels transmitting
information about the position, the kinematics, the physical characteristics of the vessel,
but also identity information and information related to the safety of navigation. Origi-
nally dedicated to maritime collision avoidance, it later began to be used for monitoring
and surveillance purposes. Today, besides its initial use of collision avoidance, it is used
by the mariners to be aware of their environment, by coastal authorities to know the
traffic off their coast, by countries to be aware of the location of their pavilion vessels, by
companies to monitor their fleet and by researchers as a useful tool for the comprehension
of maritime traffic and its various consequences. However, this system is weekly secured
is not perfect as falsifications have been demonstrated.
First, the genesis of the system is presented, then its physical and technical main
characteristics are shown. As a message-based system, the messages themselves, numerous
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(27 different messages have been designed), take an important role and they are presented
in the third section. The issues about the vulnerability of the system such as errors,
falsification and spoofing cases are presented in the fourth section of the chapter, before
the last fifth section which is a state-of-the-art in the various uses of AIS on maritime
situational awareness (in such domains as anomaly detection or trajectory analysis) as
well as the uses of AIS by researchers in a handful of applicative areas.
3.1 Genesis
The Automatic Identification System (AIS) was put in place by the Safety Of Life At
Sea (SOLAS) convention, in its 2002 version (IMO, 2004). This convention, initiated in
1914 by the sinking of the RMS Titanic two years beforehand, has the purpose of defining
the minimal requirements to which every vessel from signatory countries should comply
with. The SOLAS convention deals with a lot of subjects, ranging from the construction
of vessels to the way radio-communications shall be done.
More precisely, the SOLAS convention is widely considered as the mother of all in-
ternational instruments for the security of vessels. After the first version of 1914, other
versions were issued in 1929 (second version), 1948 (third version), 1960 (fourth version).
The last version, in force as of 2017, is the fifth one, and was adopted on the 1st of
November 1974, coming into effect as of the 25th of May 1980. It includes the tacit ac-
ceptance procedure, which provides the fact that any amendment enters into force at a
given date provided that before this date no objections to the amendment are received
from a specified number of countries.
The main purpose of the SOLAS convention is to specify the minimal requirements for
ship building, ship equipment and ship exploitation, in respect with their security. It is
incumbent upon the signatory states to look after the respect of the prescriptions of the
convention by the vessels under its flag. In addition, if a foreign vessel raises significantly
enough suspicion about the compliance with the convention, a state can examine a vessel
in one of its harbours.
The main topic of the SOLAS convention are about the construction, the structure,
the compartmentalisation, the stability, the machinery, the prevention, detection and
extinguishment of fires, the rescue plan, the radio communications, the security and safety
of navigation, the cargo transportation, the transportation of hazardous merchandise and
special provisions for nuclear vessels and high speed crafts.
As seen in the previous paragraph, one of those subjects is the security and safety of
maritime navigation, and the AIS system was created in this scope, in order to provide
real-time spatiotemporal positioning of a vessel to the other vessels and to shore stations
located in its radio range of action (so no further the radio horizon).
Some ships from the signatory countries are concerned by this regulation. Indeed, the
SOLAS convention, in its fifth chapter, nineteenth rule, paragraph 2.4, states the use of
the Automatic Identification System (IMO, 2004)
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2.4 All ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards engaged on international
voyages and cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards not engaged
on international voyages and passenger ships irrespective of size shall be
fitted with an automatic identification system (AIS) as follow
2.4.1 ships constructed on or after 1 July 2002
2.4.2 ships engaged on international voyages constructed before 1 July 2002
2.4.2.1 in the case of passenger ships, not later than 1 July 2003
2.4.2.2 in the case of tankers, not later than the first survey for safety
equipment on or after 1 July 2003
2.4.2.3 in the case of ships, other than passenger ships and tankers, of
50.000 gross tonnage and upwards, not later than 1 July 2004
2.4.2.4 in the case of ships, other than passenger ships and tankers, of
300 gross tonnage and upwards but less than 50,000 gross ton-
nage, not later than the first safety equipment survey after 1 July
2004 or by 31 December 2004, whichever occurs earlier
2.4.3 ships not engaged on international voyages constructed before 1 July
2002, not later than 1 July 2008
2.4.4 the Administration may exempt ships from the application of the re-
quirements of this paragraph when such ships will be taken perma-
nently out of service within two years after the implementation data
specified in subparagraphs 2.4.2 and 2.4.3
2.4.5 AIS shall
2.4.5.1 provide automatically to appropriately equipped shore stations,
other ships and aircraft information, including the ship’s identity,
type, position, course, speed, navigational status and other safety-
related information
2.4.5.2 receive automatically such information from similarly fitted ships
2.4.5.3 monitor and track ships
2.4.5.4 exchange data with shore-based facilities
2.4.6 the requirements of paragraph 2.4.5 shall not be applied to cases where
international agreements, rules or standards provide for the protec-
tion of navigational information
2.4.7 AIS shall be operated taking into account the guidelines adopted by the
Organization. Ships fitted with AIS shall maintain AIS in operation
at all times except where international agreements, rules or standards
provide for the protection of navigational information.
3.2 The characteristics of the system
The characteristics of AIS system covers various domains, as the system has intrinsic phys-
ical characteristics with respect to transmission, protocol use or the range of transmission
but also global characteristics such as data volume, stations location or means to display
74
information. In this section, the transmission mode of the system is first presented, then
the broadcasting characteristics are displayed with a focus on protocols, local policies and
range of transmission. Another subsection deals with data collection in the vessels, in
coastal stations and via dedicated satellites, before display in local ECDIS on-board ships
or on dedicated Internet websites. The last part presents the message-based systems that
are somewhat similar to the AIS which are the LRIT and the ADS-B.
3.2.1 Transmission mode
The transmission of AIS is done in the Very High Frequency (VHF) bandwidth (which
ranges from 30 to 400 MHz), and more precisely in the dedicated Marine VHF bandwidth
(consisting in four distinct bandwidth which have a total range of 2.225 MHz), as VHF
band is split in sub-bands which are used for specific and various applications, such
as search and rescue, private or military applications, radio-astronomy, amongst others.
Two worldwide dedicated wavelengths are used to transmit AIS data: 161.975 MHz and
162.025 MHz. In order to transmit and receive AIS signals, some dedicated devices have
been put in place since the introduction of the system. Four kinds of devices can be
distinguished: class A transponders, class B transponders, multi-channel receivers and
radio scanner receivers. The devices are technically not transponders, but transceivers,
as a transponder is a radio or radar transceiver that transmits some signal in response
to receiving a predetermined signal while transceiver is a combined radio transmitter and
receiver. Class A transceivers transmit with 12.5 W power and have priority over class
B, which are limited to 2 W (K. Schwehr, 2011).
One of those subjects is the security and safety of maritime navigation, and the AIS
system was created in this scope, in order to provide real-time spatiotemporal positioning
of a vessel to the other vessels and to shore stations located in its radio range of action
(so no further the radio horizon).
Class A transponders equip all the ships that are legally required to use the system by
the SOLAS convention. They can receive and transmit simultaneously on both channels,
and have full capability and options for the users. Class B transponders equip some of the
ships that are not legally required to use the system but which owners wish to transmit
their information and receive information from the others. As their capabilities and
options are reduced, their price is lower. Those transponders can receive and transmit on
both channels simultaneously. Multi-channel receivers and radio scanner receivers cannot
transmit information but they can receive, simultaneously on both channels or only on
one channel at a time respectively. Those receivers are used by ships wishing to improve
their situational awareness at sea.
The AIS transponders must be linked to a GNSS antenna for positioning reports, and
can be linked to an ECDIS for the visualisation of surrounding traffic and improvement
of maritime situation awareness.
Today, two types of transmission are available: terrestrial (i.e. direct reception from
emitting device) and by satellite (i.e. the broadcast signal is received by a dedicated
spacecraft). However, at first, the system was only terrestrial, with transmission occurring
from one vessel to another, or between a shore station and a vessel, in a range of distance
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which is limited by the curvature of the Earth (circa 40 nautical miles in optimal conditions
(ESA, 2012)). The development of satellites enabled to receive messages even far from
the coast line, as it uploads and stores the received messages then download information
as soon a coast line and a shore station is reached. There are specially designed high
end receive only units, in towers, aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, autonomous surface
vehicles, satellites (K. Schwehr, 2011). Transmissions between the stations are shown in
Figure 3.11.
Figure 3.1: Transmissions between AIS stations
The development of Internet gave an even more important step forward in the knowl-
edge of maritime situation as websites display AIS information from all over the world.
So where ships previously disappeared beyond the skyline from a terrestrial point of view,
they can now be tracked in the whole world by every person who can access the Internet
network.
3.2.2 Broadcasting characteristics
3.2.2.1 Protocols
The emission is made during time slots, with a length of 26.67 ms, each message being
sent uses between one and five of those time slots of 256 bits each, but messages of 4 and
5 slots are discouraged due to VHF noise that reduces the probability of correctly receive
long messages (K. Schwehr, 2011). Amongst the 256 bits of the first slot, the first 88 are
reserved for header, remaining 168 usable bits. Space for actual information transmission
is small, as for a 3-slot message, it remains 21 to 83 bytes of actual information, which
is smaller than the space available for a SMS or a 140-characters Twitter message (K.
Schwehr, 2011).
For one frequency, there are 2250 of those slots in a minute of time. In order to have
a scheduled, organised and ordered sending of the messages, several protocols were put
in place. The frame starts or ends coinciding with the UTC time provided by the GNSS,
and exact slot time synchronisation is secured using PPS (Pulse Per Second) signal and
UTC generated in the internal GPS receiver (H. Lee et al., 2007). According to (Chang,
2010), reported slots and free slots obey the Poisson theory.
1from www.allaboutais.com
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The most used of those protocols is the SOTDMA, which stands for Self Organised
Time Division Multiple Access. This protocol enables to manage operations in an auto-
matic way, and conceived for sea communication networks. The stations (vessels or shore
stations) manage their own time slots reservations for the subsequent messages, and they
can modify their own reservations in case of conflict (for instance a meeting with a new
station). The principles of the protocol is presented in Figure 3.22. This protocol is used
by class A transponders. This protocol leads to the creation of self-organised areas, with
the purpose of avoiding message collision, as presented in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.2: Slot Reservation Sketch
Two frequencies are dedicated to AIS at the global level: 161.975 MHz and 162.025
MHz. In the VHF Marine band, the channel number assignments are 87 and 88 (ITU,
2012), the two frequencies (2087, 87B) and (2088, 88B) (K. Schwehr, 2011), of which the
bandwidth are 25 kHz each. Hence, in total, 4500 slots are available per minute. The
transmission bit rate is about 9.6 kbit per second (Chang, 2010). As for the modulation,
a Gaussian Minimum Shift Keying (GMSK) modulation is used, with a modulation index
h = 1
2
and a product B × T = 0.3 or 0.5, where B is the −3 dB cut-off frequency of
the Gaussian filter and T the bit duration (Berder et al., 2005). No interleaving nor
Forward Error Correction (FEC) is used (Clazzer, Munari, et al., 2014). In addition, the
brevity of ship transmissions cause inter channel interference (ICI) and decrease the rate
of successful transmission. This issue will be developed in section 3.4.1.2.
As stated before, the slot use obeys to Poisson distribution, and (Chang, 2010) proposes
the formulas for computation of the number of reports (time of study divided by the report
interval of the user), the total number of reports, the number of slots for success report,
the number of release slots (with the given release probability of slots in SOTDMA),
the number of free slots, the number of collision, which leads to the computation of the
constant λ of Poisson distribution, itself useful for the computation of collision ratio,
successful transmission ratio and utilisation ratio of a channel.
Other protocols are also used for specific uses, for instance RATDMA (Random Access
Time Division Multiple Access), FATDMA (Fixed Access Time Division Multiple Access),
PATDMA (Pre Announced Time Division Multiple Access), ITDMA (Incremental Time
2from www.allaboutais.com
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Figure 3.3: Self Organised Areas
Division Multiple Access) and CSTDMA (Carrier Sense Time Division Multiple Access),
but there are far less numerous than SOTDMA messages. There are two types of class
B transceivers, the “SO” transceivers (standing for Self-Organised) using the SOTDMA
standard and the “CS” transceivers (standing for Carrier Sense) using the CSTDMA,
designed for the class B transceivers that does not make time slots reservation but which
finds free time slots and broadcast its message in them. The table 3.1 presents all protocols
in force and their use.
Protocol Use
SOTDMA All class A and some class B, with reservations in the slot map
CSTDMA Some class B, scanning for available space in the slot map
FATDMA AIS Base stations and AIS AtoN
RATDMA AtoN for which slot reservation is not done by Base station
PATDMA SARTs
ITDMA All AIS devices, to pre announce their AIS data
Table 3.1: Protocols in AIS
The rate of transmission, or the reporting interval of AIS message largely varies accord-
ing to the type of vessel, its speed and the type of message sent. For class A transceivers,
the reporting rates are given in the table 3.2.
Static or Voyage related 6 min, amended data, on request
Safety as required
Long Range 30 min
↓ Dynamic ↓ not changing course changing course
At anchor or moored, < 3 kn 3 min 3 min
At anchor or moored, > 3 kn 10 s 10 s
0 to 14 kn 10 s 3 1
3
s
14 to 23 kn 6 s 2 s
Over 23 kn 2 s 2 s
Table 3.2: Reporting frequencies for class A transceivers
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Equipments other than class A transceivers also have reporting rates, which are given
in table 3.3.
Class B “SO” shipborne mobile equipment < 2 kn 3 min
Class B “SO” shipborne mobile equipment in 2-14 kn 30 s
Class B “SO” shipborne mobile equipment in 14-23 kn 15 s
Class B “SO” shipborne mobile equipment > 23 kn 5 s
Class B “CS” shipborne mobile equipment < 2 kn 3 min
Class B “CS” shipborne mobile equipment > 2 kn 30 s
Search and rescue aircraft (airborne mobile equipment) 10 s
Aids to navigation 3 min
AIS base station 10 s
Table 3.3: Reporting frequencies for equipments other than class A transceivers
In addition, some particular cases will imply other intervals, for instance SAR reporting
interval can be reduced to 2 seconds in the SAR operation area, the messages 24A and
24B have to be transmitted every 6 minutes, in addition to position report messages,
and the transmission of the message 24B must follow the transmission of a 24A message
within 1 minute.
However, all information above is in force when the AIS is using the autonomous mode.
When the assign mode is used, the reporting interval set by the message number 23 must
be used, which can range from 2 seconds to 10 minutes. In addition, the same message
number 23 can command a transceiver to stop transmitting information for a given time,
which can range from 1 to 15 minutes.
3.2.2.2 Range of transmission
The typical range of a class A AIS transceiver can be calculated in km with the formula
R = 4.131 · (√ht +
√
hr), ht and hr being the heights of the transmitter and receiver
antenna respectively, expressed in meters above the sea level.
Three main phenomena affect tangibly AIS transmission: diffraction over the sea
around the curvature of the earth (extend the range of transmission), multipath effects
due to the mounting of the emitter antenna, the structure of the ship, the wind conditions,
the mounting of the receiving antenna and configuration, and ducting due to the varying
refractivity of the air (extend the range of transmission) (Mazzarella, Vespe, Tarchi, et al.,
2016).
Other phenomena such as tropospheric scatter and ionospheric layers scattering have
not a considerable effect on the transmission range. Usually, in normal conditions, the
transmission range is about 40 NM (ESA, 2012) but the effects such as ducting effect
presented above can extend this propagation up to 100 NM (Natale et al., 2015).
The relation between the transmitter power and the receiver power is summarised in
the following equation: Pr =
PtGtGr
L
· ( λ
4pid
)2, with Pr power of the receiver, Pt power of
the transmitter, Gt antenna gain in transmission, Gr antenna gain in reception, λ the
wavelength, 4pid the Free Space path Loss and L a term without unit taking into account
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receiver losses, transmitter losses and the fading effects due to shadowing, multipath and
atmospheric propagation loss (Mazzarella, Vespe, Tarchi, et al., 2016).
Being used with a lesser power, the transmission of AIS Class B transceivers is limited
to 5 to 10 nautical miles (Serry and Le´veˆque, 2015).
3.2.2.3 Local policies
Some local policies can apply for the use of AIS, as several states take internal measures
for law enforcement. For instance, in the EU it is compulsory to carry a AIS device for all
vessels of length above 15 m since May 2014 (Natale et al., 2015), following the obligation
for all fishing vessels of length above 15 m, back in 2009 (Lindstrom, 2014).
Mexico made class B transceiver use mandatory on all vessels of length above 7 m,
India made AIS mandatory for all vessels of length above 20 m since 2009. In Singapore,
all power-driven vessels must be fitted out with AIS since January 2012 and in the USA, all
commercial self-propelled vessel of length above 65 feet, all towing vessels of length above
26 feet and of power above 600 horsepower, all vessels with a capacity above 50 passengers
for hire, all high speed passenger vessels of capacity above 12 passengers for hire, certain
dredges and floating plants, as well as vessels carrying certain dangerous cargoes have
to be fitted out with AIS (Lindstrom, 2014). Canadian fishing vessels are completely
exempted (McCauley et al., 2016) from carrying AIS by their government. In the Bay
of Brest, fishing vessels are obliged to carry AIS, regardless of their size (Te´le´gramme,
2011).
3.2.3 Data collection
3.2.3.1 Data volume
As there is no official bureau for AIS-fitted vessel, it is not possible to know how many
vessels are fitted out with the system, and how many messages are transmitted, however
some estimates are given in literature, displaying some variations in the figures. (Wind-
ward, 2014) estimates the number of AIS-fitted vessels at 200,000 as of 2014, and in the
European Union waters, 5 million messages are sent every day, by circa 17,000 unique
vessels (EMSA, 2015). At any time, the website marinetraffic.com tracks more than
80,000 vessels, the data being collected by a network of over 1,800 coastal stations, in 140
countries (Zissis, 2016). (Natale et al., 2015) estimates that in a month, at a global scale,
200,000 unique messages are received, and 130,000 vessels of all categories are sending
those messages. (Jukka-Pekka Jalkanen et al., 2014) notices an increase in the number
of messages, from 172 million in 2006 to 261 million in 2009. In the European Union
waters, there are circa 10,000 unique vessels per day and about 100,000,000 messages
per year (Iphar, Aldo Napoli, and Ray, 2016) and at the global level, as stated by (ESA,
2012), “on a good day, approximately 400,000 ship position reports are received from more
than 22,000 different ship identification numbers (Maritime Mobile Service Identity, or
MMSI). In a summary made in Oct. 2011, the total number of position reports received
exceeded 110 million messages from more than 82,000 different MMSI numbers”.
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3.2.3.2 Coastal stations
AIS transceivers are located both on vessels and on coastal stations, and all transceivers
are sending a message that all transceivers within the line of sight can receive, provided
that there is no slot collision. Mobile stations and shore-based stations send different kind
of messages, but receive all messages sent by all transceivers, independently from their
origin.
Local data collection in vessels enables the information display system to give a reliable
image of the traffic in the surroundings of the vessel, improving the maritime domain
awareness. Some additional pieces of information about dangers at sea are also provided
in order to enhance the security of navigation. However, the amount of data which
is storable in the buffer is limited and data is erased so new data can be stored and
displayed.
Local data collection in coastal stations enables the coastal country to have a clear
view of the traffic off its coasts, to know vessels that have a destination in one of its ports
or if the vessel just passes by. This information can be useful to many people, such as
MRCCs, coastal police or ship owners. On-shore stations also have the possibility to store
an important amount of messages, so that the history of one vessel can be tracked, and
it is possible to know if the vessel is a new one in the area or if it is a current vessel in
the neighbourhood.
The communications between the coastal stations, in convergence with the rise of the
Internet and the development of Satellite AIS technology, led to the creation of data
repository, to which coastal stations can send their messages in order to give a global
overview of the marine traffic, as faithful as possible. The satellite AIS technology will
be further described in section 3.2.3.3.
3.2.3.3 Satellite AIS
Satellite AIS (S-AIS) is a satellite-based system in which ad hoc satellites receive messages
sent by vessels. The message number 27 was designed for this particular purpose of ship
to satellite communication. The AIS was not designed for the reception of messages for
space, and interference problems could arise if vessels are near-by (Faber et al., 2012). In
addition, protocols like SOTDMA will tend to avoid message collision within an organised
area in the neighbourhood of the vessel, and as the field of view of a satellite is important,
multiple organised areas will enter its scope, which is likely to increase message collision
cases. At 650 km of altitude, the field of view is 5000 km in diameter (Plass, Poehlmann,
et al., 2015).
The possibility of reception of AIS messages from space was first presented in 2003,
in the 4th IAA Symposium on Small Satellites for Earth Observation, by the Norwegian
Defence Research Establishment (FFI). This possibility is due to the miniaturisation of
space technology (Wahl et al., 2005). The messages can be received by a standard receiver
up to 1000 km in altitude (Høye et al., 2008) applying the Friis transmission equation
and a decrease of −1dB / 100 km (Eriksen et al., 2006), where the swath worth 3630
NM (in the European waters it could worth up to 6200 vessels simultaneously). There
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is a demand for such global data for several reasons such as surveillance, anti-piracy or
environmental protection for instance (Plass, Poehlmann, et al., 2015). It is necessary
to have a space segment: the satellite itself, with the antenna and the storage device, a
ground segment, which are ground stations for the download of information and the user
segment, with online display of data (Vu Trong et al., 2011).
The feasibility of such satellite-based reception of AIS needs to focus on several aspects
(Eriksen et al., 2006): the signal power in space, the detection probability in space, the
scenarios for coverage in Europe (the busiest location) and the consideration for space-
based subjects. For the coverage of Europe, a 1900 NM span would be needed, which is
far larger than the 800 NM possible span without excessive loss, as seen in the message
collision section (section 3.4.1.2). For information loading of 10,000 vessels, a 2 Mb
memory would be needed on-board, and assuming a downlink of 10 minutes to a ground
station, the downlink rate must be at least 34 Kbps (Eriksen et al., 2006). A single
satellite is not sufficient then, and a constellation must be used.
The AIS satellites are located on the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) (Natale et al., 2015),
which are 600-800 km orbits (Vu Trong et al., 2011). The fist AIS satellite was TacSat-2,
with a weight of 370kg, done by the US Air Force laboratory. Some followed, such as
PathFinder2 of LuxSpace (8 kg) in 2009 and AISSAT-1 of the Norwegian FFI (7 kg) in
2010, amongst others (Vu Trong et al., 2011). In the mission presented in (Vu Trong
et al., 2011), the downlink rate if 38.4 Kbps and the revisit time is about 12 hours, but
this time can be reduced by the increase of the number of satellites, and can be reduced
by the large spatial line of sight of the antenna (as it is omnidirectional). However, in
some cases, a directional antenna can be used in order to avoid message collision and
increase the message reception rate (Høye et al., 2008).
The study proposed in (Cervera, Ginesi, and Eckstein, 2011) and (Cervera and Ginesi,
2008) shows that the use of a deployable antenna (Helix) with 6 turns improve the chances
to decode messages because of the power variation it introduces on the link budget. The
target is to have a ship report every 3 hours. This target is reachable using 5-10 LEO (Low
Earth Orbiter) satellites, at 600 km of altitude, with carefully chosen orbital constellation,
which can lead to a probability of ship detection of 90%. The size of the constellation (5 to
10) will depend on the traffic prediction uncertainties. Satellites are getting ever smaller,
with for instance the Norwegian micro-satellite NSAT-1, of dimensions 55x55x70cm, fitted
with a X-band radar, or the very small feasible AIS satellite of type CubeSat, which
dimensions are 10x10x10cm (Wahl et al., 2005).
The use of satellite AIS is various, but can be particularly useful in come cases such as
the estimation of gas emissions in arctic regions (Winther et al., 2014), data fusion with
other sources of data (SAR, terrestrial AIS, radar, amongst others) or the detection and
classification of fishing patterns, as presented in (Souza et al., 2016).
3.2.3.4 Dedicated websites
AIS data being collected and gathered worldwide, and shared on the Internet it was
then possible to display it on dedicated websites. Some of them have a free access for
visualisation and some basic features, and a paying access for charged features, other need
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registration for data visualisation, and other are fully charged. The purpose of this section
is neither to present the characteristics of each website nor to display an exhaustive list
of them, but amongst the websites, some of the most widely used are marinetraffic.com,
shipfinder.co, fleetmon.com, vesselfinder.com, aishub.net or globalfishingwatch.org.
3.2.4 Similar systems
The AIS is not the only maritime positioning system, albeit being the one sending the
greater amount of data due to the high rate of transmission. In this part we introduce
the LRIT system, similar to AIS, on board ships and the ADS-B system, based on the
same kind of position report messages, but for the airplanes. AIS and ADS-B undergo
similar problems, thus the comparison of the system makes sense.
3.2.4.1 The LRIT
The Long-Range Identification and Tracking system is a satellite-based system for position
reporting, set up under the auspices of IMO, with purposes in maritime safety, marine
environment protection and maritime search and rescue (EMSA, 2013). In force since July
2009, it is a mandatory system for all passenger ships, high speed crafts and cargo vessels
which have a gross tonnage above 300, provided that they are engaged in international
voyages. Mobile offshore drilling units must also carry LRIT. However, vessels fitted
out with AIS which operate exclusively within the Sea Area A1 (of the IMO SOLAS
GMDSS Sea Areas) as described in (IMO, 1995) (between 20 and 35NM from the coast)
are exempted from using LRIT (Faber et al., 2012).
The information transmitted is the identity of the vessel, its position and the date and
time of position. The advantages of LRIT are a global coverage and a large number of
concerned vessel as the decision to set up this system was taken at the IMO level. Some
drawbacks of the system are the fact that very few information is transmitted: there is no
speed for instance, nor heading, and the frequency is low, as the vessels have to transmit
at least once every six hours. Moreover, data is not gathered at one central point and data
is confidential as only SOLAS contracting governments are allowed to request information
on a limited amount of vessels (Faber et al., 2012) (EMSA, 2013), which are:
• The vessels operating under their flag
• The vessels operating within 1,000 NM off their coast
• The vessels that declare their intention to enter a port which is under their juris-
diction
The European Union set up the EU CDC (European Union Cooperative Data Centre),
one of the biggest data centres in all LRIT network, with over 8,500 vessels tracked and
200,000 position report per week, for a coverage of approximatively 25% of the world
equipped fleet (EMSA, 2013). LRIT system can be used in data fusion with AIS, as
shown in section 3.5.1.6, but it can also be the only reliable maritime positioning source,
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as the AIS can lawfully be switched off in peculiar hazardous cases. For instance, the
study done by (Vespe et al., 2015) presents the decline of the piracy attacks off the
Somalian coast, as the LRIT system is not shut down in case of hazardous areas (due to
the confidentiality of data).
3.2.4.2 The ADS-B
The ADS-B, which stands for Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast, is an airplane-
based location system. The broadcast is made of a plain text, unencrypted (Finke et al.,
2013), with no authentication (Faragher et al., 2014), error-code protected (Costin and
Francillon, 2012) and under the form of messages. There is one message sent per second,
containing position, velocity, identification, air traffic control information and manage-
ment information (Costin and Francillon, 2012). The current ADS-B implementation is
based on single-hop unidirectional broadcast link, with any kind of energy constraint not
taken into consideration. The ADS-B protocol is intended to be widely deployed for air
traffic management by 2020 (Costin and Francillon, 2012), and as a positioning device,
GPS will be used (so some GPS-related attacks are conceivable), with some requirements
such as integrity checks on GPS signals, so most attacks will be withstood, and the fact
that aircraft data such as position, identity and velocity is broadcast via unencrypted
raises serious security concerns.
ADS-B signals are received by ground stations and website display the world air traffic.
If this is at first intended for hobbyists and aviation enthusiasts, such an information
display could be used for malicious purposes (Finke et al., 2013). This is due to the lack
of authentication (for protection against injections from unauthorised actors), to the lack
of message encryption (for protection against eavesdropping), to the lack of challenge-
response mechanisms (for protection against replay attacks) and to the lack of ephemeral
identifiers (for protection against privacy tracking attacks).
Attacks can come from different sources and take several forms (Costin and Francillon,
2012). The attacker can be external (most probable) or insider, ground-based (probable)
or airborne, and the goals can be various : pranksters (least offensive), abusive users
(diverse motivations, up to pilots with abusive access use), criminals (for money and/or
terror), military/intelligence (state-level motivations: spying, sabotage. . . ). The various
threats at stake are the jamming, the denial of service, the eavesdropping, the spoofing,
the impersonation, the message injection, the message replay and the message manip-
ulation. The attacks on ADS-B system include: ghost aircraft injection, ghost aircraft
flooding, virtual trajectory modification, false alarm, ground station flooding, aircraft
disappearance and aircraft spoofing, whose feasibility has been studied by (Scha¨fer et al.,
2013).
Encryption of the signal is proposed as a way to reduce the threats on the system.
Three kinds of encryption methods (Finke et al., 2013) are assessed for ADS-B signals:
asymmetric encryption, symmetric encryption and format preserving encryption. (S.-H.
Lee et al., 2014), (Strohmeier et al., 2015) and (Faragher et al., 2014) propose ADS-B
protection measures.
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3.3 The messages
AIS messages have been designed to carry messages of various types, each one carrying a
given type of information. In this respect, 27 different messages have been designed, each
one having its own layout of data fields nature according to the type of information it is
supposed to carry. This section presents on the one hand the various types of messages
and on the other hand their content, with a focus on the two most important messages
and on vessel identifiers.
3.3.1 Messages of various types
There are 27 different kind of messages as of 2017, but this number could evolve in the
future and 64 different messages are possible according to the specifications. Out of
those messages, some categorisation is possible. The study of (Tunaley, 2013) proposes
a separation in six categories of messages, namely standard, aid to navigation, timing,
safety, binary and other. A summary of the categories of messages is proposed in Figure
3.4.
Figure 3.4: Summary of all AIS messages by category, from (Tunaley, 2013)
The first category, the most important one, is the Standard category, which gathers the
messages that are position reports (or static information reports). The static information
reports are the message 5 for class A transceivers and message 24 for class B transceivers,
and contain all static and voyage-related information for a vessel. All other messages
from this category display the position (latitude and longitude), as well as other dynamic
information such as the speed over ground. Position report messages for class A vessels
are 1, 2 and 3, for class B transceivers are 18 and 19, the message number 9 is intended for
search and rescue operations aircrafts and the message number 27 has been specifically
designed for satellite communication. In the case of class A transceivers, the message
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number 1 corresponds to the autonomous position report, done at a rate fixed by the
intervals defined in section 3.2.2.1, whereas the message number 2 stands for position
reports done at intervals which are assigned by a competent authority, this assignment
being done via a message 16 or a message 23. Similarly, the message number 3 is a special
position report sent as a response to a command done via message 15.
In the second category, aid to navigation, there is only one message, which is the
number 21. In this message, the aids to navigation characteristics are displayed, their
nature, their unique identifier, their type, their location (latitude and longitude) and
their status.
The third category is timing, and gathers all messages in relation with time and timing
of the messages. The message 4 is the base station report, sent by every single base station
in a periodical way, including the UTC time to the nearest second. In addition, it includes
communication status, indicating how the system is synchronised with external stations.
The messages 10 and 11 are respectively UTC inquiry and UTC response. Message 11
is similar in shape to message 4, but message 4 is not sent as a response to an inquiry.
Those messages can be sent to and from all stations. In addition to those three timing
messages, some timing information is included in standard messages such as messages 1,
2, 3, 18 and 19, which is the UTC second. Also, satellite AIS reports include a time stamp
for each message, dated with the satellite clock.
The safety related messages form the fourth category, with the messages 12, 13 and
14. The number 12 is an addressed text message in which the main part of the message
is dedicated to a safety related text, in addition to the identifiers of the sender and of the
addressee. The message number 13 constitutes the acknowledgement of the reception of
a message 12, although up to four senders can be acknowledged at once. Message 14 is
a safety related message similar to message 12, the difference being that there is neither
addressee nor required acknowledgement.
The six types of binary messages form the fifth category. Message 6 is an addressed
binary message containing a binary message and the identifiers of the sender and the
addressee, in an analogous way to message 12. Acknowledgement message for message
6 is message 7, which in a similar fashion to message 13 can acknowledge up to four
senders. Similarly to message 14, a corresponding broadcast message similar to message
6 that does not need neither addressee nor acknowledgement exists: it is message 8.
Message 17 contains the GNSS update data, which is transmitted by a base station, in
which the position of the DGNSS (Differential GNSS) reference is included. Message 25
is intended for short (one slot) infrequent transmissions, at either the addressed or the
broadcast format. Last, message 26 is designed for scheduled binary data transmissions,
with structured or unstructured data.
The last category gathers all the remaining messages, which are message 15 (interro-
gation for specific messages), message 16 (assignment mode command), message 20 (data
link management), message 22 (channel management) and message 23 (group assignment
command).
Figure 3.5 presents the number of messages (and thus the relative prevalence of mes-
sages) from a study conducted by (Tunaley, 2013) with one month of data.
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Figure 3.5: Number of messages according to message type, from (Tunaley, 2013) study
3.3.2 The content of the messages
The data inside AIS messages can basically be divided into three main categories: static,
dynamic and voyage-related (Lundkvist et al., 2008). Static data are data fields which
are not intended to change, or at least to seldom change, such as MMSI number, IMO
number, call sign, name of the vessel, length and beam, the type of ship or the position
of the position fixing device. Dynamic data are the pieces of information contained in the
data fields which are expected to change over time, displaying a physical motion, such
as the latitude, longitude, course over ground, speed over ground, rate of turn or true
heading. Voyage-related data are pieces of information that are expected to change often,
at each new voyage, such as the draught, the number of person on-board, the destination,
the estimated time of arrival or the hazardous nature of the cargo.
3.3.2.1 The main messages
In the AIS system, all messages matter, although all are not used at the same rate, and
the understanding of the system as a whole needs the knowledge and the understanding
of every single message out of the list of messages presented in section 3.3.1. However,
due to their prevalence and their particularly important role in AIS display information
they provide, the messages 1 and 5 are presented in this part. They are the most used
messages for each of their functions, which are dynamic data reporting and static data
reporting. Those messages are the main information provider for digital chart displaying
on-board vessels and for Internet AIS data hubs presented in section 3.2.3.4.
The Table 3.4 displays the layout of message 1, with the fields, the number of bits
allocated to each field and a comment on this field. It must be noticed that the messages
2 and 3 display the exact same layout as message 1, and that the layout of message 18
is very similar to this one. Apart from the identification field, location data is provided
by the “longitude” and “latitude” fields, with a precision on localisation provided by the
“position accuracy” field. Some dynamic data are provided by the “speed over ground”,
“rate of turn”, “course over ground” and “true heading” data fields. Some additional
data are also provided such as navigational data in “navigational status” and “special
manoeuvre indicator” data fields. There is also a weak time stamp provided by the “time
stamp” data field.
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Field Bits Description
Message ID 6 Message number. Here = 1
Repeat Indicator 2 How many times the message was repeated
User ID 30 MMSI Number
Navigational Status 4 Current status (anchored, fishing, ...)
Rate of Turn 8 Convertible in deg.min−1
Speed Over Ground 10 In 1
10
kn
Position Accuracy 1 Over or Under 10 m
Longitude 28 In 1
10000
arcmin
Latitude 27 In 1
10000
arcmin
Course Over Ground 12 In 1
10
deg
True Heading 9 In degrees
Time Stamp 6 UTC Second
Special Manoeuvre Indicator 2 If engaged in special manoeuvre
Spare 3 Not Used = 0
RAIM-flag 1 Use of Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring
Communication State 19 Planning of next transmission
Table 3.4: Layout of AIS Message number 1
The Table 3.5 displays the layout of message 5 with the fields, the number of bits
allocated to each field and a comment on this field. It must be noticed that the message
number 19 displays a layout which is quite similar to this one. Apart from the identifica-
tion field used in every single AIS message, some other identification fields are present in
this message, such as “IMO number” and “name”. Other fields show information about
the physical characteristics of the vessel such as “overall dimensions / reference for posi-
tion” and “maximum present static draught” data fields, or about the vessel itself such as
“type of ship and cargo type” and “type of electronic position fixing device” data fields,
or about the current voyage such as “estimated time of arrival” and “destination” data
fields.
Field Bits Description
Message ID 6 Message number. Here = 5
Repeat Indicator 2 How many times the message was repeated
User ID 30 MMSI Number
AIS version indicator 2 Compliance with ITU recommendations
IMO Number 30 As seen in section 3.3.2.3.2
Call Sign 42 In 7 6-bits ASCII characters
Name 120 In 20 6-bits ASCII characters
Type of ship and cargo type 8 As defined by the specifications
Overall dimension / reference
for position
30 Dimension of the ship and position of reference point
Type of electronic position fix-
ing device
4 GPS, GLONASS, Loran-C, ...
ETA 20 Estimated Time of Arrival in next port of call
Maximum Present Static
Draught
8 In 1
10
m
Destination 120 In 20 6-bits ASCII characters
DTE 1 Data terminal equipment ready
Spare 1 Not Used = 0
Table 3.5: Layout of AIS Message number 5
3.3.2.2 Theoretical and practical range of values
The theoretical range of values of each field is the total number of possible values for this
specific field. As we know the number of bits dedicated to each field, it is easy to compute
it: for a field taking n bits, we have 2n possible value, resulting in a range going from
0 to 2n − 1. The empty field can also be taken into account as a possible data (or lack
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thereof), adding a 2nth value.
However, in a certain amount of fields, the definition range of the field does not cover
the entire range of the field. For instance the “Type of electronic position fixing device”
field has a theoretical range of value of 16, however the values 9 to 14 are not used, so in
this case the practical range of values is smaller than the theoretical one, as the practical
range of value represents the values allowed by the specifications of the system, including
default values.
Let Ωxi be the theoretical range of value of the i
th field of message number x, let Rxi be
the practical range of value of the ith field of message number x, then ∀i, x ∈ N2, Rxi ⊆ Ωxi
3.3.2.3 The vessel identifiers
3.3.2.3.1 The Maritime Mobile Service Identity The MMSI (Maritime Mobile
Service Identity) is a number which stands as identifier as it uniquely identifies a ship or a
coastal station. It consists in a number of nine digits and is standardised by ITU in (ITU,
2015). Within the MMSI number is the Maritime Identification Digits (MID), which are
identifiers of three digits, which denote the country (or administrative region) responsible
for the ship station. The assignment of the nine digits number varies according to the
type of station.
When the station is a vessel, the MMSI number is under the form “MIDXXXXXX”,
“MID” are the first three digits which stand for the MID number, and the six remaining
“X” are figures from 0 to 9.
When the station is a coastal station, the MMSI number is under the form “00MIDXXXX”,
where the third, fourth and fifth digits stand for the MID number, and “X” is any figure
from 0 to 9. The sixth digit can be optionally used to differentiate between certain spe-
cific uses, with “1” used in case of coast radio station, “2” used is case of harbour radio
station, “3” used in case of pilot stations and “4” used in case of AIS repeater station.
When the station is an aircraft, the MMSI number is under the form “111MIDXXX”
where the fourth, fifth and sixth digits stand for the MID number, and “X” is any figure
from 0 to 9. The seventh digit can be optionally used to differentiate certain specific uses,
with “1” used in case of fixed-wing aircraft, or “5” used in case of helicopters.
When the station is an AIS aid to navigation, the MMSI number is under the form
“99MIDXXXX”, where the third, fourth and fifth digits stand for the MID number, and
“X” is any figure from 0 to 9. The sixth digit can be optionally used to differentiate
between certain specific uses, with “1” used in case of physical AIS aid to navigation or
“6” used in case of virtual AIS aid to navigation.
In the special case of crafts associated with parent ships, their MMSI is under the form
“98MIDXXXX”, where the third, fourth and fifth digits stand for the MID number, and
“X” is any figure from 0 to 9.
In addition to those casual cases, special cases are also addressed, with MMSI as-
signments methods for special purposes. A VHF transceiver with digital selective calling
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(DSC) and GNSS, which participates in the marine mobile service, will have a MMSI
number under the form “8MIDXXXXX”. Other devices use a free-form number identity
without reference country, such as AIS-SART (Automatic identification system-search
and rescue transmitter), man overboard (MOB) device or EPIRB (Emergency Position
Indicator Radio Beacon), which MMSI number are under the forms “970XXYYYY”,
“972XXYYYY” and “974XXYYYY” respectively, where the fourth and fifth digits (“XX”)
stands for a manufacturer identifier number from “01” to “99” and the four last digits
(“YYYY”) is the sequence number from “0000” to “9999”. The various cases of MMSI
format are presented in figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6: MMSI formats allowed, from (Tunaley, 2013)
Administrations are in charge of managing their own list of vessels (under its or their
MIDs), by implementing effective procedures for registration and identity assignments, by
providing regular updates of assigned MMSI numbers to the Radiocommunication Bureau,
by ensuring that the moves to and from another administration are made properly, by
assigning a non-used number in case of arrival and by reassigning the former number
in case of departure. In addition, if 80% of the allocated MID resource is exhausted, it
is possible for this administration to request the allocation of an additional MID to the
Radiocommunication Bureau.
3.3.2.3.2 The IMO number The IMO number field that is present in the message
5 in an international number put in place in 1987 by the International Maritime Organ-
isation in the resolution A.600(15) (IMO, 1987), the prerogatives of it were enhanced in
2014 by the resolution A.1078(28) (IMO, 2013). Those resolutions put in place a ship
identification number scheme, with the purpose of enhancement of maritime safety, pollu-
tion prevention and the facilitation of the prevention of maritime fraud. Administrations
can apply this system on a voluntary basis for both new and existing ships engaged in
international voyages under their flag. It is also possible to give IMO numbers for vessels
engaged in domestic voyages only.
According to (IMO, 2013), “The scheme applies to seagoing ships of 100 gross ton-
nage and above”, with the exception of some vessels, such as “ships without mechanical
means of propulsion, pleasure yachts, ships engaged on special service”, such as floating
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radio stations, search and rescue vessels, lightships, “hopper barges, hydrofoils, hovercraft,
floating docks and structures classified in a similar manner, ships of war and troop ships,
and wooden ships in general”.
The IMO number consists of the “IMO” letters followed by 7 digits ranging from 0
to 9. The number is allocated by IHS Maritime, on the behalf of IMO. This number is
shown on ship certificates and is never reassigned to another ship.
3.4 The issues of the system vulnerability
As stated before, the system is weakly protected and several falsification cases have been
demonstrated. In this section the various issues of the system are presented, in the first
place the intrinsic weaknesses of AIS such as the missing data, the message collision (cases
of overlapping, particularly in the airborne reception). Then the errors, falsification and
spoofing cases of AIS are presented and explained.
3.4.1 The system has intrinsic weaknesses
3.4.1.1 Missing data
The system in itself can fail in transmitting information. Some transponders fail to reach
all the requirements set by the International Telecommunications Union, and some ships
display large blank areas. This missing data, as shown in (Lecornu et al., 2013), weakens
the exploitation of AIS data by decreasing the reliability, but does not prevent it (as a
meaningful statistical study is needed in order to judge the quality of data). The AIS
has some critical shortfalls in additions to problems such as limited bandwidth and range:
limited retransmit capabilities for a few messages and no retransmit capabilities for the
majority (McGillivary et al., 2009). There is no way to detect dropped packets (typically
observed by embedding sequence number in packets), there is no mechanism to verify the
identity of the sender, so a large portion of the message may be problematic. Moreover,
the several systems put in place in order to handle the different messages, with priority
purposes and management of conflicts. Those systems are not perfect, and when they get
overloaded, they cannot handle all the messages and lose some of them. This phenomenon,
known as message collision, is presented in the section 3.4.1.2.
3.4.1.2 Message collision
3.4.1.2.1 Collision Cases are due to the Protocol itself All AIS signals are not
received by the receivers, as there is a loss percentage. When the installation is correct,
with a good-level hardware and a good weather, most loss is due to VHF transmission.
About 2% of messages are lost due to channel overload (Last, Hering-Bertram, et al.,
2015), even if the traffic is far less important that the one that the SOTDMA protocol
could handle, however, this protocol is not perfect and some messages collide and some
time slots are lost. But the biggest reason for message loss is the shadowing due to
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obstacles (Last, Hering-Bertram, et al., 2015). The obstacles can be on board the vessel
(masks, even if the IMO guidelines for installation clearly states the fact that the antenna
shall be free of masks), or other vessels hiding more distant ones.
The SOTDMA protocol creates organised areas in which message transmission is opti-
mised, in order to reduce as much as possible the fact that two vessel use the same slot to
sent their message. However, this is not always possible as vessels are moving, and a vessel
can move from one organised area to another one between two message transmissions, the
slot reservation of the former area remaining unused and the slot used in the new area
being possibly already reserved by another vessel. In addition, the reception of messages
by airplanes and satellites is done with a large spatial span, leading to the reception of
messages coming from several organised areas. The cases of slot collision are frequent
(H. Lee et al., 2007), as this section displays.
3.4.1.2.2 Message Overlapping When two messages are overlapping, both mes-
sages are lost. This can happen when two messages are sent during the same time slot
from two organised areas, as explained before, or sent during two adjacent time slots and
overlapping due to the path difference of the signals. The AIS has a 12 bits delay (Eriksen
et al., 2006), which is 202 NM at the speed of light. From 600 km altitude, 202 NM in
difference is worth 394 NM ground range or a swath width of circa 800 NM. In order to
respect this 800 NM maximal value, the field of view angle for the satellite must not be
over 96◦ (Eriksen et al., 2006).
3.4.1.2.3 Collision ratio and vessel perspective From the point of view of a vessel,
two situations can be distinguished: outside-group slot collision and inside-group slot
collision (Liping and Shexiang, 2012). Outside-group slot collision occurs when two vessels
afar enough from each other send messages at the same time and one vessel in the middle
gets the two messages at the same time and inside-group slot collision occurs in high-
density traffic areas, when the system still reserves a spot knowing it has already been
reserved.
Several quantities can be computed: the collision ratio of the free slots, the number of
collision slots, the system collision ratio, the successfully transmission ratio, the number
of successfully transmission slots, the number of successfully transmission in the system
and eventually the utilisation ratio of one channel. A simulation of collision ratio and
utilisation ratio (also successful transmission ratio) was conducted by (Chang, 2010) with
the reports numbers, and up to 2000 messages per minute, collision ratio remain under
1%. Utilisation ratio has a peak around 4000 messages per minute (75%). In addition, In
the ocean, far from VTS, the utilisation ratio does not exceed 20% (within 1000 reports),
with a successful transmission ratio over 98.5% and a collision ratio under 0.2%.
(Last, Hering-Bertram, et al., 2015) estimated that for a channel load of 20%, 5% of
messages were lost, for a channel load of 60%, 15% of the messages were lost and 25% of
the messages were lost with a channel load of 90%.
3.4.1.2.4 The case of airliners The possibility to equip airliners that are already
in operation with AIS reception system is presented in (Plass, Poehlmann, et al., 2015)
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and (Plass and Hermenier, 2014). The equipment of airliners is proposed as satellites are
very remote and have high collision rate due to large coverage area, moreover, satellite
uplink reception has to handle any influence on the signal done by a Faraday rotation
due to the propagation through the ionosphere. In addition, the maritime traffic and the
aircraft traffic are stunningly similar worldwide, as the main routes are the same. It is
evaluated by (Plass and Hermenier, 2014) that 62.5% of the worldwide fleet is covered by
at least one airliner on the first computation. The authors assume that up to 85.9% of
vessels could be covered if current data is taken (as their study is based on 2007 data),
elevation angle being taken at 10◦ (but 5◦ is also a realistic value). The aircrafts could
then become another source of AIS data for the World, as the use of airliners from a big
alliance could cover most of the marine traffic and provide several contacts per day for
every vessel (Plass, Poehlmann, et al., 2015).
In a study led by (Plass, Poehlmann, et al., 2015), an aircraft measurement campaign
took place in 2013, over Germany and a part of the Northern Sea. 46 minutes of data
were recorded at an altitude between 8,500 and 10,000 meters (flight levels 280 and 330).
At the altitude of 10,000 m (frequent cruise altitude), the radius of coverage of an airliner
is 56 km (Plass and Hermenier, 2014). A lot of packets were received, but only 29% were
error-free due to multiple collisions. The detection rates were 3823 packets per minute
for 1000 valid packets per minute. It was demonstrated that when a packet from nearby
collides with a packet from far away (which can be 10-20 dB weaker), the first one survives.
In heavy traffic, the use of directional antenna could be useful to limit message collision
(Høye et al., 2008).
3.4.1.2.5 The Satellite Reception The impact of capture effect and multi-user de-
tection on the satellite reception of AIS messages is assessed in (Clazzer and Munari,
2015). The purpose is to enhance the “destructive collision channel model” which states
that all packets involved in a collision are lost and packets not involved in a collision are
received. The enhancement uses physical layers that represent the propagation of the
waves. In addition to the basic model, two additional, namely the capture model and the
successive interference cancellation model, where vessel-satellite distance and Rayleigh
fading (linking the received power and the transmitted power, the received power being
in 1
R2
(Liping and Shexiang, 2012)) are both taken into consideration.
As some parts of the message are known (some bits never vary), it is possible to know
a priori parts of messages. A receiver aware of those characteristics of the system can
increase, according to (Hassanin et al., 2015), the amount of received messages by 10%
with respect to coherent AIS receiver and by 80% with respect to conventional receivers.
This could be useful in the case in which heavy collision is observed, such as satellite
reception. As for satellite reception, (Clazzer, Munari, et al., 2014) demonstrate that
SOTDMA can be seen as a slotted random access protocol at the satellite. This simplifies
in a noteworthy way the analysis of the protocol performance, as an optimisation on the
rate of transmission of AIS packets generation can be done to have a better success rate
and then maximise the vessel tracking frequency.
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3.4.2 The system broadcast errors
A part of the information contained in AIS messages are entered manually by the crew,
both at the initialisation of the system for permanent data (such as the name of the vessel
for instance) and at every new journey for journey-related data (such as the destination for
instance), some of the pieces of information can be erroneous. A study of such erroneous
data can be found in (Harati-Mokhtari et al., 2007). They can be done by underestimating
the importance of a correct fulfilment of the system or by ignorance and, as being errors,
are not intentional.
Each human-filled field is subject to errors, as well in static data such as identification
number of the ship, type of the vessel, name of the vessel, the physical characteristics
(length, beam, draft) that in dynamic data such as the position (latitude, longitude), the
navigation status, the estimated time of arrival or the destination. According to the study
of (Harati-Mokhtari et al., 2007), both static and dynamic data are subject to errors.
Thus, the MMSI number is false is an estimated 2% of the cases (Harati-Mokhtari et al.,
2007). Four numbers appeared in a regular way: “0”, “1”, “999999999” and “1193046”,
the latter being guessed as being the initialisation number of some kind of transponder.
Also, the type of the vessel is often unclear. As 6% do not define a type at all, 3%
define their vessel simply as “vessel”. The problem of definition is larger, as it lies on the
perception of the person entering information: a case of three ferries, perfectly identical
vessels, was shown, were the three given types were “High Speed Craft”, “Passenger” and
“Cargo” (Harati-Mokhtari et al., 2007). The name of the vessel is another issue, as 0.5%
does not have a registered name, and some others exceed the allocated space in the field,
which is 20 characters.
The position is also subject to problems, as it was noticed that circa 1% of ships
had a latitude value (in absolute value) superior to 90◦ or a longitude value (in absolute
value) superior to 180◦. Physical characteristics of vessels also suffer from several lacks of
consistency (Harati-Mokhtari et al., 2007).
On the website marinetraffic.com where a part of the international traffic is displayed,
some cases of erroneous destination fields are shown. Six examples of such problematic
data are: “ATLANTIC OCEAN”, where the destination is too vague, “HOME”, where
the destination is perhaps true but not precise, “FOS SUR MER”, where the vessel clearly
seems to come from this French city, and not go to it, “CH 16 FOR DESTINATION”,
where the pilot asks for a communication in the maritime channel number 16, “TBA”,
where the destination seems not to be known yet and “ANYWHERE BUT HERE”, where
the pilot seems to joke without having bad intentions. Globally, only 41% of the ships
report their destinations (Hadzagic and Anne-Laure Jousselme, 2016). The most common
errors in the next port of call data field are, according to (Bosˇnjak et al., 2012), a number
instead of the port of destination, a name of country and not a name of port, an unknown
abbreviation, the word “unavailable”, the word “unidentified”, a null space or a black
space.
Moreover, the system in itself can fail in transmitting information. Some transponders
fail to reach all the requirements set by the ITU, and some ships display large blank areas.
This missing data, as shown in (Lecornu et al., 2013), weaken the exploitation of AIS data
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by decreasing the reliability, but do not prevent it (as a meaningful statistical study is
needed in order to judge the quality of data).
3.4.3 The system presents data falsification
Intentional falsification of the AIS signal is done by the crews on board the ships in order
to modify or stop the message they send, in the very particular purpose of misleading the
outside world.
Identity theft also exists in the maritime domain (Windward, 2014). It corresponds to
the fact to navigate with a MMSI number which is not the real one, allocated and inter-
nationally recognised, but with the one of another vessel that actually exists somewhere
else. Hundreds of ships are disguised this way. As the MMSI number changes, there is
no way to assess a priori whether the vessel one is looking at is the right one. As stated
in (gCaptain, 2012) and (The Maritime Executive, 2012b), Iran used to falsify the MMSI
number of some ships in order to trade with Syria, then under embargo. The Iranian ship
Millionnaire took the identity of the Syrian ship Lady Rasha. At some time, there were
two declared Lady Rasha, one in the Mediterranean Sea and one in the Indian Ocean.
Destination masking is also sometimes a falsification (Windward, 2014). As sometimes
it can be considered as an error, some other cases are about a voluntary deficiency of
information, done in order to sidestep the overview of the global ships flows.
Disappearances are also a kind of falsification, as ships turn off their AIS transceiver
in order to hide some of their activities, such as fishing in an unauthorised area, or trade
illegal goods (Katsilieris et al., 2013) with other ships or on coasts.
The problems met with AIS are numerous, and most of them are the consequence of the
non-secured nature of the transmission. According to (Lloyd’s List, 2013), the fixes that
would be needed to have a reliable AIS system are at the protocol level. Five main issues
are developed by (Windward, 2014): the identity fraud, the concealing of destination, the
fact to voluntarily stop the broadcast, the GNSS manipulation and the spoofing of the
system.
Identity fraud is the fact to use a false or stolen identifying mark of a vessel. An
estimated 1% of the vessels assessed by (Windward, 2014) used a false IMO number. The
impact is then that anyone interested in AIS data has no assurance that the name dis-
played corresponds to the selected vessel of interest. Cases have been demonstrated, such
as Iranian vessels trading with Syria under Tanzanian flags (before their deregistration),
their previous flag, Tuvalu, having deregistered them beforehand (gCaptain, 2012) (The
Maritime Executive, 2012b).
Concealing the destination occurs more than half of the time, when vessels do not
report their next port of call (41% rate (Windward, 2014)). The impact is the creation
of information gap (as it is not possible to know when the vessel will arrive) and possibly
an intentional mislead, a skew of the view of the state of the traffic.
The fact to “go dark” is the fact to turn off the AIS transmission, as over a quarter
of the vessel turn off their system at least 10% of the time (once the active shut downs
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and lack of satellite coverage taken into consideration). As the large vessels (over 250
m in length) are more likely to turn off their transmission, this is suggesting that they
have greater will to conceal some of their activities. The impact is that it undermines the
ability to track vessels, and it is challenging for financial and security stakeholders.
As there is no validation of GNSS location, the coordinates can be changed. From mid-
2013 to mid-2014, a 59% increase in GPS manipulation has been observed (Windward,
2014). The impact is the difficulty it brings to know the actual location of a vessel.
The spoofing case impacts the maritime situational picture in a harmful way, and more
particularly in conflictual areas.
3.4.4 The system undergoes spoofing
The spoofing of messages is done by an external actor by the creation ex nihilo of false
messages and their broadcast on the AIS frequencies (Balduzzi, Pasta, et al., 2014). Those
spoofing activities are done in order to mislead both the outer world and the crews at
sea, by the creation of ghost vessels, of false closest point of approach trigger, a false
emergency message or even a false cape (in the case of a spoofed vessel).
In the scope of spoofing capabilities, several threats can be taken into consideration:
ship spoofing, aid to navigation spoofing, collision spoofing, AIS-SART spoofing, weather
forecasting, AIS hijacking and availability disruption threats (Balduzzi, Pasta, et al.,
2014). Cases presented in this section have been implemented in a proposed software
and self-built transmitter, with built AIS frames (Balduzzi, Pasta, et al., 2014), in an
experiment conducted far from any significant body of water (Balduzzi, Wilhoit, et al.,
2014).
Ship spoofing consists in the crafting of a valid non-existent ship, with the assignation
to the fictions ship of static information. A wide range of malicious scenarios can be
imagined, such as spoofing a vessel into the jurisdiction water of an enemy, making a
nuclear carrying vessel sailing in the waters of a nuclear-free nation, amongst others. An
attacker would also be able to counterfeit information to blame someone else about an
event, for instance a voluntary oil spill in the open sea.
Aid to navigation spoofing consists in the crafting of false data to lure a targeted ship
into a manoeuvre that could be wrong and possibly hazardous. For instance it would be
the fact to place buoys at the entrance of a harbour, or to place buoy to instruct a vessel
to navigate in low waters.
Collision spoofing is the fact to create a ghost vessel which would cross the trajectory
of the targeted vessel and trigger a CPA (Closest Point of Approach) alert, which could
lead the vessel off-course, possibly running aground or into a rock.
AIS-SART spoofing consists in the generation of a false distress beacon for man over-
board at given coordinates in order to lure and possibly force the target vessel into an
attacker-controlled area, as by law a vessel is required to join an ongoing rescue operation
upon the reception of such message.
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Weather forecasting can be involved in the case of spoofing of binary messages, which
convey messages such as weather and in this threat false weather forecast can be done
and sent to the vessels.
AIS hijacking consists in the alteration of information of existing AIS stations, with
eavesdropping on the communication and replacement of some AIS data. The recipi-
ent receives a message which is not the one sent, as the attacker overrides the original
transmission by broadcasting the fake signal with a higher power.
Availability disruption threats are three of a kind: slot starvation, frequency hopping
and timing attacks. Slot starvation consists in impersonating the maritime authority to
reserve all the spots, thus all stations within coverage have no slot available for reservation
and emission. Frequency hopping in the fact to instruct the AIS transceivers to change
their transmission frequency, as it is possible by protocol specification for given areas
in the World. In timing attacks, the malicious user instruct transceivers to delay their
transmission, by doing it repetitively, it prevents the system from functioning normally;
and on the contrary, the attacker can command transceivers to send updates at a very
high rate, thus overloading the channel.
3.4.4.1 Implications
The implication of a false, falsified or spoofed AIS are, first, on the subject of the safety
of maritime navigation, as it weakens the view one can have of the marine traffic, of
its surroundings for a vessel, off its coasts for a country or of its fleet for a company.
But there is also an implication for finance as it brings a distorted view of the flows of
goods, a flawed understanding of supply and demand, and an impact on trading models
(Windward, 2014).
For security and law enforcement, the main implications are the fact to trust no one, as
AIS data cannot be fully trusted as it is manipulated. The use of AIS for maritime control
requires the ability to assess AIS data; the existence of ghost ships, potentially elevating
political tensions in case of malicious vessel appearance; the erasing of footprints, by the
removal of tracking data of the activities of the vessel; and the fact to undermine watch
lists as, by concealing their activities and their identities, vessel avoid the watch lists held
by ports and authorities, dramatically decreasing their effectiveness.
3.5 Overview on the uses of AIS data
AIS is widely used for drafting a picture of the maritime situation at a given time. Due
to the large number of vessels carrying it, it offers a wide and somewhat truthful view of
the state of the marine traffic. Some of the main applicative domains for the use of AIS
messages which are maritime domain awareness, anomaly detection, trajectory analysis,
knowledge discovery, vessel prediction and data fusion are presented in this section. An
overview of all several other minor applicative models is also proposed at the end of this
section.
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3.5.1 On maritime situational awareness
3.5.1.1 On maritime domain awareness
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is the detection, classification, identification and
monitoring of vessel data (Lessing et al., 2006). From an operational point of view, the
Commandant of the United States Coast Guard defines it as such: Maritime Domain
Awareness, “in its simplest terms, is to identify and intercept threats well before they
reach our shores. Realisation of this goal depends on timely information-sharing, protect-
ing our vital maritime infrastructure, partnering with others at home and abroad, building
on current international cooperative security efforts, and preparing to respond quickly to
future events. Enhancing our awareness – of our vulnerabilities, threats, and targets-of-
interest on the water – is perhaps the most critical element of our Maritime Homeland
Security Strategy. We want total transparency of people, cargo, and vessels that use our
maritime system... We need to know which vessels are in operation, their history, the
names of the crews and the passengers, as well as the nature of the ship’s cargo, especially
for those vessels that are inbound to U.S. ports. Global MDA is critical to distinguish the
law-abiding sailor and ship from the anomalous threat. Achieving MDA allows interven-
tions to prevent a security incident from happening ... allows us to mitigate risk. To gain
MDA means having the right sensors and tracking systems, the right intelligence archi-
tecture, and the ability to globally fuse and share information in a timely way. We are
putting the policy, procedures and systems together that will help us get there.” (Tetreault,
2005).
The needs are to check that the passage in the territorial waters is harmless, so in order
to fulfil those needs control bodies are used, to which analysis tools must be provided for
a spatio-temporal monitoring of sea activities. The concerns of the administrations in
charge of the maritime domain awareness are numerous (Gaspar et al., 2016): prevention
of accidents, particularly on ships which carry hazardous material or pollution cargo ;
detection of oil spills and generation of alerts for agencies in charge of oil spill operations
; support anti-piracy operations; monitor the maritime borders ; monitor the fisheries,
and detect illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing ; the detection of illegal trafficking
and smuggling ; the support of authorities in S&R (Search and Rescue) operations. Thus
the stakes are maritime security: port security, container tracking, effective S&R, and
maritime safety: struggle against trafficking, piracy, smuggling, illegal immigration, illegal
pollution or antiterrorism (Morel et al., 2009) (Maggi et al., 2013).
In order to do so, it is necessary to use heterogeneous sources of information, to per-
manently discovery new knowledge on maritime routes and vessel behaviours. Systems
must enable a permanent watchfulness of the maritime traffic, and adapt to new cus-
toms of transgressors (Morel et al., 2009). AIS is part of the usable sources, but other
self-reporting systems exists in the maritime domain and outside: VMS, VOS, AMVER,
LRIT, ADS-B, EPLRS, VTS, civilian or military such as the VRMTC used by the Por-
tuguese Navy operations centre (Serafim, 2016), coordinated by Italian Navy and NATO
military systems. The use of those systems arise the problem of privacy and trust as pri-
vacy of people shall be preserved and trust between authorities and self-reporting entities
is of paramount importance for information quality and quantity (Hammond et al., 2006).
The key characteristics to understand and assess information coming from self-reporting
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sources are the entity which has to pay the equipment, the fact that it is voluntary or
legal, the fact that self benefits are obvious for the mariners, if they are expectations on
privacy, the easiness to intercept the communications and the online availability of infor-
mation, this is why for a proper use, those self-reporting systems must, as a public policy,
be of legitimate purpose, be proportional, be fair, lawful and equal, and be transparent
(Hammond et al., 2006).
The Maritime Situational Picture is basically the maps of the locations of the ships in a
given area of interest, at a given time. A proper Maritime Situational Awareness requires
the ongoing maintenance of the Maritime Situational Picture (Mazzarella, Arguedas, et
al., 2015). In this scope, the goals of AIS for Maritime Domain Awareness are the coverage,
the network, the interoperability and the data management (Tetreault, 2005). To fulfil
those goals, the system must be made usable for Maritime Domain Awareness by the
validation of data, correlation, data fusion and the storage of AIS data in an usable way
for future analysis. The policy issues around AIS are numerous, for the management of
binary information (that must not affect current and future AIS equipment on-board ship
by causing mariners to stop their use of the system), the data sharing policies, the use
of AIS for other purpose than its original ones (that could cause people to be reluctant
in its use), the frequency allocation and the use of other frequencies in some parts of the
world (which prevents the satellite system from receiving all data), and the enforcement
of carriage (Tetreault, 2005).
3.5.1.2 On anomaly detection
Detecting and classifying abnormal behaviours is a key task of maritime situational aware-
ness, for several reasons such as the extraction of relevant contextual information and the
proper monitoring of both self-reporting systems (such as AIS) and non-cooperative sys-
tems (such as satellite imagery or coastal radar). The operator must get information with
a quality which is good enough to make a decision but also to understand the underlying
meaning of the data handled, through evaluation criteria. Those criteria are numerous,
but the main ones are uncertainty, imprecision and trueness (Anne-Laure Jousselme and
Pallotta, 2015), the uncertainty being the degree of confidence assigned to a specific value
(when one is known to be true), and can be caused by lack of knowledge (epistemic un-
certainty) or random variability of the process (aleatory uncertainty); imprecision being
the inability of the source to provide a single value or to discriminate between several
values; and the trueness being the criterion linking a piece of information to the truth (or
reference), also referred as the closeness of agreement between the expectation and the
measurement.
The size of data matters, as the cost to extract relevant information increases with the
data volume. Data acquisition costs also exist, and the right amount of data needed to en-
able the detection of anomalies within the desired confidence bracket shall be determined.
In the maritime environment, data often is surface data, whereas it is not necessarily the
case as aircraft, submarines or unmanned underwater vehicles can provide data as well.
The different kind of anomalies that can be met are the kinematic (anomaly shown
in the motion of the vessel) and static (anomaly shown in the properties of the vessel)
(Horn et al., 2016). They can be further divided in subgroups, such as manoeuvring
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issues (involving the velocity vector of a vessel), location issues, interaction issues (illicit
or unusual interaction between vessels, or between a vessel and an infrastructure) for
kinematic anomalies.
The detection of anomalies can then embrace the cases of vessel stopping, vessel loiter-
ing, the entrance in an exclusion zone, the crossing of an exclusion zone, or a rendezvous
detection, amongst others.
For outlier detection, several models are possible in the maritime domain: statistical,
distance-based, density-based, rules-based or model-based (Koufakou et al., 2011) and
the rule-based one is particularly popular in the maritime domain (Holst et al., 2016).
But today, one major drawback of anomaly detection is that it is necessary to filter
this data prior its entrance into the database, which is not an easy task for a website like
marinetraffic.com, with approximatively a 5 GB increase rate per day, and over one million
events triggered. There is therefore a need for the information system to process itself,
so that it can increase its autonomy, and do low-level repetitive tasks. The anticipation,
the detection, the identification and the protection of the system are important, and the
rise of the Internet of Things and the Big Data techniques will make it possible (Zissis,
2016).
Several methods are used and have been implemented for anomaly detection of mar-
itime traffic using AIS data, such as clustering and classification (Zissis, 2016), Bayesian
networks (Hadzagic and Anne-Laure Jousselme, 2016), hidden Markov Models (Zouaoui-
Elloumi, 2012) (Yaghoubi Shahir et al., 2014), unsupervised route extraction (Pallotta
et al., 2013c), rare events detection (Riveiro, Falkman, et al., 2009), taxonomies (Pinto,
2016), outlier detection based on frequent itemsets (Koufakou et al., 2011), low-likelihood
behaviour (A. Alessandrini et al., 2016), route pattern comparison (Liu and X. Chen,
2013). Those methods are implemented for specific cases of anomaly detection, including
(Gaspar et al., 2016) entrance in a specific area (in general or by a vessel displaying given
characteristics (Serafim, 2016)), exit of a specific area, encounter of two vessels at sea
(Holst et al., 2016), huge change in estimated time of arrival, case of off-track location
with respect to declared destination, underreporting or overreporting of positions, signifi-
cant change of speed, significant change of heading (and the movement patterns in general
(Holst et al., 2016)), significant change of destination, anchored vessels in harbour, and
grounding hazard (Holst et al., 2016). Other cases can include (Pinto, 2016) unusual and
unexplained high speed, slow speed and turn, unusual course region, loitering, presence of
a vessel outside historical routes or traffic lanes, high-seas or littoral proximity rendezvous
and recurrent proximity with other vessels.
Last, some methods are peculiar to use cases, such as the inter-detection time, which
follows a log-logistic distribution (Horn et al., 2016), so a measure can be set up to check
the reality of this distribution, and the characteristics for instance of migrant vessels
(following the major crisis of the rise of illegal immigration in Europe) at sea via correlation
methods. In (Langford et al., 2016) this case is studies, and in their dataset, three vessels
were known to have smuggled migrants, so their track data is analysed. The correlation,
positive or negative, between variables for both migrant vessels and all vessels in the
database is performed (5804 unique), the variables are the kurtosis of SOG, the latitude
range, the longitude range, the skewness of SOG, the standard deviation of SOG, the
mean of SOG and the 0th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 100th centiles of SOG quantile breaks. The
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migrant vessel behaviour is then characterised, so it is possible to detect further migrant
vessels at sea.
3.5.1.3 On trajectory analysis
The analysis of trajectories are a main feature of AIS data. A trajectory being a spatio-
temporal track of a moving object and trajectories a travel from a begin to an end which
can be decomposed. (Yan et al., 2008) define a trajectory as “a record of the evolution of
the position (perceived as a point) of an object that is moving in space during a given time
interval in order to achieve a given goal”. The AIS, in this scope, provides data at a high
reporting rate enabling the analysis of trajectories, provided that a sufficient amount of
messages is received by the receivers.
A semantic trajectory can be described in a sequence of stops and moves (Parent
et al., 2013), and in this scope significant stops must be separated from non-significant
ones. In addition, a geographic component of the trajectory is necessary to understand
well the trajectories, that is why (Yan et al., 2008) state that a semantic trajectory
modelling requires three modules: geometric features, geographic features and application
domain knowledge. Some AIS trajectories are incomplete (Lecornu et al., 2013), and this
is a problem for trajectory analysis, which is necessary for understanding of maritime
situation. Data can be missing for various reasons: technical problems, navigation in areas
of lacking coverage or voluntary interruption of signal transmission. Semantic trajectories
have application in many fields (Ilarri et al., 2015) as various as traffic management,
ambient assisted living or urban dynamics analysis.
For reliability assessment of data suspected from being incomplete, on the one hand,
for each pair of message, the time elapsed between the messages can be compared to the
expected time between two messages (which depends on the speed of the vessel). On
the other hand, the position of the second point can be calculated with respect to the
position, the speed and the heading of the first point in order to assess whether or not the
segment is reliable. In order to do so, (Lecornu et al., 2013) proposed a method in which
a statistical distribution of positions was put in place and a risk value assigned to the
points of the trajectories, leading to the determination of the lack of reliability of such a
segment using Shannon’s amount of information for the determination of the occurrence
of events.
Spatial aggregation of trajectories based on AIS data is discussed in (Andrienko et al.,
2016b) and (Andrienko et al., 2016a), as discrete data is not always usable for analysis
purposes, as well as incomplete data. Two approaches are then usable when it comes to
spatial aggregation of trajectories: discrete and continuous. Continuous approach pre-
serves spatial pattern as they avoid distortion due to discretisation of space, and discrete
approach gives accurate numeric measures of movements. A way to summarise the vessels
movements is the trajectory box plot, as presented in (Etienne, Devogele, Buckin, et al.,
2016).
As for trajectory analysis, the sinuosity of the trajectory i.e. the fact not to be straight
is computed and high sinuosity tracks are isolated. In (Andrienko et al., 2016b), 326 out
of 334 sinuosity detected concern vessel that are also involved in a near-location event. It
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is a signature of collision avoidance manoeuvre, and it can avoid a miscategorised data,
as some anomalous behaviour can be explained this way. Statistical analysis can be done
in the cases where vessels follow the same itinerary (Etienne, Devogele, and Bouju, 2010).
The application of traffic route extraction algorithms is performed in (Pallotta et al.,
2013b) in the bay of Brest, France, which can enhance the situational awareness in a given
area (of interest) because it can predict future position, probable destination, even with
no prior knowledge of situation, or prior knowledge of the area of interest.
One of the descriptive ways of frequent behaviours in terms of space and time (area
visited during the movement evolution and the duration of those movements, respectively)
is trajectory pattern discovery (Giannotti et al., 2007). Based on the notion of frequent
sequential patterns (timestamped set of items) where the elements are ordered by their
timestamps, its purpose is the discovery and construction of regions of interest by detection
of popular points.
3.5.1.4 On knowledge discovery
Knowledge discovery from AIS messages covers areas such as data mining techniques,
mining of association rules, multilevel data generalisation, summarisation and characteri-
sation, data classification, clustering analysis and pattern-based similarity research (M.-S.
Chen et al., 1996) with the purpose of finding a new piece of information about maritime
traffic.
The analysis of mobility track is an important point of knowledge discovery. Today,
those tracks are everywhere in our environment, and this presence is going to increase in
the near future. Applications for travel time optimisation, car-sharing or dating websites,
or adjustment methods for insurances companies for instance. The first step of the analysis
of mobility tracks is to transform the spatio-temporal sequence of events into a sequence
of events associated with points of interest (POI) with spatial or temporal descriptors:
which POI visited, how much time, at which time (of the day, of the week, of the year,
with which weather) and pieces of information on the POI itself. Then the second step
is the pattern generation, with the only one of the most relevant ones with respect to a
quality measure (Belfodil et al., 2016).
From AIS data, it is possible to extrapolate an automatic production of hierarchical
graph-based representation of shipping lanes, by separating the traffic between segments
(tracklets) and turning points (breakpoints) (Fernandez Arguedas et al., 2014a). The
maritime network is then constructed as follow: from AIS raw data, entry in an area of
interest, exit of an area of interest and location near a point of interest (port, off-shore
platform) are detected, leading to route extraction, breakpoint detection (based on course
over ground data, and more particularly course over ground circular standard deviation,
where behavioural changes are shown by peaks (Fernandez Arguedas et al., 2014b)) and
maritime lane association for the construction of the geographical maritime network. The
parameters for a route are the time, the route ID, the number of vessel associated to that
route at that time, the MMSI list of vessel associated with that route, the vessel type,
the direction (way in, way out) and the points, defining the spatio-temporal evolution.
Detection and discovery of such highlighting of frequent lines and breakpoints have been
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performed by (Fernandez Arguedas et al., 2014a) in the Dover Strait and by (Fernandez
Arguedas et al., 2014b) during the journey between Dover Strait and Gibraltar Strait.
A method, called Ornstein-Uhlenbeck, based on a stochastic process, is a prediction
methods for vessels, the parameters of which being estimated by historical patterns. This
method, used in (Pallotta, Horn, et al., 2014) and (Braca and d’Afflisio, 2017), enables the
prediction of the trajectory of a vessel that follows a route by several hours and point out
vessels of interest that are not following the predicted route. In addition, Shannon entropy
can be used to assess route complexity (Pallotta et al., 2013a) after a learning of maritime
routes. The patterns extracted from such studies are useful for traffic knowledge of human
operators, as they put the bases of anomaly detection, vessel behavioural models, density
maps, prediction, and a source of information for data fusion (Pallotta et al., 2013c).
3.5.1.5 On vessel prediction
The best way to track a vessel and predict its future position is to rely on the way it moves.
Different methods for vessel prediction can be used, such as point-based, acceleration-
based, heading-based, vector-based or cog-based (based on the course over ground). Ad
hoc systems (Redoutey et al., 2008) compute predicted positions with at least two actual
updated positions, and then when a new piece of information is provided, it can be
compared to the predicted position. If the difference is larger than a given threshold, new
updated positions are used for a new prediction.
The point-based prediction can be used when the ship does not move a lot, i.e. when
anchored or moored. The vector-based approach can be used when the vessel has a long-
time linear and constant speed. At the beginning of such a phase, cog-based should be
more efficient, then heading-based before the eventual vector-based. When the vessel
accelerates or decelerates, acceleration-based predictions shall be used. A combination
of such methods (Redoutey et al., 2008) should decrease the calculation time of tracking
algorithms.
Other methods for the prediction of the position of a vessel include genetic algorithms
(Vanneschi et al., 2015), track prediction algorithms using Malahanobis distance (Maz-
zarella, Arguedas, et al., 2015) or probability-based methods (Last, Bahlke, et al., 2014)
(L. Millefiori et al., 2016) such as the evaluation of latitude, longitude, course over ground,
speed over ground and rate of turn data at a given time t, using the values of those fields
previously received.
3.5.1.6 On data fusion
The purposes of data fusion are to ingest data from different sources, to track vessels
from certain areas in both real-time and offline cases, to provide a maritime situational
picture and to associate cooperative reporting systems with non-cooperatively detected
vessel (Mazzarella, Alfredo Alessandrini, et al., 2013). None of the sensors such as AIS
or radar can provide sufficient data on a regular basis for the establishment of a accurate
and reliable picture of the maritime traffic at each moment. Radar is less accurate than
AIS, and is subject to weather conditions, while AIS is fully dependant on its cooperative
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nature (Siegert et al., 2016). The fusion of data can improve the quality of information.
Numerous methods to deal with multiple data of the same type exist, however few
exist to deal with multiple data of different types. The multi-type multi-source data
fusion is complicated and computationally expensive. Single-type multi-source data fu-
sion techniques are Neural Network learning, Bayesian learning, Kalman filtering and
Dempster-Shafer evidential reasoning. Only few of those techniques can be applied to
multi-type data fusion but some variants can be applied. Neural networks can be ex-
tended to neuro-fuzzy and genetic algorithms, and Bayesian learning can be extended for
the correlation of heterogeneous data (Corporation, 2015). In their study, (Siegert et al.,
2016) designed a interacting multiple model multi-sensor Probabilistic Data Association
with unscented Kalman filtering.
Figure 3.7 displays a table of the main observation-based and self-reporting position-
ing systems available for maritime situational awareness, from which data fusion can be
performed (from (Alfredo Alessandrini et al., 2014)).
Figure 3.7: Main operational observation-based and self-reporting positioning systems for
maritime situational awareness, from (Alfredo Alessandrini et al., 2014)
Data fusion enables target identification: in the Halifax harbour, AIS reports are
used to direct a camera towards a ship to take a picture of it, via the Automated Ship
Image Acquisition (St-Hilaire, 2010). AIS data fusion with terrestrial radar (Katsilieris
et al., 2013) (Morel et al., 2009) (Habtemariam et al., 2015) and Synthetic Aperture
Radars (Mazzarella, Vespe, and Santamaria, 2015) (Corporation, 2015) (Mazzarella, Al-
fredo Alessandrini, et al., 2013) (Brusch et al., 2011) (Oo et al., 2010) are the most
commonly met.
Data fusion with AIS and SAR data is widely used as it can provide a better picture
of maritime traffic and detect vessels which are not reporting their position via AIS. On
the other side, it is possible to identify vessels detected via satellite imagery (Mazzarella,
Vespe, and Santamaria, 2015). It depends on the resolution of SAR Beacons, but it is
often possible not only to detect an object, but also to estimate some parameters such
as its length, width or heading (Voinov et al., 2016) (Brusch et al., 2011), with a further
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crossing of information with AIS. Specialised satellites such as TerraSAR-X (Brusch et al.,
2011) and RADARSAT-2 (Corporation, 2015) by the Canadian Space Agency are used.
A track reconstruction can also be performed with both data sources (Voinov et al., 2016),
the intermediate points being estimated by the use of the dead reckoning method.
3.5.2 On various applicative models
AIS data is widely used for various applicative models of the maritime network and the
maritime navigation. AIS, given its high frequency and carriage obligation for a large
number of vessels, provide a reliable picture of the maritime navigation, at least for the
vessels obliged to carry the system. In addition, AIS provide a wide range of data, which
can be used in a wide range of applications.
In general, it must be noticed that most of the studies take the AIS data “as if” and do
not question their genuineness. Some studies, such as (Qu et al., 2011) or (Weng et al.,
2012) even create missing data from neighbouring data, in accordance with their need for
particular data at a given time.
The collision risk is the main application of this section, as some waterways are busy,
such as Rotterdam (30,000 sea-going ships and 135,000 inland vessels per year) or Shen-
zhen, near Hong Kong, with 500,000 ships per year. In the downstream Yangtze, up to
5,000 ships are transiting daily. The collision occurrences would climb proportionally with
the number of ships without traffic management and traffic services (Mou et al., 2010). In
European waters, some recent disasters such as Erika (December 1999), Ievoli Sun (Oc-
tober 2000), Prestige (November 2002), Tricolor (December 2002) occurred, underlining
the necessity of collision risk reduction. The traffic lane situation is assessed by (Su et al.,
2012), (Qu et al., 2011) and (Fangliang Xiao et al., 2015), as one of the elements of safe
navigation is the ship domain, defined in (Qu et al., 2011) as “the surrounding effective
waters which the navigator of a ship want to keep clear of other ships and fixed objects”,
from a quotation of Goodwin. Various geometries have been proposed for such domains
(Fujii and Goodwin for instance), including binary ship domains (safe/dangerous) or fuzzy
ship domains (very safe, safe, less safe, dangerous, very dangerous). Regulations, such as
COLREGS, are a major point of collision risk prevention (Stitt, 2004), (Y. Wang et al.,
2013). Collision reasons are various and presented in (Montewka et al., 2010), (Tsou and
Hsueh, 2010), (Zhang et al., 2015), (Goerlandt and Kujala, 2011), (Montewka et al., 2010)
and (Shu et al., 2013). Probability computations on various domains of vessel collision
has been studied in (Gilberg et al., 2016), (Silveira et al., 2013), (Montewka et al., 2010),
(Perkovic et al., 2012), (Kao et al., 2007), (Qu et al., 2011) and (Weng et al., 2012).
All other listed applicative models include emergency response: the way AIS helps
us to understand the response to an emergency, spots the issues raised by this response
and proposes improvement to emergency response plans (K. D. Schwehr and McGillivary,
2007) (K. Schwehr, 2011), fisheries: in order to analyse the pressure on fishing grounds,
and the fishing patterns of vessels, in order to understand the fishing habits and the way
various kinds of fishing activities are conducted (Hu et al., 2016) (Mazzarella, Vespe,
Damalas, et al., 2014) (Natale et al., 2015) (Souza et al., 2016), planning: the use of AIS
as a monitoring tool (Stoddard et al., 2016) (Vodas et al., 2013) (Huntington et al., 2015)
(McCauley et al., 2016) (Serry and Le´veˆque, 2015) (Shelmerdine, 2015) (Faber et al.,
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2012) (Shucksmith et al., 2014), traffic modelling: the use of traffic lane, the behaviour
of the vessels at the entrance of ports, or in rivers (J. Chen et al., 2015) (Numano et al.,
2003) (Zheng et al., 2008) (Oo et al., 2010) (Gucma, 2008) (Naus et al., 2007) (Fanglinag
Xiao et al., 2012) (Aarsæther and Moan, 2007) (Aarsæther and Moan, 2010) (Kotovirta
et al., 2009) (L. M. Millefiori, Zissis, et al., 2016) (L. M. Millefiori, Cazzanti, et al.,
2016), vessel emissions: gas released by maritime navigation, including greenhouse
gases and pollutants (Miola and Ciuffo, 2011) (Ng et al., 2013) (Yau et al., 2012) (Song,
2014) (J.-P. Jalkanen, Brink, et al., 2009) (Diesch et al., 2013) (L. Goldsworthy and B.
Goldsworthy, 2015) (J.-P. Jalkanen, Johansson, et al., 2012) (Jukka-Pekka Jalkanen et
al., 2014) (Winther et al., 2014) (Perez et al., 2009), vessel noise: noise exposure of
human operations at sea on animal life (Hatch et al., 2008) (Erbe, MacGillivray, et al.,
2012) (Merchant, Witt, et al., 2012) (Bassett et al., 2012) (Erbe, Duncan, et al., 2012)
(Erbe, Williams, et al., 2014) (McKenna et al., 2012) (Merchant, Pirotta, et al., 2014),
animal collision: collisions between vessels and animals, particularly marine mammals
(McGillivary et al., 2009) (Wiley et al., 2011) (Allen, 2014) and sea surface currents:
study of the near-surface oceanic currents (Guichoux et al., 2016).
Conclusion
This chapter has shown the diversity of AIS messages, their technical characteristics and
the way information is carried through them. Messages have to follow very strict layouts,
which makes AIS a system of organised data. Such analysis of the system, understanding
of its inner mechanisms and applicative domains is necessary for the methodology for AIS
messages assessments presented in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
A methodology for AIS messages
assessment
Chapitre 4 : Une me´thode pour l’e´valuation des mes-
sages AIS
Du fait des vulne´rabilite´s pre´sentes au sein du syste`me AIS, et du fait que la pre´sence
de ces vulne´rabilite´s sont a` meˆme d’augmenter les risques de la navigation maritime, ce
chapitre propose une me´thode pour e´valuer ces risques, base´e sur la notion d’inte´grite´ des
messages AIS. Dans cette me´thode, un examen minutieux du syste`me lui-meˆme a permis
l’e´tablissement de 935 items uniques d’e´valuation de l’inte´grite´ du syste`me, prenant en
compte la structure complexe de l’AIS. A cette fin, une nomenclature a e´te´ mise en place
afin de pouvoir distinguer de fac¸on unique et non ambigue¨ n’importe quel champ de
n’importe quel type de message.
Ces items d’e´valuation sont autant de points e´le´mentaires dans lesquels les donne´es
AIS pourraient ne pas eˆtre en conformite´ avec ce qui est attendu du point de vue des
spe´cifications techniques ou de´montrer une faille d’inte´grite´ du syste`me en pre´sentant
un couple ou un ensemble de donne´es incohe´rent. Quatre ordres d’e´valuations ont e´te´
e´tablis : un premier ordre ou` un champ d’un message est pris individuellement et traite´
au regard des spe´cifications du syste`me, un second ordre ou diffe´rents champs d’un meˆme
message sont compare´s entre eux, un troisie`me ordre ou` un meˆme champ ou diffe´rents
champs issus de messages diffe´rents mais du meˆme type (par exemple une succession de
message 1) sont compare´s et un quatrie`me ordre ou` diffe´rents champs de messages de
type diffe´rents sont compare´s. Des grandes familles d’items peuvent eˆtre e´tablies, ces
familles sont les proble´matiques de conformite´, les donne´es de champs incohe´rentes, les
proble´matiques d’e´volution de valeur d’un champ, d’une trajectoire, les valeurs inhab-
ituelles, une communication trop importante ou trop lointaine, un changement inattendu
de valeur d’un champ, les proble´matiques lie´es au positionnement ou a` la position meˆme
du navire, ou encore une re´ponse incohe´rente. Pour chaque message, chacun des items
est e´value´ de fac¸on binaire, et une valeur Vrai ou Faux leur est attribue´e en suivant la
logique des pre´dicats, permettant une e´valuation rigoureuse de chacun des items.
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L’utilisation des seules donne´es AIS serait suffisante dans le cadre d’un syste`me isole´.
Hors les navires e´voluent dans un environnement qui doit eˆtre pris en conside´ration dans le
cadre d’une e´tude base´e sur l’inte´grite´ du syste`me AIS et devant aboutir a` une e´valuation
des risques associe´s. Ainsi, toute source de donne´es dans laquelle un e´le´ment peut-eˆtre
compare´ a` une ou plusieurs donne´es issues de l’AIS peut servir pour cette e´valuation
comple´mentaire. Le syste`me AIS couvrant un large panel d’informations, de multi-
ples sources de donne´es peuvent eˆtre utilise´es, et trois familles principales ont e´te´ dis-
tingue´es : les sources de donne´es environnementales (donnant des informations a` propos
de l’environnement dans lequel le navire e´volue, telles que les donne´es me´te´orologiques),
les sources de donne´es oriente´es navires (avec les registres de peˆche par exemple) et les
sources de donne´es oriente´es navigation (avec les ge´ome´tries des zones d’inte´reˆt par ex-
emple, telles que les zones de mouillage ou les dispositifs de se´paration du trafic).
Afin de permettre une compre´hension de la situation d’un message par rapport a` son
analyse d’inte´grite´, un syste`me de fanions a e´te´ mis en place, un fanion e´tant un e´le´ment
en langage naturel de´crivant une situation donne´e lie´e a` l’e´tat du message, conse´quence
directe des analyses qui ont e´te´ effectue´es suite a` la re´ception du message. Un fanion est
boole´en et prend la forme d’une valeur Vrai ou Faux repre´sentant le statut de l’e´le´ment
de langage correspondant. Quatre types de fanions ont e´te´ de´finis : les fanions lie´s aux
items d’e´valuation de l’inte´grite´ et les fanions lie´s aux donne´es contextuelles, auxquels
sont ajoute´s des fanions directement lie´s a` la situation et a` l’e´tat du navire, fanions issus
de l’AIS mais ne constituant pas une proble´matique d’inte´grite´ qui sont les fanions lie´s
aux indicateurs de situation maritime et les fanions lie´s au type du navire en question.
Introduction
As AIS messages present vulnerabilities such as falsifications in their structure and data,
and that those vulnerabilities can lead to the creation or the increase of maritime risks,
the necessity of a treatment of data arises. In this chapter is proposed a method for
assessing such risks, based on the notion of integrity of AIS messages. In the proposed
method, a thorough examination of AIS messages enables the identification of integrity
items (over 900) which are elements in AIS complex structure in which AIS data may
disagree, which would be the indicator of an integrity problem. A system of flags, on the
one hand based on items and on the other hand based on additional non-AIS data, has
been developed, with the purpose of highlighting humanly understandable issues about
the system, in the frame of specified scenarios. The flags are raised when a combination of
integrity assessment item results are gathered, and the conjunction of some given flags will
trigger some scenarios and associated maritime risks, the final purpose being to deliver
in near-real-time added-value pieces of information to maritime authorities and rescue
centres, based on a risk level assessment.
A raw frame of AIS can be treated by the data side or by the signal side. This section
and this study concentrates on the data side, i.e. using AIS data once parsed into data
fields. The signal side, which consists of the study of the signal characteristics from a
physical point of view, has been performed by other actors of the De´AIS project (Alincourt
et al., 2016) (Collin et al., 2017).
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The method is made of three parts, the first two consisting each of a section of this
chapter and the last one being presented in chapter 6, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. The
first part is about the integrity assessment of AIS messages, the second one concerns the
falsification scenarios and the way situational flags are raised, and the third one is about
the way to the risk assessment based on the flags previously computed and the maritime
environment.
Figure 4.1: Methodology Workflow
The section 4.1 treats how all data fields have been discriminated via a nomenclature,
to create over 900 different integrity items (themselves uniquely described by a nomencla-
ture), and how the items work using predicate logic so that it is possible to assign them
a value True (if an integrity problem is demonstrated) or False (if no integrity problem is
shown).
Then, section 4.2 presents the available data for the scenario assessment, and more
particularly the various non-AIS databases which are usable in the process, such as a
polygon of the local port, or a fleet register. The various considered scenarios are then de-
scribed, as well as the various flags which are raised, following the results of the integrity
assessment. Those flags are of different nature, either directly coming from integrity item
results, or from additional data (as the fleet register database can provide useful pieces
of information on the identity of a vessel), for scenario assessment and for vessel neigh-
bourhood assessment (trajectory of the vessel, nature of the environment, the location,
the surrounding vessels and their trajectory).
4.1 Integrity assessment of messages
4.1.1 Data structure and fields nomenclature
4.1.1.1 A variety of message types
As displayed in section 3.3.2, the AIS messages are various, therefore they can be dis-
criminated in various families, each families having similar kind of messages, which will
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be able to undergo similar integrity assessment. Figure 4.2 presents several kinds of AIS
messages classification.
Figure 4.2: Variety of AIS messages
The column on the left-hand side of the Figure 4.2 displays the different kind of senders
for the AIS messages. Indeed, some messages are only sent by base stations (shore-based
stations or other non-vessel stations), others are only sent by mobile stations, and a large
number of messages can be sent by both mobile and base stations. In this scope, it is
not expected for vessels having a given MMSI number (discriminating it as a vessel or
as a base station, or even at a aid to navigation) to send messages which do not match
its category. The same column shows the messages that are sent by class A stations (i.e.
violet and blue ovals, not circled) and those sent by class B stations (circled ovals). It is
not expected that any MMSI can match any pair of (class A, class B) messages.
The column in the centre shows the variety of AIS messages, as it was previously stated
in section 3.3.2. There are several kinds of AIS messages, and all messages belonging to
the same kind will have the tendency to undergo similar studies. In addition, when it
comes to multi-messages assessments, any pair of similar messages will have the tendency
to propose similar items, as the data fields involved in the comparison of the messages
will tend to be present in both couple of messages.
The column in the right-hand side of the Figure 4.2 displays three of the main messages
families: the messages in which positioning is involved, the messages in which static data
is provided and the messages in which a communication between two vessels is involved.
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The fact, for a message, to have a positioning data (so a latitude field and a longitude
field) is that it opens all position-related assessments. Similarly, to have static data open
identity-related assessments and to have communication data (so a source MMSI number
and a destination MMSI number) opens all kind of analyses on the identities and locations
of those vessels. In this figure, the messages in grey do not belong to any of the three
kinds of messages families presented.
4.1.1.2 A variety of data types
The AIS messages are various and the data within can take several forms. The diversity of
the data fields types can be demonstrated by the study of the message number 5. Table
4.1 displays the fields of the message with the parameter represented and the type of
datum.
Field Data type
Message ID Numeric representing an identifier
Repeat Indicator Numeric representing a quantity
User ID Numeric representing an identifier
AIS version indicator Numeric representing a choice
IMO Number Numeric representing an identifier
Call Sign Textual
Name Textual
Type of ship and cargo type Numeric representing a choice
Overall dimension / reference for position Numeric representing a quantity
Type of electronic position fixing device Numeric representing a choice
ETA Date
Maximum Present Static Draught Numeric representing a quantity
Destination Textual
DTE Binary
Spare Binary
Table 4.1: Different data types in AIS Message 5
Six data types are then discriminated, which are: numeric representing an identifier,
numeric representing a quantity, numeric representing a choice, textual, date and binary.
A numeric datum representing an identifier is a piece of information linked to a unique
identification number of a kind, e.g. the “User ID” field stands for the MMSI number, a
unique identification number for an AIS emitter, or the “IMO number” field stands for a
number linked to the vessel given by the IMO as an unique identifier. Such fields can be
taken as primary key for further studies.
A numeric datum representing a quantity is a piece of information linked to a physical
quantity, in general the given value is not exact but rounded to a given precision for
data representation purposes and sensors physical limitations, e.g. in the message 5, the
maximum present static draught field is defined over 8 bits, with values ranging from 0 to
255, representing the corresponding physical quantity in 1
10
of meters, which means the
values range from 0 to 25.5 m, with a precision of 0.1 m.
A numeric datum representing a choice is a piece of information linked to the fields that
display their range of possibilities over a list of choices, the selected value representing the
choice of the corresponding item in the list. For instance the “Type of electronic position
fixing device” field ranges from 0 to 15, with some value unused, 10 of them are actual
possible choices. The field representing the type of electronic fixing device, according to
111
the message layout if the value if 1, it means that “GPS” is used, if the value is 2 it means
the use of “GLONASS”, and so on and so forth until the last possible value.
A textual datum is a textual piece of information, i.e. the bits are converted into
ASCII characters by groups of six (six-bit character code). Fields such as “Name” or
“Destination” require such information, necessary although impractical as the limitation
of the number of characters (20 for “Name” and “Destination”) can lead to problems in
cases where the actual name or destination needs more than 20 characters to be written.
In this case, abbreviations can be used but decrease the level of clearness of the field.
A date datum, represented here by the “Estimated Time of Arrival” field is a rare data
type for a field in AIS messages, represents a date under a given form, in the “Estimated
Time of Arrival” case being MMDDHHMM, i.e. the juxtaposition of month, day, hour
and minute pieces of information.
A binary datum is a field defined by a single bit, therefore taking only two possible
values: 0 and 1. Such a field is in general related to fields where a statement is declared
as true or false, a value superior or inferior to a given threshold or a choice in a list of
exactly two possible choices.
In addition to those data types that are found in normal use conditions, two additional
cases must be taken into consideration: default values and empty fields. Default values
exist in AIS messages, as some fields have a value which is designated in case no value
is allocated to it. For instance, in the case of message number 1, the longitude value
“181” is the default value, or the value “511” for the data field True Heading (Raymond,
2016). Empty fields often occurs in the data when a field has no value allocated to it, and
constitute an issue of data completeness.
4.1.1.3 A unique identification number for the data fields
As stated before, each one of those 27 messages have a certain amount of fields, as defined
by the International Telecommunication Union in (ITU, 2014), each field providing a
value. In our study, we are interested in every single field value of every single received
message, as the integrity of information in AIS and thus integrity of the system itself shall
be treated from the broadest possible point of view in order to get an all-encompassing
assessment. Furthermore, the complexity of the various AIS message types (as seen in
section 4.1.1.1) and layout (as seen in section 4.1.1.2) forces a clear identification of each
single data field.
The number of fields varies according to the message type, e.g. message 1 has 16 fields
whereas message 10 has 6 and message 22 has 19. Moreover, two similar fields can be
found in two different messages, and do not occupy necessarily the same position in both
messages, e.g. “Course over Ground” field appears in messages number 1, 2, 3, 9, 18, 19
and 27, and is located in those messages as the eighth field for message 18, the ninth field
for messages 9 and 19 and the tenth field for messages 1, 2, 3 and 27. In addition, a field
in a message can have the same name as another field in another message, represent the
same quantity and yet have a different inner definition, e.g. the field “Latitude” which
appears in 11 messages has two different layouts: in the first one the field is 17-bit long
(2 messages out of 11) and in the second one the field is 27-bit long (9 messages out of
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11). Furthermore, the first three fields are common for all messages: the message ID for 6
bits, a repeat indicator for 2 bits and the MMSI number of the source station for 30 bits.
This profusion of identical or barely identical fields in several messages is another step
forward for the necessity of a clear nomenclature of the fields, so that one specific field
cannot be confused with another one. Therefore, the nomenclature we propose connects
each field of each message to a unique three-characters string of type “XXY”, where
XX stands for a number between 01 and 27 corresponding to the message number and
where Y stands for a letter, between A and S (at most), the position of which in the
alphabetical order indicating the position of the field in the given corresponding message,
e.g. the field nomenclature “09E” corresponds to the fifth field (as E is the fifth letter in
the common English alphabetical order) of the message number 9, i.e. the “Speed Over
Ground” field. For the application of the nomenclature to AIS messages, three different
kinds of messages are exemplified in Table 4.2.
Nom. Field
01A Message ID
01B Repeat Indicator
01C User ID
01D Navigational Status
01E Rate of turn
01F Speed over ground
01G Position Accuracy
01H Longitude
01I Latitude
01J Course Over Ground
01K True Heading
01L Time Stamp
01M Spacial manoeuvre in-
dicator
01N Spare
01O RAIM-flag
01P Communication state
Nom. Field
05A Message ID
05B Repeat Indicator
05C User ID
05D AIS version indicator
05E IMO Number
05F Call Sign
05G Name
05H Type of ship and cargo
type
05I Overall dimension / ref-
erence for position
05J Type of electronic posi-
tion fixing device
05K ETA
05L Maximum Present
Static Draught
05M Destination
05N DTE
05O Spare
Nom. Field
12A Message ID
12B Repeat Indicator
12C Source ID
12D Sequence Number
12E Destination ID
12F Retransmit flag
12G Spare
12H Safety related text
Table 4.2: Nomenclatures of data fields for messages 1, 5 and 12
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4.1.2 Data integrity items
4.1.2.1 A four-order integrity assessment
Considering the data within the fields of the 27 AIS messages, four ways to discriminate
the inner integrity of those data can be distinguished, those four ways are displayed in
Figure 4.3. The first way consists of the control of the integrity of each field of each message
taken individually. The second way is at the scale of one single message, and assesses the
integrity, in this very message, of all the fields with respect to one another. As there are 27
types of messages, message of the same type have the same fields and it is thus possible
to compare them and assess their integrity, this makes the third way. Eventually, the
fourth way is the comparison and integrity assessment of the fields of different messages.
Indeed, although pieces of information can come from different messages, it is possible to
assess their integrity as some fields are either the same or linked or comparable. Those
four ways will then be referred as first-order, second-order, third-order and fourth-order
assessments, respectively. The first-order and second-order assessments only rely on one
message, and thus are invariant with the environment, whereas the third-order and fourth-
order assessments rely on several messages in data history (at least one other, up to an
entire time series for one vessel), and the result of those assessments can vary according
to the environment (the sample size, the location of the message within the sample).
Figure 4.3: The four-order assessment
The assessment of data integrity is done through integrity items, which are simple and
unambiguous statements involving one or several data fields, which are designed under
their nomenclature presented in section 4.1.1.3. Each statement is about one field, several
fields in the same message or several fields in several messages in which data could be in
discordance with the expectations of the technical specification or in which data within
the data fields could disagree, i.e. displaying two or more pieces of information that might
not been displayed in a proper or expected functioning of the system.
4.1.2.2 Nomenclature
An ad hoc nomenclature has been established so that each assessment can have a clear
unique identifier. There is a slight difference in the nomenclature between the first three
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orders and the fourth one.
For the first, second and third order items, the unique identifier is a character string
of five characters. The first two characters correspond to a number from 01 to 27,
corresponding to the message number, the third character is a letter: S, M or I. The “S”
letter stands for “Single field” and indicates a first-order assessment, the “M” letter stands
for “Message” and indicates a second-order assessment and the “I” letter stands for ”Inter-
message” and indicates a third-order assessment. The two last characters correspond to
a number from 01 to 12 (actual limit, whereas the theoretical limit is 99), which stands
for the number of the item for both its order and the message. For instance “09M03”
corresponds to the third item of second-order assessment for message 9.
For the fourth order items, the unique identifier is a character string of seven characters.
The first two characters correspond to a number from 01 to 27, corresponding to the first
message number, the two following characters correspond to another number from 01
to 27 (which shall be different from the first one) corresponding to the second message
number, the fifth character is the letter “I”, which stands for “Inter-message”. The
two last characters correspond to a number from 01 to 12 (actual limit, whereas the
theoretical limit is 99), which stands for the number of the item for both its order and the
two messages. For instance “0105I02” corresponds to the second item of fourth-order
assessment for the case where we have the message number 1 and 5 to compare, in the
case the assessed message is message 1. In the reverse case in which the assessed message
is the number 5, and that the assessment is done with respect to the message number 1,
the very same item would be called “0501I02” . This distinction is due to the fact that
the frequencies of the messages are not the same, therefore the relationships between the
messages are not bijective. Figure 4.4 sums up all the different kinds of nomenclatures.
Figure 4.4: The four-order nomenclature
4.1.2.3 Order one: Single-message single-field assessment
This section focuses on the cases of assessment of the first order, which are the simplest
as the only involve one single data field at a time. The values within the data fields
are defined by the International Telecommunications Union and a layout for each field of
each message is given, displaying all necessary information to a proper understanding of
an AIS message.
As the fields are allocated a given number of bits, the range of values is limited, and
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is easy to compute: for a field taking n bits, we have 2n possible values (plus the empty
field), resulting in a range going from 0 to 2n − 1.
However, in some fields the possible range for actual data as prescribed by the speci-
fications do not cover the entirety of the possible range. For instance the 05J field (Type
of electronic position fixing device) has a theoretical range of value of 16, however the
values 9 to 14 are not used, so in this case the practical range of values is smaller than
the theoretical one, as the practical range of value represents the values allowed by the
specifications of the system, including default values. Another example is in message 1,
where field 01H (longitude) extends between hexadecimal values of 0 and 66FF300 for
positive longitudes, between hexadecimal values of 9900D00 and 7FFFFFF for negative
longitudes (following the rules of the two’s complement for binary values), as well as the
hexadecimal value of 6791AC0, standing as a default value. As seen in Section 3.3.2.2:
Let Ωxi be the theoretical range of value of the i
th field of message number x, let Rxi be
the practical range of value of the ith field of message number x, then ∀i, x ∈ N2, Rxi ⊆ Ωxi
Figure 4.5 displays a list of assessment items of first-order assessments, with the nomen-
clature, in two kinds of messages: sent by a mobile station and sent by a fixed station.
Figure 4.5: Some order 1 item, from message 18
4.1.2.4 Order two: Single-message multi-field assessment
The assessments of second order are involving several data fields of the same message.
Remaining at the level of one single message, all possible disagreements between data are
listed. For example, in a position report message such as message number 1, 2 or 3, we
expect data in fields 01D (Navigational Status) and 01F (Speed Over Ground) to be in
accordance: if the 01D gives “moored” or “anchored”, a 01F value equal or very close to
0 is expected. A list of second-order assessment is proposed in Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6: Some order 2 item, from message 19
4.1.2.5 Order three: Multi-message single-type assessment
The third-order assessments involve several messages, but of only one message type, and
sent by the same emitting station (MMSI number). Those messages must also have been
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received by the same receiving station (although this condition might be withdrawn with
future developments). The scope is extended with respect to the first two orders and
now takes into consideration the environment. The number of messages involved in those
assessment items is variable, from only two (one message and the former one of the same
kind from the vessel in question) or a time series with all known messages of this type
coming from the vessel in question, in the study range or in the whole set of available
data.
The main feature of those assessment is to concentrate on the evolution of a field
along time, as well as the fields which are intended to change (which display a movement,
speed or position) as the fields which are not intended to change (the dimensions of the
vessel), or even the fields that are seldom expected to change, such as the name of the
vessel. Another feature is the predictive position computation (with only two messages
for instance), where the next expected position is computed from the former position,
speed, course over ground and rate of turn data. Other kinds of pieces of information
could also be predicted in this way, such as heading or speed. Source alignment could
also be a way to provide additional information to this study.
A list of several different third-order assessment items is presented in Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7: Some order 3 item, from message 2
4.1.2.6 Order four: Multi-message multi-type assessment
The fourth order of integrity items deals with several messages of distinct type, but still
coming from the same emitting station (and received by the same receiving station). It
can either be a comparison between two data fields in two messages (in this case the
closest message of the second kind in time is compared to the message of the first kind),
or an assessment between one message of the first kind and a time series of messages of the
second kind. Thus, we can concentrate on the possibility of the existence of two values in
different single messages or compare a datum with a series of data from data fields from
another message type. A list of fourth-order assessments is proposed in Figure 4.8
The number of items for each order and each message varies largely. A summary of
the number of identified items for each message is presented in Table 4.3.
4.1.2.7 Assessment classification
Two main kinds of assessments can be discriminated: the ones that assess conformity,
i.e. the conformity of the AIS message to the AIS specifications, and the ones that assess
coherence between data fields and messages.
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Figure 4.8: Some order 4 item, from message 1
The conformity items are all the first order items and a very small part of second order
items, the one in which conformity is assessed but the value of another field is required
in order to know if the value is present in the data field. It can occur in two cases: for
message 24 which is in two separate transmissions, and one part of the message can be
received and not the other part, so a query on an ad hoc data field is required to know
is the expected data is present; and some message (such as 22 and 25) present two kinds
of possibilities: address the message to a specific user or broadcast it to whom it may
be received by, in this case, a Boolean data field must be queried to know in which case
we are, and subsequently which are the nature of the relevant data fields in the message.
In the first order items, the presence of a default value does not constitute a conformity
issue, whereas the presence of an empty field in an item in which it is expected to have a
value does.
The coherence items are all the remaining second order items, as well as all the third
and fourth order items. Amongst all coherence items, eleven families of items have been
discriminated. They are presented in Table 4.4, with a precision on which order their
items can be found and a short description of their nature.
4.1.3 A logic-based formalism for item assessment
4.1.3.1 Item determination
Once the list of items determined, each item must be assessed following a rigorous process
in order to check the coherence or the conformity of the fields within. The value associated
with the item to the message assessed is assigned as Boolean, taking the value True or
False, considering this value as an answer to the question:
Is the statement expressed in the item demonstrating an AIS-data integrity
violation?
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Message # O1 O2 O3 O4 Total
1 10 3 9 51 73
2 10 3 9 51 73
3 10 3 9 51 73
4 11 4 5 22 42
5 8 0 8 44 60
6 4 3 2 12 21
7 6 10 5 36 57
8 2 0 1 0 3
9 7 2 5 10 24
10 5 1 2 7 15
11 11 3 6 29 49
12 4 3 2 12 21
13 6 10 5 36 57
14 2 0 1 0 3
15 11 3 3 16 33
16 5 3 3 8 19
17 6 1 4 20 31
18 9 1 5 31 46
19 12 4 10 35 61
20 3 0 1 0 4
21 7 3 7 10 27
22 12 4 4 3 23
23 13 2 2 0 17
24 2 4 7 16 29
25 2 2 2 8 14
26 3 2 2 8 15
27 7 4 6 28 45
Total 188 78 125 544 935
Table 4.3: Number of items by message and by order (O1 = Order 1, etc...)
If the item states something which occurs to end in an integrity problem, then the
value associated to this item for this message is True, else it is False.
In many cases, the item essence will not be assessed, for several reasons. In this case,
unless no assessment has been done, the value associated to this item is False, as the
integrity of the system has not been violated. For instance, third order algorithms require
a former message of the same type from the same sender, if such a message does not exist,
it does not constitute an integrity violation, despite no third-order item was properly
assessed. It is also the case for fourth order items with rare messages: for instance, as
the reception of a message number 13 is quite rare, it is highly probable that the item
“0113I01” will be seldom properly assessed, yet the value False will be assigned each time
that no message 13 shows up.
4.1.3.2 Exemplification with five items in a logic-based formalism
Predicate logic formally presents the actions that will lead on the determination of the
item integrity in a rigorous and unambiguous way. It relies on three main elements: the
syntax, the data fields values and the expert knowledge values. A logic-based formalism
based on predicate logic has been chosen for item assessment. The syntax is the whole of
the elements that make the statements logical and understandable. They are:
• ∀, for all, the universal quantifier
• ∃, the existential quantifier
119
Families # O1 O2 O3 O4 Description
Conformity issues X X Non compliance to the specifications
Inconsistent field values X X X Inconsistencies between two or more values, from the
same message or from different messages, such as speed
over ground and rate of turn, or course over ground and
true heading.
Data field evolution X X The evolution of the value of one data field in several
messages is not coherent, such as tremendous speed dif-
ferences in short amount of time, or brutal change of
position
Motion evolution X X The motion values between several data fields are not
in accordance, such as the position between two consec-
utive messages, given the speed over ground, the course
over ground and the rate of turn
Unusual values X X The value of one particular field is not in accordance
with the usual values of this field for this vessel in other
messages, such as a declared speed being over the usual
cruising speed of this vessel
Overabundant reporting X The vessel sends too many messages with respect to its
kinematic values and the expected transmission rate, in
absence of any message 23
Overabundant communication X The study points out that two stations are communi-
cating a number of times which is too important with
respect to usual communication between stations
Remote communication X A communication between two stations for which the
location data displays a distance between them which
is too important for a communication to take place
Unexpected data field change X X X The value of one particular field has changed with re-
spect to the former message of this vessel, usually a
static information field for which data is not expected
to evolve
Position fixing device issue X X X The vessel displays a position which is not compatible
with the declared position fixing device it is using
Unexpected country location X X X The station is a base station or an aid to navigation and
has position data which is not in accordance with the
country displayed in the country code part of the MMSI
number
Inconsistent response X The data field is part of a response message but the
message that triggered this response is nowhere to be
found, or the data field is an inquiry and the response
is nowhere to be found
Table 4.4: Families of items and the order in which they are found
• !, the uniqueness indicator for existential quantifier
• `, the implication
• ¬, the negation
• ∈, the affiliation
• ←, the attribution
• >, the True statement
• ⊥, the False statement
• ∪, the union
• ∩, the intersection
The data field values are the values called in the frame of our item. According to
section 4.1.1.2, they can take various types, and their number is function of the item
itself, as it can require very few data field or several.
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The expert knowledge is a set of values that have been determined for each item in
which it is necessary. Some items, such as the ones assessing conformity, are straightfor-
ward, as the data value is either is accordance with the specifications or in disagreement
with the specifications. However, for the determination of items in which, for instance,
continuous data such as speed or location are used, for which distances are computed,
a limit between the True and the False value must be set. In this perspective, expert
knowledge is used.
In the remaining of this section, Mx stands for the whole of messages number x, m
stands for a single message, D stands for a whole of data field values (a list of fields, set
in accordance with the need), Ta is a time bracket standing for the reference time (Ta
standing for Tassessment), Tc is a time bracket standing for the current assessment time (Tc
standing for Tcurrent)(i.e. we assess all messages received during Tc, using all messages
received during Ta as our archived message database, this mechanism will be explained
more in depth in section 5.1), Rzm stands for the result of assessment item z on message
m.
Example 1: Item 01S05: 01I: absolute value of the field is superior to 337F980h and
is not 3412140h
The purpose of this item is to check if the latitude value of message number 1 is within
the scope of expected values, which are [−90, 90] ∪ {91} (because the extent of longitude
is between −90 and 90 and the value 91 is the default value.
∀m(D, t) ∈M1, D = {id, lat}, t ∈ Tc
((lat ∈ [−90, 90] ∪ lat = 91) ` R01S05m ← ⊥)
(¬(lat ∈ [−90, 90] ∪ lat = 91) ` R01S05m ← >)
Example 2: Item 05S07: 05J: field value is between 9 and 14
The purpose of this item is to check if fixing device value of message number 5 is within
the scope of expected values, which are J1 ; 8K ∪ {15}.
∃K = J1 ; 8K ∪ {15}
∀m(D, t) ∈M5, D = {id, fixdevicetype}, t ∈ Tc
((fixdevicetype ∈ K) ` R05S07m ← ⊥)
(¬(fixdevicetype ∈ K) ` R05S07m ← >)
Example 3: Item 16M01: 16C and 16E are identical
The purpose of this item is to check if the MMSI of the source of the message is
different than the MMSI of the vessel to which the message is emitted.
∀m(D, t) ∈M16, D = {id, sourcemmsi, destinationmmsi}, t ∈ Tc
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((sourcemmsi = destinationmmsi) ` R16M01m ← >)
(¬(sourcemmsi = destinationmmsi) ` R16M01m ← ⊥)
Example 4: Item 01I05: 01H and 01I field values evolution is not consistent with 01F,
01E, 01J and time
The purpose of this item is to check the position of the vessel is in accordance with
the kinematic values of the messages. This item uses additional function of trajectory
planning which have been named f and g in this item.
∃f : [−180, 180]× [−90, 90]× [0, 102.2]× [0, 4.21]× [0, 360]× [−180, 180]× [−90, 90]→ R+
∃g : [0, 102.2]× [0, 4.21]× N∗ × N∗ → R+
∀m(D, t) ∈M1, D = {id, lon, lat, speed, rateturn, course}, t ∈ Tc
((∃!m′(D′, t′) ∈M1, t′ ∈ Ta, t′ < t,D′ = (id′,mmsi′, lon′, lat′),mmsi =
mmsi′,min∀t′∈Ta(t
′ − t)) `
(Λ = f(lon, lat, speed, rateturn, course, lon′, lat′),Ω = g(speed, rateturn, t′, t) :
(Λ < Ω ` R01I05m ← ⊥),
(¬(Λ < Ω) ` R01I05m ← >)))
(¬(∃!m′(D′, t′) ∈M1, t′ ∈ Ta, t′ < t,D′ = (id′,mmsi′, lon′, lat′),mmsi =
mmsi′,min∀t′∈Ta(t
′ − t)) ` R01I05m ← ⊥
Example 5: Item 0305I06: 05J field value is 4 and 03H and 03I is not a possible
location for Loran-C navigation
The purpose of this item is to check if fixing device value of message number 5 is in
accordance with the location of the vessel as displayed in message number 3. As the value
of the data field 05J is 4, it is expected that Loran-C is used for position fixing. But
Loran-C can only be used in given areas, that have been defined here under the variable
Dom.
∃Dom, x ∈ J1 ; 8K ∪ {15}, x = 4, τ ∈ N∗
∀m(D, t) ∈M3, D = {id,mmsi, lon, lat}, t ∈ Tc
((∃!m′(D′, t′) ∈M5, t′ ∈ Ta, t′ < t,D′ = (id′,mmsi′, fixdevicetype′),mmsi =
mmsi′,min∀t′∈Ta(t
′ − t), t′ − t < τ) `
(fixdevicetype′ = x ∪ ¬({lat, lon} ∈ Dom) ` R0305I06m ← >),
(¬(fixdevicetype′ = x ∪ ¬({lat, lon} ∈ Dom)) ` R0305I06m ← ⊥)),
(¬(∃!m′(D′, t′) ∈M5, t′ ∈ Ta, t′ < t,D′ = (id′,mmsi′, fixdevicetype′),mmsi =
mmsi′,min∀t′∈Ta(t
′ − t), t′ − t < τ) ` R0305I06m ← ⊥)
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As a conclusion of this section, we can say that description logic is an useful way
to describe items in a deterministic way under an unambiguous form (as it provides a
Boolean result), in order to assess the integrity status that this item represents. In this
scope, a substantial part of the 935 defined items have been formalised this way.
4.2 Falsification scenarios
4.2.1 Data for scenario assessment
Once computed, the Boolean result of the integrity items will be the cornerstone of sce-
nario assessment, as it will be described in section 4.2.3. However, a study that would
be based on sole system data would be possible but incomplete, as the environment in
which the vessel evolves is ignored. In this scope, the addition of other data, which is not
coming from the AIS system, is presented.
4.2.1.1 Necessity of data integration
The fact to concentrate on the sole data coming from the system itself is interesting for the
integrity assessment of the system, and would be perfect if the system were an isolated
system. However as the world around the system evolves such configuration is never
found and it is always useful to rely on additional data in order to have a more accurate
study. A proper understanding of a situation sometimes needs several points of view, and
the point of view of a sensor might not be enough to discriminate a situation considered
normal from a situation considered abnormal. Indeed, a situation considered abnormal
with respect to one system data might be explained from another data source, and in a
contrary case, an expected situation from a system point of view can be highlighted as
abnormal in light of non-system data.
And of course, as the AIS is set on a vessel which has some characteristics, and evolves
in a environment which has some others features, other non-AIS data can be used to
deepen the analysis. As the environment itself evolves, the understanding of the behaviour
of the vessels can be enhanced by those external sources of information. Indeed, on the
one hand a piece of information or a group of pieces of information can look casually with
perfect data integrity with only inner data assessment and some discrepancies from this
normality could then be provided by external databases (e.g. a fishing vessel has a valid
MMSI number and a classical fishing behaviour, however it is not registered in the official
fishing fleet register); and on the other hand a piece of information or a group of pieces of
information that can look anomalous on the basis of sole inner data could then be cleared
by the use of external data and turn back into a normal behaviour case (e.g. a vessel
which would deviate from its classical route due to the will to avoid an obstacle such as
a storm).
The variety of possible datasets enables an approach on multiple frames, although it is
an enhancement from the message-only study which constitutes the core of the integrity
assessment.
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4.2.1.2 Integrable databases
The databases that may be added for analysis extension are in general various, but they
depend on the nature of the main system data.
Basically, every single source in which a single of its data fields can be useful in any
type of assessment with the data coming from the system can be considered. As the
system data can cover a wide range of information, the sources in question can be varied
and come from several different domains. In general, it is not possible to establish an
exhaustive list of such usable sources, because of several reasons: it is not possible to be
aware of all available sources on a given subject, the sources evolve, appear and go out of
date in an unpredictable pattern.
Those sources can come from several domains (albeit sometimes there is no clear
belonging to a domain for a source), and the more close will be the domain in question
to the data transmitted by the system, the more there is a chance that this database fits
for any assessment. The variety of the domains covered by the selected databases (cf.
section 5.2.1.3) shows the variety of information inside the system, that can therefore be
assessed.
In the case of AIS messages, the selected databases must at least be related to maritime
navigation, even by far. Three main families of databases have been discriminated: exter-
nal information can be split into environmental, vessel-oriented and navigation-oriented
databases. The AIS presents the advantage of having 27 different messages, each one
carrying specific pieces of information, and as a whole, the system has a quantity of in-
formation coming from a number of data domains which is particularly important. The
precision of some pieces of information and the large opportunities offered by some par-
ticular messages are far from being fully covered in our study.
Environmental data would embrace all kinds to database with a relation with the
environment in which the vessel evolves. Meteorological databases with data such as
temperature, pressure, wind force, waves height and rainfalls can be useful for behaviour
understanding as stated before. In another category tidal information and bathymetric
maps can be useful for the understanding of coastal navigation, particularly when it comes
to notions such as draught and under keel clearance. In addition, databases representing
sea areas enter in this category, as they give clues to the environment in which a vessel
evolves. Such areas can include anchorage areas, protected areas, fishing grounds, ex-
clusive economic zones and all zones related to a degree of sovereignty of a coastal state
towards a vessel sailing off its coast (such as the notions of internal waters, territorial sea,
archipelagic waters, contiguous zone or continental shelf), areas where undersea material
in located, military restricted areas, port areas and in general any two-dimensional feature
standing for a navigational-useful tool.
Vessel-oriented databases would gather the different fleet registers available, from the
freely online available European Union Fishing Vessel Fleet Register to charged Lloyd’s
Register. In our case, we used the ANFR (Agence Nationale des Fre´quences, the French
National Agency for Frequencies) fleet register. Such registers contain data and a com-
parison of AIS data with them will then be possible. Insurance databases could also be
used for such assessment, by themselves for a further study or from the outside with
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publicly available information. In addition, receptor-specific pieces of information can be
added in this category, such as the location of AIS data receptor, as well as their coverage
areas: theoretical with respect to the local topography models and the Earth curvature or
practical with respect to actual data reception, which may vary with time, meteorological
conditions, time in the day or season in the year.
Navigation-oriented databases would concentrate all kind of information linked to the
navigation and the route of the vessels, for instance all kind of traffic separations (such
as TSSs), the aids to navigations such as navigational lines or fairways. The coastline,
enabling several analysis, or the location of ports can be included in this category, as
well as location of aids to navigation such as buoys, semaphores, beacons and lighthouses.
Other sensors such as radar can be included, as well as origin and destination habits of
vessels.
4.2.2 A range of falsification scenarios
4.2.2.1 General considerations
A falsification scenario is a case considered when we are involved in integrity analysis of
a system. As systems in general can be falsified, it is important to point out the different
cases in which they can undergo a falsification. As a falsification is the fact to transmit
erroneous data or the fact to trick the system making him behave a way it is not supposed
to do, a falsification case will be one particular falsification, one particular way to change
data, input false data or force the system to behave the wrong way.
The diversity of the falsification cases will tend to reflect the diversity of possible ways
to flaw the system, i.e. the possibility offered by the data itself: the more complex, the
more data, the more complete the system is, the more possibilities for falsify data we will
have; but also the possibilities conveyed by the way the system works and its interactions
with the outer world (for instance a system based on electromagnetic transmissions will be
able to suffer from interferences or any signal-related issues); as well as the possibilities
conveyed by the exposure of the system to human interaction, i.e. how easy it is to
modify the parameters of the system, to change the normal functioning of the system or
the easiness to shut down the system.
Each one of those cases, once clearly stated, becomes a falsification case with a clear
definition. Then, it is possible to assess those cases by associating to each case assess-
ment elements in order to check the reality of the selected falsification. The advantage
to consider falsification cases is that despite the fact that several individual assessment
provide information about a discovered issue in the data, it will be possible to gather all
those pieces of information in those falsification cases, being expected, in the frame of a
risk analysis, that all cases belonging to a single falsification case will cause and imply
the same kind of risks.
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4.2.2.2 Selected cases
Several falsification scenarios are possible in the case of AIS falsification and spoofing,
this section presents a list of falsification scenarios which is not exhaustive, but which
corresponds to the ones we chose to implement in our work1. The scenarios are presented
in the Table 4.5 and a description of each scenario is proposed subsequently, with an
exception of the signal branch of the study, which is not the subject of this section.
Case # Case Description
1.1 MMSI issue
1.2 Identity issue
1.3 Identity change
1.4 Ubiquity issue
2.1 Wrong position
2.2 Kinematic inaccuracies
2.3 Disappearing/Reappearing vessel
2.4 Spontaneous unexpected appearing
3.1 Message 22 alert
3.2 Message 23 alert
Table 4.5: Various considered falsification scenarios
The first family of cases is about static information and identity data of the vessels.
In this family, we chose the issues related to the MMSI number, the identity issues, the
identity change (that might be normal but might be suspicious) and the ubiquity issues
(which is the fact to receive positions too remote from one single MMSI). The second
family gathers analyses upon all dynamic and kinematic information of AIS messages, and
the scenarios selected are about the wrong position of a vessel (such as inland reporting),
kinematic inaccuracies, the fact to disappear and reappear in unexpected location (in this
case a voluntary switch off of the system may be suspected) or the fact to spontaneously
appear in an unexpected location. In addition to those classical approaches, a third one
is proposed with the last family, with two messages which are amongst the most peculiar
messages of the system: the message number 22 (channel management) and number 23
(group assign command). Only sent by base stations, those messages send operational
parameters to mobile stations which are of paramount importance: they assign and can
change the frequency of transmission (more particularly the transmission channel) in the
case of message 22, and impose a transmission interval or a forced quiet time to mobile
stations in the case of message 23.
A thorough presentation of those scenarios will be done in section 5.2.3.
4.2.3 From the integrity assessment items to the scenarios flag
raising
4.2.3.1 Definition of flags
Inside the scenarios themselves as described in section 4.2.2, there are several ways to
assess data, and several ways to point out the problems in the data, the discrepancies or
1Others have been implemented in the frame of the De´AIS project, such as the scenarios linked to the
analysis of the signal, or the number of messages received by one station by unit of time, or the number
of messages received from one given MMSI number (saturation)
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cases of unreliable data. In this frame, a basic element for anomaly detection has been
defined. This element is part of a scenario, and assessed during the assessment of the
scenario in question.
As basic elements of the scenario part of the study, they will serve as elementary bricks
of the risk determination and risk level assessment presented lately in section 6. As their
value is either “No” or “Yes”, those basic elements have been called flags, and will be
referred as such in the following sections of this document. Each one of those flags stands
for a fundamental explicit case of integrity breach in the data assessed.
Two main families of flags can be discriminated: flags directly linked to the integrity
items previously computed and flags linked to assessments with data coming from outside
the system. The flag is a Boolean value, and its initial value is False. Then, if the
scenario in which the flag is located is assessed then its value can be changed to True if
the conditions for this particular case to raise the flag are gathered.
The number of flags assessed actually depends on the number and type of available
databases, as the flags linked to the integrity assessment items do not vary over time.
The more available databases we have, and the more those database are able to provide
pieces of information for a great number of flags, the more flags we will have.
Let Si be the i
th scenario, n being the number of scenarios, C ′Si be the number of flags
directly linked to integrity assessment items and system data, C ′′Si be the number of flags
linked to assessments with data coming from outside the system, we can say that the total
number of flags F is:
F =
n∑
i=1
C ′Si + C
′′
Si
= F ′ +
n∑
i=1
C ′′Si , as F
′ = Cst =
n∑
i=1
C ′Si
In this section, in the scope of the study of the AIS system, four kinds of flags are
presented, two belonging to the family of the flags linked to integrity assessment items
and system data (so which number does not vary over time): the integrity assessment items
flags (section 4.2.3.2) and the vessel type flags (section 4.2.3.5); and two belonging to the
family of the flags linked to non-AIS data (so for which the number of flags varies with
respect to available data): the scenario-specific flags (section 4.2.3.3) and the maritime
situational indicators flags (section 4.2.3.4).
4.2.3.2 Flags linked to the integrity assessment items
In section 4.1.3 was defined a method for determining the integrity status of every single
integrity assessment item. However, this method treated data fields separately and it was
not possible to easily drag any information from it. However, as it was demonstrated
in section 4.1.2.7 that items can gather around families, the purpose is to extract from
each set of items corresponding to each message type issues that are humanly easily
understandable, which are the flags, presented in section 4.2.3.1.
Each one corresponds to a specific issue in the analysis of AIS messages. For instance,
one of the flags is called “remoteness”, and corresponds to the fact to have two communi-
cating vessels despite the fact that the location they pretend to have makes the distance
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too high for their communication.
As stated before, a flag is a Boolean that takes the value False if no problem is spotted
and True if a problem is spotted according to the relevant associated items. The False
value is the default value, and the True value is triggered as soon as one of the associated
items has a False value.
For each of the items in each scenario, a list of corresponding integrity assessment
items have been established, the results of which must be queried and assessed in order to
get the outcome of the flag computation. The list of integrity items for each flag is fixed,
and the list of flags which directly use integrity items results is fixed for each scenario,
therefore the list of integrity items needed for each scenario can be easily obtained by
gathering all items of every single flag of the given scenario.
In this example, the case “remoteness” for a message 1 is taken. For it, the associated
items are: “0106I01”, “0107I01”, “0107I02”, “0107I03”, “0107I04”, “0110I01”, “0112I01”,
“0113I01”, “0113I02”, “0113I03”, “0113I04”, “0115I01”, “0115I02”, “0116I01”, “0116I02”,
“0125I01” and “0126I01”.
∃K = {0106I01, 0107I01, 0107I02, . . . , 0125I01, 0126I01}
∀m(t) ∈M1, t ∈ Tc
(
⋃
i∈K(R
i
m = ⊥) ` f remoteness← ⊥)
(¬(⋃i∈K(Rim = ⊥)) ` f remoteness← >)
As several scenarios have been set, and several families of items discriminated, several
flags can be set, each one representing a given understandable type of issue. In addition
to the “Remoteness” flag presented before, the flags that have been defined and tested
will be presented in section 5.2.2.
Other flags, oriented towards the signal analysis part of the whole system can also be
defined and raised if needed, for instance in order to know is a vessel is reporting too
much in general, reporting too much in a given area, sending too many times the same
message, or on the contrary if it does not send enough messages, or if it failed the signal
consistency analysis performed.
4.2.3.3 Addition of scenario-specific data flags
In addition to the flags raised after a study on the data field, other flags coming from ad-
ditional data can be raised. Those flags are totally dependent on the available databases,
and each flag will be tied on the content of the database. Therefore there is no fixed list
of those scenario-specific flags, as it will vary according to the available databases.
The fact to use such databases is particularly important in order to be aware of the
environment of the system, and the assessments provided are as various as data coming
from the system enable it.
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Each flag is associated with one particular assessment type involving both system data
and non-system data (i.e. it is necessary to query both AIS and non-AIS data before
assessing the item), then the computation of the result is done in a specially designed
algorithm, as if the system side of the computation is fully known, the non-system side of
the computation is subject to vary with respect to the database used. Therefore it is not
possible to write a general assessment program but it is necessary to adjust the program
to the data structure and type of the non-system database. As in the flags determined
from integrity items, the default value is False, and it is changed to True whether the
conditions set on the values coming from the databases by the algorithms are gathered.
The large amount of data within the AIS system and the variety of possible databases
in the maritime domain increase the possibilities to find cases in which matching pieces
of information are available, and therefore increase the possibility of integrity checks. A
list of those databases will be presented in section 5.2.1.3. Two assessment examples of
the many possible integrity checks and flag determination are presented here.
Exemple 1: f fleetRegisterConsistency
This item assesses the conformity of AIS data with a given fleet register, in our case
the European Union Fishing Vessel Fleet Register (which contains the list of EU fishing
vessels). It turns out that the fields in common are the call sign (which will serve as
foreign key, usable for a join), the vessel dimensions and the vessel name (which will be
the values compared).
Let B be the EU fishing vessel database, b be an element of B,  be a Boolean standing
for the fact for B to be exhaustive (> = exhaustive), Distα be a semantic distance (here
an Edit distance), Distβ be a Minkowski distance (here a Manhattan distance), Ξ and Υ
be the respective thresholds for semantic and Minkowski distance for data compliance.
∀m(D, t) ∈M5, D = {id, callsign, name, dimensions}, t ∈ Tc
((∃!b(Db) ∈ B,Db = {callsignb, nameb, dimensionsb}, Distα(callsign, callsignb) = 0) `
((Distα(name, nameb) < Ξ ∪Distβ(dimensions, dimensionsb) < Υ) `
(f fleetRegisterConsistency ← ⊥),
(¬(Distα(name, nameb) < Ξ ∪Distβ(dimensions, dimensionsb) < Υ)) `
(f fleetRegisterConsistency ← >)),
(¬(∃!b(Db) ∈ B,Db = {callsignb, nameb, dimensionsb}, Distα(callsign, callsignb) =
0) ∪  = >) ` f fleetRegisterConsistency ← >
(¬(∃!b(Db) ∈ B,Db = {callsignb, nameb, dimensionsb}, Distα(callsign, callsignb) =
0) ∪  = ⊥) ` f fleetRegisterConsistency ← ⊥
Example 2: f disapreap
This item assesses checks if a vessel disappears in an unexpected disappearance area
and reappears later in a unexpected reappearance area. For convenience, and as we do
not have reliable practical coverage map to rely on, the area designated as Unexpected is
defined by: the bay of Brest minus the port of Brest.
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Let Abay and Aport be the polygons representing respectively the bay and the port of
Brest, and τ be the minimal time between two consecutive messages.
∀m(D, t) ∈M1, D = {id,mmsi, lon, lat}, t ∈ Tc
(∃!m′(D′, t′) ∈M1, D′ = {id′,mmsi′, lon′, lat′}, t′ < t, t′ ∈ Ta,min∀t′∈Ta(t′−t), t′−t > τ) `
(((((lon, lat) ∈ Abay),¬((lon, lat) ∈ Aport), ((lon′, lat′) ∈ Abay),¬((lon′, lat′) ∈ Aport)) `
(f disapreap← >)),
((¬(((lon, lat) ∈ Abay),¬((lon, lat) ∈ Aport), ((lon′, lat′) ∈ Abay),¬((lon′, lat′) ∈ Aport))) `
(f disapreap← ⊥)))
(¬(∃!m′(D′, t′) ∈M1, D′ = {id′,mmsi′, lon′, lat′}, t′ < t, t′ ∈ Ta,min∀t′∈Ta(t′ − t), t′ − t >
τ)) ` (f disapreap← ⊥)
4.2.3.4 Addition of MSI flags
Indeed, as it is not possible to rely only on system data, a peculiar category of non-
system data gathers the flags that are not only related to system data but the assessment
of which does not enter in any scenario case. By non entering any scenario case, they
will not directly lead to any following risk assessment, however they are useful as they
provide additional pieces of information which will be added to the other flags in the risk
analysis.
In the maritime domain those flags represent relevant facts of the maritime navigation
that are relevant for such assessments. Such artefacts are named Maritime Situational
Indicators (MSI), after the name of the concept found in literature, where such pieces
of information about the vessel and its neighbourhood have been developed by (Roy
and Davenport, 2009) (called Maritime situational facts) and (Pallotta and Anne-Laure
Jousselme, 2015) (called this way), used in (A.-L. Jousselme et al., 2016).
Therefore, in addition to the previous flags, other issues about the neighbourhood of
the vessel, or its status, can be investigated. Those issues, linked to the environment
(its location) or the surrounding vessels have the purpose of clarifying the navigational
situation and helping the understanding of a maritime given situation.
A great amount of flags can be raised with MSIs, and some of them, the most interesting
for the cases we are interested in, will be presented in section 5.2.2. Here is presented one
simple algorithm of this kind, and as before the default value is False, changed to True
when the event in question is verified.
Assessment Example: f isinTSS
This item determines wether or not the vessel is in the TSS.
Let A be the TSS area,
∀m(D, t) ∈M1, D = {id, lon, lat}, t ∈ Tc
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(((lon, lat) ∈A) ` (f isInTSS ← >))
((¬((lon, lat) ∈A)) ` (f isInTSS ← ⊥))
4.2.3.5 Addition of vessel type flags
This last section, particular to our assessment of AIS, gathers all the flags that do belong
to the category of system-only data but are not based on data integrity items. In our
case, this section is made of the flags standing for the vessel type, as the vessel type has
been discriminated as a key factor for the risk assessment of falsification cases that will
be presented in section 6.
In our case, four vessel types have been discriminated, so each one has a flag which
is False if the vessel is not of the type in question and True if the vessel is of the type
in question. As the data type is part of AIS static message information, it is possible to
assess it easily. Three additional flags have been set for this case: if the vessel has not a
valid vessel type (as a vessel can display a number which is not affiliated to any type),
if a vessel has a type which does not enter the four main categories as we will define in
section 6.5.1 and if, for a vessel, it is not possible to know the type because of lack of
static information message linked to the MMSI (for instance if we get a message number
1 from a MMSI for which we do not have a message number 5, it is not possible to know
its vessel type).
So seven flags have been set, of which in every single case one and only one is True and
the remaining six are False. Those flags will be used in combinations for risk assessment
as it will be stated in section 6.4. Here is presented an example of such flag assessment.
Assessment Example: f isFishingVessel
This item determines whether or not the vessel is a fishing vessel (or if it emits a type
corresponding to a fishing vessel).
∀m(D, t) ∈M5, D = {id, vesseltype}, t ∈ Tc
((vesseltype = 30) ` (f isF ishingV essel← >))
((¬(vesseltype = 30)) ` (f isF ishingV essel← ⊥))
Conclusion
In this chapter a methodology for system message assessment was presented, leading to
the determination of flags for the vessel behaviour for the message. All system messages
are assessed with respect to all the different integrity items, in order to point out the cases
for which non-compliant or non-coherent data is shown. System data is also compared
to non-system data in order to point out issues that could not have been revealed only
by using system data. The scenario defined triggers different analysis according to their
nature, and eventually raises flags if some item analysis or non-system data analysis
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turns out to demonstrate an integrity failure. An implementation of this methodology is
proposed in the next chapter with the use of AIS messages, the 935 integrity assessment
items presented before, the AIS database enhanced by several non-AIS data, and the flags
to assess that we are interested in.
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Chapter 5
Implementation of a system of
detection of corrupted AIS messages
Chapitre 5 : Imple´mentation d’un syste`me de de´tection
de messages AIS corrompus
Ce chapitre pre´sente l’imple´mentation de la me´thode propose´e au chapitre pre´ce´dent. Du
point de vue du traitement de l’information, une approche a` plusieurs re´cepteurs a e´te´
choisie. En effet, bien que notre validation ne reposera que sur les donne´es d’un seul
re´cepteur, son de´ploiement ope´rationnel complet ne´cessiterait le traitement de donne´es
issues de plusieurs re´cepteurs (dans le cadre d’une analyse centralise´e des donne´es par
exemple, et cette perspective a e´te´ prise en compte.
L’analyse en temps re´el se base sur le principe de l’analyse asynchrone des messages,
avec un pas de temps, ou` a` chaque nouveau pas tous les messages rec¸us n’ayant pas encore
e´te´ traite´s le sont. Ainsi, nous sommes assure´s que chaque message soit traite´ une seule
fois. L’imple´mentation a e´te´ re´alise´e en python et les donne´es ont e´te´ stocke´es au sein
d’une base de donne´es relationnelle postgres/postgis. A chaque boucle de traitement, les
re´sultats interme´diaires et les re´sultats finaux de l’analyse sont stocke´s dans des tables
spe´cifiques de la base de donne´es, et peuvent eˆtre amene´s a` faire l’objet d’une requeˆte
SQL dans le cadre des traitements.
Ainsi, pour chaque item et pour chaque sce´nario propose´ a` l’e´tude, le programme
python effectue une requeˆte sur la base de donne´es afin de re´cupe´rer les informations
utiles pour l’e´tude en question, puis le programme analyse l’item, assigne une valeur et
ce re´sultat est enregistre´ dans la base de donne´es sous la forme d’une requeˆte au sein du
programme.
Afin de mener a` bien les expe´rimentations, nous be´ne´ficions de donne´es AIS recueillies
par une antenne situe´e a` Brest durant six mois entre 2015 et 2016, couvrant une grande
partie de la baie de Brest, le goulet d’entre´e ainsi que le trafic passant au large, dans le
dispositif de se´paration du trafic d’Ouessant. En plus de ces donne´es AIS recueillies, des
donne´es AIS de synthe`se ont e´te´ utilise´es pour pouvoir be´ne´ficier de cas dans lesquels une
situation donne´e se re´alise.
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Outre les donne´es AIS, la base de donne´e contient des donne´es contextuelles permet-
tant une e´tude croise´e, ainsi des donne´es relatives aux stations radio coˆtie`res, aux zones
naturelles prote´ge´es, aux zones de mouillage, aux zones de peˆche, au port de Brest, a` la
baie de Brest, aux zones e´conomiques exclusives sont disponibles, de meˆme que des reg-
istres de flottes de navires, les couvertures the´oriques et pratiques du re´cepteur de Brest,
les traits de coˆtes ou les positions des ports.
Parmi les fanions principaux se´lectionne´s, on peut noter ceux concernant une distance
trop grande pour la communication, des proble`mes avec le code pays du navire, son
nume´ro de matricule, sa trajectoire, ou encore le fait qu’il pre´sente de l’ubiquite´ ou une
pe´riode importante sans transmissions. Des fanions lie´s aux donne´es contextuelles vien-
nent enrichir la connaissance de la situation, tels que le fait de ne pas eˆtre dans un registre
de navire, ou d’y eˆtre mais de n’avoir pas des donne´es cohe´rentes, ou le fait d’apparaˆıtre
soudainement dans une zone inattendue.
Dix cas d’e´tudes ont e´te´ de´finis dans lesquels il est constate´ que les fanions leve´s
correspondent au comportement qui est attendu en de telles circonstances. Aussi, la
re´action du syste`me pour quatre cas qui sont l’ubiquite´, la cohe´rence avec les registres
de peˆche, la position vis-a`-vis des valeurs cine´matiques et l’apparition inattendue ont e´te´
ve´rifie´s. Il s’agissait, pour chacun de ces cas d’e´tudes, de s’assurer que les e´le´ments que le
syste`me a mis en avant comme relevant d’une anomalie consistait bien en une anomalie
au regard des donne´es AIS et e´ventuellement contextuelles correspondantes. De plus, le
temps de calcul s’e´levant a` environ 40% du laps de temps e´tudie´, le syste`me est assez
rapide pour pouvoir effectivement eˆtre utilise´ en temps re´el.
Introduction
This chapter presents the actual implementation of the methodology presented in the
previous chapter, leading to the risk level assessment of AIS messages. First are presented
the implementation of the program, the architecture and the choices made in the coding
part of the project. Then the available data is presented, the AIS training dataset as
well as non-AIS data, and the evaluation scenarios are presented. Then, the validation of
the approach is presented, consisting of the application of the information system in the
previously stated evaluation scenarios and the observation of the flags raising.
5.1 Software and implementation
This section presents the implemented system in its various sides. First the fact that the
implementation is made for a multi-receptor approach is highlighted, although only one
receptor is used for the validation, the theoretical frame of the use of several receptors have
been thank up. Then the principles of real-time analysis as implemented in the program
are presented, followed by the implementation choices and the schematic architecture
presented with deployment and sequence diagrams of how does the program process data.
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5.1.1 A multi-receptor approach
5.1.1.1 From the reception of the raw AIS frame to the database storage
Upon reception from an ad hoc antenna, the AIS message has the shape of a raw frame of
data, that must be processed in order to get exploitable data. This step is called parsing
and occurs in a parser.
Despite the existence of software built-in parsers, and as our study require full handling
of all dimensions of the process, we designed our own AIS parser in Java language, derived
from an already existing parser1.
The parser has the function to split the raw message into the data fields corresponding
to the given message, the number of fields, the sequence of fields and the number of bits
associated to each field, in accordance to the data specifications, as it was presented in
section 3.3.2.
However, the AIS messages do not, in their large majority, carry date and time infor-
mation. In order to have usable dates and times for the AIS messages we receive, the
parser uses a clock to put a timestamp on each frame. The fact to put a timestamp is
done at the time of parsing, however, as parsing is performed upon arrival of the message,
it can be taken together with the reception time and, with respect to the distances in
question and the speed of electromagnetic emissions in the air, the printed timestamp
will in most cases be the emission time of the message.
Once all data fields have been discriminated, they are stored in a relational database
(one table per message), the columns of which matching with the parsed elements. Two
timestamp columns are added at the end of each table: the timestamp under the form
date and time in day, for explicit understanding of the time of the message reception, and
the timestamp transformed under the form of an integer, using UNIX epoch full seconds,
allowing simple handling and computations on time values.
5.1.1.2 Various data source consideration
The AIS system is a global system. Therefore, the system must be used with several
stations and must be able to take into consideration several cases. Indeed, as illustrated
by Figure 5.2, both terrestrial and satellite reception must be handled, particularly in the
case of a worldwide analysis, as non-coastal areas are not covered by terrestrial AIS. In
addition, the same message can be received by several stations, and those messages, while
being identical, might be (slightly) diversely timestamped.
In order to deal with those different receptors, a receptor id has been created and
integrated in the database: in each message table, a column “receptor”, of type integer,
have been created, with the purpose of uniquely discriminate each reception station. In
our case, as we only use data from one reception station, this column value is always “1”,
but the feature have been anticipated for further software evolutions.
1https://github.com/tbsalling/aismessages
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Figure 5.1: Process of AIS message parsing
Figure 5.2: Integration of diverse data source
Such use of receptors opens a new dimension for integrity items. Indeed, in addition to
the four principal orders of data treatment presented in section 4.1.2.1, a specific receptor-
based order could be developed. As we do not have several receptors, such inter-receptor
items have not been developed, but the nomenclature is flexible and opened for further
evolutions.
5.1.2 Real time analysis
The system proposed in this section is designed to handle both real-time analysis case
and work with archived data. As the handling of the case with archived data is quite
straightforward, the handling of real-time data needs some particular features in the
architecture.
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As messages arrive continuously, and as some messages arrive at the same time, it is
not possible to treat all the messages one by one, on the fly. However, it is possible to
treat messages by small groups with respect to their time of arrival, i.e. at a given time,
all messages received in the last t seconds are assessed, and the process is repeated, so
that every message is treated at least and at most once. We consider t = a + s, with a
being the assessment time, i.e. the whole computational time of the program and s being
the waiting time, i.e. the time when the system pauses. This waiting time can be set at
5 seconds, 10 seconds or one minute according to the needs of the final user. This makes
the system to be not an on-the-fly real-time system but an asynchronous quasi-real-time
system. Figure 5.3 illustrates this method.
The need for this architecture is directly inducted from the data treatment process,
where a group of messages with, for each of the 27 messages, their id between given bounds
are consecutively assessed for the items, the scenarios, the flags and the associated risks,
as described in chapter 4.
Figure 5.3: Data Analysis Flow
As it was stated in section 4.1.3.2, two temporal windows have been defined for com-
putational purposes: Ta and Tc. Tc is defined by the temporal boundaries of the processed
data in a given processing loop. At each loop, the new Tc must directly follow the Tc of
the former loop, with no message loss and with no temporal overlap. Ta is defined by
the temporal boundaries of the data taken into consideration in the cases of former data
request, in items seeking for former data in order to make data comparison, or temporal
series assessment.
Ta and Tc are defined as follow for the loop number N , considering tmini = time of
analysis beginning, tN = time of beginning of the analysis for the loop N , tN−1 = time
of the end of waiting time for loop N − 2 (also time of beginning of the analysis for loop
N − 1).
Ta = [tmini, tN ] Tc = [tN−1, tN ]
Figure 5.4 illustrates the functionning of continuous time sections assessments.
From the implementation point of view, a table was created in the database, with
27 lines and 4 columns. The 27 lines correspond to the different AIS message numbers:
indeed, as each message has its own identification number counting, each message must
have a different entry in the database, as the same time bracket will not correspond to the
same identification numbers for the same message. The 4 columns stand for the message
number and the three id numbers of the corresponding message, corresponding to the
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Figure 5.4: Time Sections Handling
times tmini, tN and tN−1 discriminated before. At each loop, the table must be updated
with the new up-to-date data so that the analysis can be performed correctly, according
to the correct time brackets and message spans.
Figure 5.5: Functionning of a loop
At system initialisation, tN−1 = tmini (as defined by the user, either 0 or a given
minimum value), and tN takes the id at the time the first processing unit begins.
As the system is also usable with archived data, it works as follow: the system is made
of a single loop, processing all messages at the same time. However, as the database
table is used in the problem, it must be filled in with fixed values, corresponding, for
each message, to the minimal (for tmini and tN−1) and the maximal (for tN) values of id
the user wants to assess. Of course, the id bounders must be consistent with time for
the different messages, so that the multi-type multi-message assessment defined in section
4.1.2.1 is possible.
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5.1.3 Implementation choices
5.1.3.1 Use of Postgres/PostGis
For data storage and data manipulation, it was chosen to use a relationnal database
management system. This choice was made for the ability of such systems to find data,
write, sort, modify or transform data in database, and ensuring the user of a level of
robustness of the analysis by avoiding information loss or partial assessment. The choice
of the widespread relational database management system Postgres was made, using the
SQL querying language, with the adjunction of the Postgis extention, for the treatment
of spatial features.
5.1.3.2 Use of Python
As there was a piece of software to be built, the choice of a programming language was
made. The language Python was chosen for several reasons: easy to handle, Python
enables the database querying with embedded SQL and convenient handling of query
results. In addition, Python has good math libraries for statistical computations.
5.1.3.3 Use of user interactions
User interaction and user choice occurs at several points of the process. Although the user
is not expected to input any information while the program is running, some parameters
and input data are needed. Those are the director file, the scenario list and the waiting
time.
The director file is a text file taken as input by the program. In this director file are
listed all the items the user want to be assessed by the program. Each new item must
occupy a new line in the text file, and each one of the lines will trigger the study of this
item in the program, as it will be explained in section 5.1.4. By default, during a standard
assessment, all implemented items must be assessed, and therefore the default director
file is the full list of all available items, but the choice to remove any item or set of items
that would be of no interest for the user is up to him or her. It is also possible to leave
the director file empty, so that the previously computed item results can be re-used for
scenario and risk assessment, as it will be presented in section 5.1.4.
The scenario list is specified by the user, in which the user designates the scenarios he
or she wants to be assessed. Indeed, some scenarios might not be of interest for the user.
However, as the risk assessment is based on flag combination, as presented in chapter
6, and that the flag determination is based on the several scenarios assessed, the fact
not to choose all scenarios for assessment will prevent all the flags from being assessed,
and therefore induct a non-encompassing risk assessment, which could be acceptable with
regard to the user needs. As the scenario computation is based on item assessment, each
scenario is linked to a list of items which must be present in the director file. Should
only one of the needed items be absent from the director file, the corresponding scenario
assessment could not be performed properly. By default, as and alike all items which are
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listed in the director file, all scenarios are present in the scenario list.
The waiting time is, as presented in section 5.1.2, the time between the end of one
loop and the beginning of the following loop. By default, the time is set at 10 seconds,
but the user might want faster refreshes (up to 1 second) or longer interval time (several
minutes or hours are conceivable).
5.1.3.4 Separation between item execution and item computation
The proper use of the program requires the assessment of a list of items. For practical rea-
sons, it was decided to separate two main bodies of each item assessment: the execution,
in which the program queries the database to get all the needed information (information
about the message in question, information about all other messages that are involved
in the item assessment) and the computation, in which the algorithms take as inputs all
data field information. In this way, many algorithms will be similar (as in the same family
of assessment, as defined in section 4.1.2.7, algorithms tend to look alike). It is a way to
factorise the coding, and a way to facilitate algorithms changes if needed.
5.1.3.5 Keep open to new features
As the program is evolutive, and as the AIS system itself it not fixed, the way the program
was conceived is explicitly done for enhancement and evolution. Indeed, the list of items
is not fixed, as the AIS system still evolves, the items might come up and be included in
the program. Similarly, some deep features of AIS were not processed, such as the content
of binary data message. Their adjunction would create new items to be integrated in the
system.
The nomenclature is also flexible, as it allows new kinds of item nomenclature, involving
more messages if needed, and more importantly the items of another order (that would
be the fifth one) in the case of the simultaneous use of several receptors.
The scenario case is also open, as new scenarios with new flags might come up, adding
new features to the flag combination list and new ways to compute risk levels.
5.1.3.6 Storage of intermediate results
For the storage of intermediate results, it was chosen to keep nothing as variable in the
program, but to store everything in the database right away after each item assessment
and after each scenario computation. This enable the systematic querying of the database
by the program, and the storage of data for future reference, particularly for comparisons
between assessments. Are stored in the database: the item computation results, the flags
after scenario computation and the risk level associated with each AIS message.
Are also stored in the database pieces of information useful for the computation itself,
such as the current work window (the minimal and maximal id of the computation for
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each message, as it was presented in section 5.1.2) and the risk level tables (that will be
presented in section 6.5.1).
5.1.3.7 Independent treatment of scenarios
The several discriminated scenarios are treated separately for various reasons. On the one
hand, such separation enables, as displayed in section 4.2.3.2, not to run every scenario if
not needed. On the other hand, it is a implementational help as it helps us to discriminate
several files and parallelise the implementation of the program.
5.1.3.8 Use of non-AIS data
The use of non-AIS data has been soon discriminated as an important feature of this work,
as it takes into consideration the environment in which the vessel evolves. However, as
it is not possible to know which non-AIS data will be available, it was not possible to
include those analyses into the scheme of items, which are only built for AIS information
which can be assessed at each message and whatever information available. Therefore,
the integration of such external assessment was added to the scenarios analysis, as those
database are in general oriented towards one particular scenario, and specific flags are
displayed with respect to each database available.
5.1.4 Schematic architecture
5.1.4.1 Database properties
In the database, messages must be treated as they arrive (according to the process defined
in section 5.1.2), without any conjecture on their timestamp, therefore the primary key
must be an identifier which increments as messages arrive. AIS messages will be stored in
a relational database in which each message type must have its own table (each one with
its incremental id then), the properties of receptors must be stored, as well as external
information.
The database gathers several main parts (which are presented in Figure 5.6): the AIS
message database, with its 27 tables standing for the different messages, as presented in
section 4.1.1.1. The real-time info gathers all information in relation to the treatment
of data in near-real-time asynchronous mode, especially the values of the minimum and
maximum id that must be treated at each loop for each message, as described in section
5.1.2. External data is a database gathering all non-AIS data useful for the further analysis
of scenario cases, as described in section 4.2.1.2. The databases available in our case are
presented in section 5.2.1.3. The receptor data database gathers all information about the
various receptors used, such as the type of material used, the location of the receptor, the
theoretical coverage area and the practical coverage area. The analysis results database
gathers all tables created during the analysis and used as analysis intermediates. A final
result table presenting the highlighted anomalies with the degree of risk associated is also
present.
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Figure 5.6: Database composition
5.1.4.2 Deployment diagram
The deployment diagram presented in Figure 5.7 displays the different parts of the system.
Figure 5.7: Deployment diagram
The reception unit has the purpose of receiving the physical signal, process it and parse
the AIS messages, then push them into the database. The software uses the director
file and database information to process data, as it will be presented in the following
subsections, and the database presents the features presented in section 5.1.4.1, as receptor
data is considered as non-AIS data and risk levels come in addition for risk assessment.
The visualisation box is the feature enabling the visualising feature for the end user.
Although the development of this unit is not part of this study, it is necessary to consider
it as it will take in entry parameter one of the outcomes of our piece of software.
The program functions according to the following steps: working window update, Item
Assessment, Flag assessment, Risk assessment, waiting time and it goes all over again.
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More precise information about the way the program works for the item, flag and risk
assessment are presented in the following sections (in this chapter) 5.1.4.3, 5.1.4.4 and (in
the next chapter) 6.6 respectively.
5.1.4.3 Item assessment in the program
In the program, as presented in Figure 5.8, the item assessment involves the external file
in which the items are listed, various elements of the database (the AIS messages, the
working window table and the result tables), as well as several elements of the program
which are the main file, and some functions, including the functions for item execution
and the functions for algorithm calculation.
This part of the program works as a loop, looping on the lines of the director file, with
an initialisation done at the first line. Then, four cases are possible, and four alternative
computation cases occur at each loop. The read item is either of order 1 and 2 (so with
only one message to query), or of order 3 and 4 (so with several messages to query), or
with a bad format (non-existent item), in this case the program returns the fact that this
item has not been treated) or no value, in the case the last line has already been computed
at the previous loop, and in this case the loop ends right away.
Figure 5.8: Sequence Diagram of the Item Assessment
In both order 1 and 2 and order 3 and 4, the table of results for the item is created in the
database if it does not exist yet. Then the AIS database is queried for the interesting data
fields for this item and for the temporal span corresponding to the working window. Once
143
the AIS values are returned, they are stored in a table and a loop occurs on it, treating
one by one the messages within the working window. At this point, the treatments differ
with respect to the order of the algorithm.
If the item is of order 1 or 2, the values are directly assessed by the corresponding
algorithm, and filled in the result table of the item once all the messages in the working
window have been treated.
If the item is of order 3 or 4, another query to AIS messages database is necessary in
order to get all the other pieces of information from the other messages, either from the
same message type (order 3) or from another message type (order 4). Once the result
of the query has been stored, the assessment via the corresponding algorithm can occur,
followed by the filling in of the result table in the database once all the messages in the
working window have been treated.
Out of the 935 defined items of all order, a total number of 666 have successfully been
implemented into our system.
5.1.4.4 Flag assessment in the program
The way the flag assessment is done in the program is presented in Figure 5.9 and involves
several parts of the program (the main scenarios file, the specific scenarios file and the
algorithms related to the scenarios) and several parts of the database, which are the AIS
messages tables, the non-AIS features tables, the results of the item algorithms, the result
of the flag assessments and the working window table.
Figure 5.9: Sequence Diagram of the Flag Assessment
First, the working window table is queried in order to get the corresponding data.
Then the main scenario files contains a vector in which all the scenarios to be assessed
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are defined, and a loop is performed in the enumeration of this vector (in order to assess
only the scenarios we choose to analyse).
For each of the scenarios, the flag table corresponding to the scenario in question is
created, then the corresponding item results are queried and stored in the program for
further flag studies. Then, for each one of the messages in the temporal working window,
and for each one of the various assessment leading to the determination of a flag, the same
process is repeated.
In each case, the specific scenario case calls the algorithms corresponding to the given
assessment, and this algorithm successively calls AIS and non-AIS data in order to perform
a computation leading to potential raising of the flag. The flag results are then returned
to the specific scenario file, and once all assessments for each message of the temporal
window have been performed, all the computed flags are stored in the table created in
this respect.
5.2 Experiments
In this section, the available data are presented, on the one hand the AIS data, with
both the dataset from the Brest antenna and the messages constructed ad hoc for this
analysis, and on the other hand all the non-AIS databases available which can be, as
stated previously, of environmental, vessel-oriented or navigation-oriented nature. Then
a selection of the various flags that have been put in place are presented, and the selected
cases in which those flags will be assessed are presented, belonging to three families of
analyses: the one based on the identity of the vessel, the one based on the kinematics of
the vessel and the one based on the use of highly unlikely types of messages.
5.2.1 Available data
5.2.1.1 Received AIS data
By setting up an antenna in the Brest Bay, near the Brest city, in direct sight of the Brest
bay bottleneck, it was possible to get AIS data from a great part of the bay, from the
entering and exiting traffic and on the passing-by traffic in the Ouessant TSS.
All the data received by this antenna during a time span of six months is used for our
study, from October 1st, 2015 to March 31st, 2016. The number of messages of each type
is presented in Table 5.1.
As the messages were divided in families, Table 5.2 presents the repartition of message
number by family. This table shows that the positioning messages form the vast majority
of all received AIS messages.
The image in Figure 5.10 show the spatial extent and repartition of our spatial AIS
messages, a close-up on the Brest harbour, the data being reduced to the amount of data
received during one single day by our antenna (Figure 5.11).
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Message # Number %
1 15003029 62.4
2 194 0.001
3 3225148 13.4
4 2803971 11.7
5 882708 3.7
6 0 0
7 2 
8 150026 0.6
9 303673 1.3
10 2769 0.01
11 315 0.001
12 0 0
13 0 0
14 46 
15 11 
16 0 0
17 0 0
18 954462 4.0
19 128 0.001
20 1 
21 505764 2.1
22 0 0
23 0 0
24 201567 0.8
25 11 
26 5 
27 63 
Total 24033893 100
Table 5.1: Number of messages per message type
Message family # Number %
Total 24033893 100
Geospatial 22493074 93.6
Communication 2798 0.01
Static 1084275 4.5
Mobile station only 20369720 84.8
Base station only 2803972 11.7
Mobile and base stations 860201 3.6
Standard 20570972 85.6
AToN 505764 2.1
Timing 2807055 11.7
Safety 46 
Binary 150044 0.6
Other 12 
Table 5.2: Number of messages per family type
Figure 5.10: A view of the location of the geolocalised points in our AIS dataset
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Figure 5.11: A view of the messages in the Brest Bay received during one full day
It can be demonstrated that some AIS messages come from circa 700 km, although the
theoretical maximum distance is about 50 km. This is due to the atmospheric ducting
effect. Figure 5.3 shows the distance repartition for AIS messages number 1.
Area # of messages % of all messages
≤ 5km 2489174 17.01
5 km ≤ D ≤ 10km 7832507 53.53
10 km ≤ D ≤ 15km 412234 2.82
15 km ≤ D ≤ 20km 424469 2.90
20 km ≤ D ≤ 25km 499194 3.41
25 km ≤ D ≤ 30km 843719 5.77
30 km ≤ D ≤ 35km 1252174 8.56
35 km ≤ D ≤ 40km 329931 2.25
40 km ≤ D ≤ 45km 290382 1.98
45 km ≤ D ≤ 50km 61844 0.42
50 km ≤ D ≤ 55km 56087 0.38
55 km ≤ D ≤ 60km 58947 0.40
60 km ≤ D ≤ 65km 39516 0.27
65 km ≤ D ≤ 70km 19211 0.13
70 km ≤ D ≤ 75km 13391 0.09
75 km ≤ D ≤ 80km 10346 0.07
≥ 80 km 369903 2.53
Total 15003029 100
Table 5.3: Number of messages 1 per distance section in our dataset
5.2.1.2 Synthetic AIS data
In addition to genuine AIS data, some AIS frames were built intentionally in order to
be able to validate some scenario cases. Indeed, some of the cases involve rare or never
received messages, other require a condition on data which is rare (for instance an AIS
location on shore, or a weird-looking trajectory such as the one presented in (Balduzzi,
Pasta, et al., 2014)). In order to have data to assess, and test and validate the algorithms,
some ad hoc AIS frames were done, each one corresponding to a given scenario.
The fact to built those frames and use them directly rather than broadcast them
and insert them into a stream received by the receptor is linked to the nature of those
messages, which can carry information which is about a potential threat of terror attack, or
about acts of cyberattacks. The experimental broadcast of such messages is not welcome,
particularly as the station is in the neighbourhood of a Sub-Surface Ballistic Nuclear
Basis.
In order to do so, a software prototype has been developed to generate the frame,
either by selecting each value out of the various data fields, or by dynamic generation of
a vessel behaviour by the program.
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5.2.1.3 Non-AIS data
As stated in section 4.2.1.2, three kinds of non-AIS databases are discriminated: environ-
mental, vessel-oriented and navigation-oriented. In the case of our study because we use
data from a Brittany-based station, some dataset have a limited spatial extent around our
point of interest, while other are global. Of course, such datasets must be in accordance
with the location and the spatial extent of the data assessed.
Environmental
World Seas. This database is made of polygons standing for the main seas of the
main contiguous body of water. It can be useful to determine of two vessels are broadly
in the same region of the world, or as a quick test for communication between a coastal
station and a vessel
Dredge material areas . In some maritime area, caution in the activities must prevail
as some material lay on the ground. This database gathers the location of areas where
dredged material or other potentially harmful materials (such as explosives or chemical
waste) have been deliberately deposited. Thus, some particular assessments can be done
in those areas when a dredging vessel or any other vessel with a vessel type unveiling
possible action of the bedrock is located in those areas or in close proximity to them.
Radio Coastal Stations. This database gathers radio beacons which are on the
shore of the French region of Brittany.
Natura 2000 areas . In this database, a collection of maritime Natura 2000 areas
is shown for all the countries of the European Union. Those areas are protected from an
environmental point of view and human activities inside the area or in its neighbourhood
must be assessed.
Anchorage areas. In this database are gathered a series of anchorage areas in the
proximity of the Brest harbour. Those areas are dedicated areas for vessels which must
wait before entering the harbour, or in its proximity, so that stopped vessels are not
staying within communication routes. Then, if a vessels presents a very low or null speed,
it is possible to check whether or not this vessel, according to its type, is in an area where
anchorage or loitering is logical (i.e. such anchorage areas, or ports). As it is a spatial
feature, trajectory intersections are possible, and inquiries on the vessels speed within this
area can be done.
FAO fishing areas. This database gathers all information about the worldwide
regions that the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN has set for the world seas.
In our case, its use is restricted to the fishing industry, for example to know if fish coming
from a given vessel has a declared FAO fishing area consistent with the areas in which
the vessel effectively sailed and had a fishing ground behaviour.
Polygon of an harbour . In our database, we have a polygon representing the
harbour of Brest. It is then possible to do spatial request on this basis in order to
understand some behaviours, monitoring the vessels entering or exiting this area. As
some operations are likely to occur in a port, such as a name change, it would then be
useful to see if the location of identity changes intersects with ports polygon, particularly
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when it comes to raising alerts.
Polygon of a bay . In our database, we have two polygons: one representing the Brest
Bay strictly speaking and another one representing the extended Brest Bay. Likewise
with the harbour, it is then possible to manage spatial request in order to be aware of the
traffic, and in relation to AIS falsification, it can be proceeded to the verification of the
appearance of the vessel, as the vessel coming to Brest are expected to be visible before
their entrance in the bay.
Fishing locations . A database providing usual fishing grounds can be used to assess
if a vessel displaying a fishing behaviour is doing it inside an usual fishing ground, or if
it is not the case. An assessment on the fishing pressure can also be extracted from this
database.
Exclusive economic areas. In this database, all the Exclusive Economic Zones
of the world are gathered. This can be useful to determine the quality of some at-sea
operations as well as the competent court in some activities.
Vessel-oriented
Fishing Vessels Fleet Register . The European Union provides a list of all fishing
vessel that uses a flag of one of the countries of the Union, free of charges. This fleet
register is very partial because it only concerns fishing vessels, representing only a fraction
of the navigating vessels, but it can provide a fair training sample for some algorithms,
that could be extended if a more complete database is available. The data field to be
matched with AIS data would be the international reference call sign, then the comparable
data (i.e. same data present or inferable in the two databases) being the name and the
vessel length.
ANFR Fleet Register . This table represents the fleet register of the French Agence
Nationale des Fre´quences, which includes a great number of French-registered vessels.
Receptor location . This table gathers the location of the various AIS receptors.
In our case only one is used, however the method has covered the integration of several
receptors. As the receptor location is known, the conformity of message reception can be
assessed, and the communication between stations can also be checked.
MMSI country codes. The three-digit country code at the beginning of each MMSI
number are paired in this database table with the name of the country. It is then possible,
with another table, for instance the country polygons, to check if a vessel mainly deserves
ports of its flag (detection of flags of convenience), or if a coastal station with fixed
coordinated is well located within the country its country code displays.
Theoretical coverage of the receptor . In this table, for each receptor, its the-
oretical coverage region is materialised by a polygon. Thus, it is possible to assess the
location from which an emitted message is received, particularly if it is far outside the
area. In addition, the arrival of a new vessel and the disappearance of a sea-going vessel
are expected to happen around the limit of the theoretical coverage for a given receptor,
and it is then possible to assess if it is the case. The range of the theoretical coverage can
be computed by the formula for radio communications provided by the IMO.
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Practical coverage of the receptor . In this table, for each receptor, its practical
coverage region is materialised by a polygon. With respect to the theoretical coverage
geometry, it has the advantage to take into consideration the possible masks that the
antenna has with respect to some sea areas, and possibly to consider variations of the
range due to particular conditions.
Navigation-oriented
European coastline . This database provides the coastline for European shores.
Yet it is not worldwide, it is more than enough for us as we focus on French coasts.
The algorithms can then be extended to other continents if an usable database of the
coastlines of this continent is added. The knowledge of the coastline enables several
analyses, mostly spatial, such as the proximity of a vessel from the coast, to ensure the
proximity of a coastal station from the coastline, or to give clues on the possible masks
between stations that could be caused by topography.
TSS of Ouessant . This base contains the area of the TSS of Ouessant, off the coast
of Brittany, separating the traffic in both directions that are from or are going to either
the English Channel or Cape Finisterre in Spain. As a TSS is a security tool in maritime
navigation, security assessment can be performed, with for instance the presence of a
vessel outside the navigation channels, or the fact for a vessel to leave its channel, or
even to find out a vessel that would optimally cross the TSS, thus augmenting the risk of
boarding.
Location of ports . In this database, the location of ports around Brittany is gath-
ered. As ports are supposed to be designated in the “Destination” field of message 5, the
fact to have the name and location of ports will enable studies on vessel trajectory, for
example to check if a vessel is heading towards the declared port or not, and even to know
if a vessel if heading towards a port or if it is heading towards the coast. As a vessel can
head to a port without physically pointing its course over ground towards it, a study on
the profusion of vessels declaring the same destination while not heading to it can also
be performed. Similarly, a database of fishing ports in provided in another database, for
related studies.
Navigational lines. This database gathers recommended lines for maritime naviga-
tion. As those lines are recommended, vessels are welcomed to follow them for optimal
security and vessels are expected to follow them as much as possible. Studies on vessel
trajectories and distance to the recommended line can then be performed.
Location of fairways . This database gathers fairways around Brittany. Fairways
are the main bodies of water on which vessel are located. It is commonly expected to
find a vessel on those fairways, and whereas navigation is free in authorised areas outside
fairways, it could be considered as an anomalous behaviour, so such an assessment based
on such database has its place in our study.
5.2.2 Discriminated flags
As seen in section 4.2, flags that can faithfully and clearly describe the situation must be
set, and four families of flags have been discriminated: the flags linked with the integrity
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assessment and system data items, the flags that describe the vessel type, the flags that are
linked to scenario-specific analyses and those standing for maritime situational indicators.
The flags describing vessel types have all already been presented in section 4.2.3.5.
Their number might be extended in the future if more precise vessel type families are
designed, but as for now, the flags are: is a cargo or tanker, is a cargo or tanker carrying
hazardous goods, is a passenger vessel, is a pleasure, fishing or service vessel, is of other
type or has an incorrect vessel type, given that for each vessel one and only one of those
flags is raised. An additional flag is here in case no static information message have been
linked to the studied message (in this case, it is not possible to know the vessel type).
As for the flags linked to the items, several scenarios have been set, and several families
of items discriminated, several flags can be set, each one representing a given understand-
able type of issue. In addition to the “Remoteness” flag presented before, the flags that
have been defined and implemented are:
• f country: This flag is raised when the country code of a vessel is not valid
• f MMSI: This flag is raised when the MMSI has not a valid form, in any of the
possible shapes a MMSI number can take (as presented in section 3.3.2.3.1)
• f ubiquity: This flag is raised when a vessel displays diverse locations in a short
amount of time
• f nextposition: This flag spots the case when the position of a vessel is not in
accordance with the kinematic and positional values of the message before
• f trajectory: This flag is raised when one point out of a trajectory is not in accor-
dance with the remaining of the trajectory
• f bigTemporalGap: The flag is raised when two messages are separated with an
amount of time too important according to the technical specifications
• f outOfScope: The flag is raised if the location coordinates are not valid
• f outOfArea: This flag is up when a vessel transmits in a location where it should
not locate itself due to its declared position fixing device
• f unusualLocation: This flag is raised when a vessel displays a location which is
highly unusual for it
This list is not exhaustive, and other flags, oriented towards the signal analysis part of
the whole system can also be defined and raised if needed, for instance in order to know if
a vessel is reporting too much in general, reporting too much in a given area, sending too
many times the same message, or on the contrary if it does not send enough messages, or
if it failed the signal consistency analysis performed.
Some of the flags describing scenario-specific situation, as presented in section 4.2.3.3
are presented here. Those flags, in addition to the flags raised after a study on the data
fields, are other flags coming from additional data that can be raised. Those flags are
totally dependent on the available databases, and each flag will be dependent on the given
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database used. Therefore there is no fixed list of those scenario-specific flags, as it will
vary according to the available databases. Some examples of such flags are:
• f notInFleetRegister – Needs a fleet register database. The flag is raised if the
vessel is not in the database while it should (as a cargo is not expected to be in a
fishing vessel register, but a fishing vessel is). This flag has been implemented in
the program.
• f fleetRegisterConsistency – Needs a fleet register database. This flag is raised if
the studied is in the database and if the data within has discrepancies with the AIS
data. This flag has been implemented in the program.
• f isInBlacklist – Needs a vessel blacklist. The flag is raised if the vessel is in the
blacklist
• f notHeadingTowardsDeclaredPort – Needs a port list database with port locations.
The flag is raised is the vessel is not following a route that leads to the port declared
in the “Destination” field
• f hasBathymetricDiscrepancies – Needs a bathymetric database. The flag is raised
if the vessel is located in a location it should not be according to local bathymetry
and declared draft value
• f disapreap – Needs expected appearance areas for the station. The flag is raised if a
vessel disappears from a location located outside the expected appearance/disappearance
area and reappears a long time after in a location which is outside the expected ap-
pearance/disappearance area. This flag has been implemented in the program.
• f suddenapp – Needs expected appearance areas for the station. The flag is raised
if a vessel suddenly appears in a location which is outside the expected appear-
ance/disappearance area. This flag has been implemented in the program.
• f slowSpeed – Needs anchorage areas, fishing grounds. The flag is raised if a vessel
has a slow speed without being in a area where having a slow speed is normal
As described in section 4.2.3.4, a great amount of flags can be raised with MSIs, and it
is not possible to extract an exhaustive list of them. However, the Table 5.4 presents some
flags for cases we might be interested in. Not all of those flags have been implemented
yet, however a thorough study may need such an implementation.
5.2.3 Assessment cases
In section 4.2.2.2 were presented the selected cases at a glance. In this section, all those
cases that have been named will be presented in details, in order to highlight their legit-
imacy for being case studies acknowledging our hypotheses. Three families of cases are
present, linked to the identity (beginning by “1”), linked to the kinematics (beginning by
“2”) and linked to the peculiar messages 22 and 23 (beginning by “3”). In the remaining
of this manuscript, all MMSI numbers presented in cases in which real data have been
used have been anonymised.
152
f isHeadingTowardsAPort f isInRestrictedFishingArea
f isHeadingTowardsTheCoast f isInExclusionArea
f isLoitering f isInProximityToACoast
f isCarryingHazardousCargo f isComingFromADubiousLocation
f isInTSS f isHeadingTowardsADubiousLocation
f isNotRespectingATSS f isNotFollowingAMaritimeRoute
f isInPort f isInCollisionCourseWithVessel
f isInAnchorageArea f isInCollisionCourseWithInfrastructure
f hasPassengerVesselBehaviour f hasAlledgedLocationInHazardousArea
f hasAlledgedLocationInExclusionArea f hasAlledgedLocationInFishingRestrictionArea
f hasAlledgedLocationInAnchorageArea f hasAlledgedLocationInCollisionCourseWithVessel
f hasAlledgedLocationInCollisionCourseWithInfrastructure f hasFishingVesselBehaviour
f hasCargoTankerBehaviour
Table 5.4: List of MSI flags
5.2.3.1 Case 1.1: MMSI value and country code
In this scenario, the fact for a vessel to sail with an impossible MMSI number or an
unattributed country code is assessed. Indeed, the MMSI layout can only follow some
patterns, at it was shown in section 3.3.2.3.1, and in addition in each MMSI number,
three of the digits stand for the country, and there is a list of possible combinations.
If the vessel displays a number which does not match with any country, it is a case of
falsification.
Experimental Case (A):
In this case, one item per message is directly linked with the validity of the MMSI
number. Several cases must be assessed, as MMSIs are different for mobile stations and
coastal stations. In addition, the country code is verified and the problems are raised
under the flag f country. All the integrity assessment items used in this case are of the
first order, as the expected format for a MMSI is given by the specifications and the list
of country prefixes is fixed (flag f MMSI). In this example, we took messages number
1, supposed to have vessel-only MMSI source field (9 numbers, included the country
code) and messages number 4, supposed to have base station-only MMSI source field (7
numbers, included the country code). The system response is presented in Figure 5.12
and the Table 5.5 presents the flags raised for each of the cases.
Case # Mess # MMSI f country f MMSI
1 1 227111111
2 4 227111111
√
3 1 2271111
√
4 4 2271111
5 1 282111111
√
6 4 2821111
√
7 1 2821111
√ √
8 4 282111111
√ √
Table 5.5: System reaction to several MMSI numbers
5.2.3.2 Case 1.2: Identity incompatible with database
This scenario deals with the cases where the values linked to the vessel are not in accor-
dance with some data that might be available through databases. The feasibility of this
scenario highly depends on the external database (mainly a fleet register), as a common
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Figure 5.12: System response of MMSI treatment
field must be found out and used as the comparison basis of the analysis. Most matches
will be done with the MMSI number or the call sign of the vessel. Typical comparisons
will be about the name of the vessel, the length of the vessel or its gross tonnage, for
instance. The completeness and accuracy of the database must be determined prior to
the analysis, as the completeness assesses the number of vessel in the database with re-
spect to all the vessels we might receive a message from, and the accuracy the fact for the
database to be more or less up-to-date, with more or less accurate data.
Experimental Case (B):
This case is directly linked to the scenario-specific flags as a fleet register database is
needed. Integrity is assessed between the AIS messages and the fleet registers available,
where first the fact to belong in the database is assessed (which will result in the raising of
the flag f isNotInFleetRegister if it is not the case) and second the checking of the various
data in both AIS and fleet register databases in case there is a match, in order to assess
the integrity of information within (raising the flag f fleetRegisterConsistency). Figure
5.13 displays the process for the study of this case. As it involves static information,
only messages 5 are assessed. In our case, the elements belonging to both databases were
the name of the vessel and the dimensions of the vessel. The Levensthein distance was
taken as edit distance, with a maximal admissible distance of 5 (in order to take into
consideration the small discrepancies between string values standing for the name of the
vessel) and a total difference of 2 meters was the maximal admissible value for length and
width of the vessel, as rounding errors makes any value beyond it possible with genuine
data. Figure 5.14 shows the verbose version of messages undergoing this treatment.
5.2.3.3 Case 1.3: Identity changes
In this scenario, the identity changes of vessels are recorded and analysed. In the AIS
messages, the identity of a vessel is displayed in static information messages through
four identity items. In a current use, we expect those fields to remain largely unchanged.
Those fields are the name of the vessel (data field 05G), the MMSI number (05C), the IMO
number (05E) and the international reference call sigh (05F). In the case of class B vessels,
only three of those fields are displayed, which are the MMSI number (24C), the name of
the vessel (24E), and the international reference call sign (24H). Out of those four fields,
only the IMO number, attached to the physical structure of the vessel, is never expected
to change. The MMSI number and the international reference call sign are assigned by
the country of the flag, so when a vessel changes its affiliation, new data are allocated and
those fields can change. For the name, it can change even more often, at the inclination
of the owner, providing the fact to let the authorities know. The treatment of such data
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Figure 5.13: Processing of the presence in the fleet register database
Figure 5.14: System response of the presence in the fleet register database treatment with
real AIS data
quadruplets (or triplets in the case of class B vessels) has the purpose of highlighting the
cases when the quadruplet change, as it can occur when any one of the four fields change.
A change on the IMO number is likely to be a falsification as changes on this field are not
expected. In the case of the name of the vessel, it can either be an actual name change
(then the location of occurrence and authorities must be taken into consideration), or it
is an attempt to conceal its identity. As the flag country assigns the MMSI number and
the international reference call sign, the analysis for mismatching with those fields must
be done using a comparison with a state fleet register, and the location where the change
has occurred.
Experimental Case (C):
This case is about the identity changes and the inconsistencies between declared iden-
tities between various messages number 5. The principle of data within quadruplets was
explained just before, as a quadruplet is a unique combination of { MMSI number, IMO
number, Name, Call Sign }. In this part, the program is discriminating every unique
quadruplet, highlighting the cases where one or several of the data fields that constitute
the quadruplet have changed. Figure 5.15 displays the process for the study of this case,
Figure 5.16 shows the system response to such quadruplet analysis and the Figure 5.17
shows the quadruplet table as shown in the result database. A new entry for which at
least one of the fields has already been seen will trigger the flag f severalIdentities.
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Figure 5.15: Processing of the compliance with the fleet register database
Figure 5.16: System response of the compliance with the fleet register database treatment
with real AIS data
5.2.3.4 Case 1.4: Ubiquity cases
This scenario consists of the fact to have several vessels at the same time in different
locations but using the same identity (i.e. the same MMSI number). This phenomenon,
that we call ubiquity, can have several causes: the malfunction of the GNSS of a vessel,
the fact that several vessels in the same area or belonging to the same company use the
same identification number, or most probably the identity theft of one vessel by another
one. Those kind of identity concealing is the fact of vessel owners willing to hide their
identity and present a friendly one, for instance in cases of troubled areas or to conceal
embargo violation.
Experimental Case (D):
As an example of this ubiquity case, a trajectory has been created with 9 points
numbered temporally from 1 to 9, simulating two vessels, one going eastwards towards
mainland France, and one going southwards in the Brest bay, as shown in Figure 5.18.
The timestamps for each couple of points (1 and 2, 3 and 4) are similar as their difference
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Figure 5.17: Quadruplets table in the database
is only about 5 seconds. As presented in Table 5.6, the flag for ubiquity is raised from
the second point on, as well as the flags related to the trajectory and the coherence of the
consecutive points.
Figure 5.18: Ubiquity scenario cases
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
f suddenapp
√
f ubiquity
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
f trajectory
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
f nextPoint
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Table 5.6: Table of flag raising in the ubiquity case
5.2.3.5 Case 2.1: Wrong position
This scenario deals with the cases of the outbreak of a vessel not only outside an expected
area (as seen later in scenario 2.4), but in an impossible area, such as land or outside the
latitude and longitude range, as shown in Figure 5.19.
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Figure 5.19: Wrong position scenario cases
The appearance on land represents the fact not to appear on a body of water, which
can be caused by a rough falsification try, by the spoofing of the system, but it can also
be caused by AIS signal emission attempts by people which does not want to disturb the
marine traffic, or AIS switched on by accident or on purpose when the vessel is on dry
cock, or when the vessel is being transported by another vehicle using terrestrial means.
Such a study must be careful of the fact that inland navigation and therefore inland AIS
does exist and a good modelling of navigable waterways is needed to avoid false positives.
The fact to appear outside the range of the map is the fact to receive an AIS mes-
sage with at least one of those statements false: the vessel is within [−90, 90] degrees in
latitude ; the vessel is within [−180, 180] degrees in longitude. As it is unlikely to be a
misconfiguration of the system or any kind of GNSS failure, such scenario is characteristic
of an AIS falsification (disappearance of the map) or signal spoofing cases, as AIS signal
emission attempts could also use such coordinates in their location fields in order not to
disturb the marine traffic.
Experimental Case (E):
For the case of wrong position, a set of 9 data points has been created which starts
in the Brest Bay, goes north, crosses the restricted military area and finished on land.
Speed, heading and distances have been set consistently so that the trajectory point could
be real if they were not on land. Several flags have been raised, the sudden apparition
for the first point, then trajectory that went in the direction of the Brest harbour, then
inside the restricted area, triggering several alerts, before hitting the land and continuing
its course. The risks triggered have been indicated in the table, however the level of the
risks is not assessed, as it will depend on the type of vessel.
Figure 5.20: Location of points in the inland positioning case
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
f suddenapp
√
f restrictedArea
√ √
f isInLand
√ √ √ √
f CoastProximity
√
f headingTowardsPort
√ √ √
Table 5.7: Table of flag raising in the inland positioning case
5.2.3.6 Case 2.2: Kinematic inaccuracies
This scenario concentrates on cases of two incoherent consecutive points, and in this
scope, four cases have been discriminated, as displayed in the Figure 5.21. The case a)
is one single outlier point out of a regular-looking trajectory, that can be originated by
an error of the system, a falsification test at the level of the station or a spoofing test
from an external actor. The case b) shows the brutal shift of a trajectory which seems
to be regular before and after it. Such a case can be caused by a continuous software or
hardware malfunction in which a bias has been activated, a proper falsification from the
vessel or a spoofing case. The falsification case could be favoured if the area in question
is in the near location of a place where a vessel could be willing to hide some information.
The case c) draws the case of a vessel changing its course in a regular-looking trajectory,
but in which other AIS data would disagree with the observed change. The same causes
as case b) can be proposed. The case d) displays a trajectory of a vessel going back and
forth from two locations (more or less remote), actually forming two separate trajectories
of two vessels sailing under the same identification number. This case would be typical
of identity theft or identity sharing.
Figure 5.21: Kinematic inaccuracies scenario cases
Experimental Case (F-G):
For the case of kinematic discrepancies, two sets of 9 data points have been created.
The first one, presented in Figure 5.22, represents the case of a normal trajectory for
which only one point is out of the expected path. For the remaining points, all kinematic
data are in accordance, particularly the speed, heading and physical distance between
the points. The point number 5 has a offset of 0.02o south of its expected position. For
the points number 5 and 6, the flags of next position and ubiquity are raised, as shown
in Table 5.8. Note that the ubiquity flag is only raised because of the lack of proximity
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between the points: would that point number 5 appeared with an offset small enough to
be within the accessibility range of the vessel, this flag would not have been raised.
Figure 5.22: Location of points in the whereabouts spoofing case
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
f suddenapp
√
f nextPosition
√ √
f ubiquity
√ √
Table 5.8: Table of flag raising in the whereabouts spoofing case
For the second case, presented in Figure 5.23, the trajectory is shown as going north-
wards until point 5, then eastwards from point 5 on. However, the kinematic data field
of heading displayed only one value: 0 (so northwards trajectory), resulting in the points
6 to 9 to raise the flag of incoherent next point, as it should be north of the previous one
and not east (Table 5.9). However, the flag ubiquity is never triggered as each point is
within the accessibility range of the previous one.
Figure 5.23: Location of points in the dynamic inconsistencies case
5.2.3.7 Case 2.3: Vessel disappearance and later reappearance
This scenario gathers cases of vessels disappearing and reappearing after a long timeframe,
the value of this gap being a variable of the study. In Figure 5.24, the case of a reap-
pearance in the same location (case e) and in a different location (case f) are presented.
Several causes have been discriminated for finding the reasons of such observed behaviour,
which include the fact to turn off the system, the crossing of masked locations, the fact
to be too far to be received, an attack on the signal (jamming or saturation attack) or
a natural saturation of the system. If the vessel never reappears, the hypothesis of a
shipwreck can be taken into account.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
f suddenapp
√
f nextPosition
√ √ √ √
Table 5.9: Table of flag raising in the dynamic inconsistencies case
Figure 5.24: Vessel disappearance/reappearance scenario cases
In the case of the AIS switched off, we have to concentrate on the area of the last
received message, whether or not it is in a good visibility area, and assess, according to the
speed stated in the last received message, the number of missing expected messages. The
status of the vessel, whether in blacklist or not, must also be assessed, as the historicity
of the vessel must be taken into consideration. For the cases of the crossing of a masked
area or being at the edge of the reception area, both the expected trajectory and a
map displaying the coverage area at the given time must be provided, in this scope, the
expectance of the fact not to receive messages can be assessed. The natural saturation of
the system mainly occurs in the case of airborne AIS reception, when several organised
areas are in the sight of the reception, as seen in section 3.2.3.3. In this case, an important
number of vessels will be affected by this problem in the area.
Experimental Case (H-I):
For the case of temporal issues, two cases have been discriminated and studied with
two created sets of 9 points: the fact for a vessel to stop emitting for a long time without
significant position change between the last point before the silence and the first point
after it, and the fact for a vessel to instantaneously display a huge spatial gap between
two seemingly normal trajectories.
The first case is displayed in Figure 5.25, with the temporal gap taking place between
the points 4 and 5. For our experiment we chose a gap of 10,000 seconds, between normal
trajectories. The flag temporal gap was raised, as expected, for the point number 5, as
shown in Table 5.10. The flag of unexpected disappearance followed by an unexpected
reappearance has also been raised. This is because we defined two expected appear-
ance/disappearance areas which are the port and the limit of the coverage area, as shown
in section 5.2.3.8. As we have both Brest Bay and Brest Port geometries (section 5.2.1.3)
in our study, we can consider the geometry Brest Bay minus Brest Port as an unexpected
location for disappearing or reappearing.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
f suddenapp
√
f temporalGap
√
Table 5.10: Table of flag raising in the big temporal gap case
The second case is more complex, presented in Figure 5.26 with results in Table 5.11.
A big spatial gap occurred between points 4 and 5, without out-of-normal temporal gap
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Figure 5.25: Location of points in the big temporal gap case
between those points. This scenario raises several flags: the next position flag for point
5, but also the trajectory flag between points 3 and 6, as well as the coast proximity flag
due to the location of the points 5 to 9 (which is the reason why the risk boarding have
been selected), and the ubiquity flag, only for the point 5.
Figure 5.26: Location of points in the big spatial gap case
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
f suddenapp
√
f trajectory
√ √ √ √
f ubiquity
√
f coastProximity
√ √ √ √ √
f nextPosition
√
Table 5.11: Table of flag raising in the big spatial gap case
5.2.3.8 Case 2.4: Spontaneous unexpected appearance
Scenario 2.4 is about the spontaneous apparition of a vessel in an area in which the
apparition of a vessel is of low probability (i.e. not in coverage area limits or in a port).
Several reasons can be spotted, such as the fact to switch on the system, the presence of
a ghost vessel, the modelling of the coverage area and port area, a change in the software
or hardware of a reception antenna or an installation of a new antenna (Salmon et al.,
2016).
In the case of the AIS switched on, we can focus on the status of the vessel (for
blacklisting), and if it has a last known position which constitutes a disappearance in a
low probability area. In the cases of ghost vessels, the existence of the MMSI number can
be verified, and if it exists we can check if it exists somewhere else at the same time, if we
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Figure 5.27: Vessel sudden appearance scenario cases
already saw it before. Several behavioural algorithms can then be applied to it, such as
the fact to cross the trajectory of another vessel (interfere in the navigation), to cross the
land or to have crossed over another vessel (i.e. the trajectories have met and such a case
should have provoked a collision). It is also possible to broadcast an addressed message to
the (allegedly ghost) vessel and wait for its answer (addressed inquiring messages needing
acknowledgement are number 6, 10 and 12). A change in the software or the hardware of
an antenna, as well as the installation of a new antenna will bring several changes such as
signature changes, a great number of vessels appearing in unusual areas (as the coverage
map will need to be readjusted). In addition, a bad implementation of the coverage
determination algorithm will bring a distorted view of the actual coverage capabilities of
antennas and will spot a great number of vessels.
Experimental Case (J-K):
This case deals with sudden apparition, and the way they are treated according to the
location of such sudden apparition, as defined just before in section 5.2.3.7. The first case
(Figure 5.28) shows an appearance in the middle of the Brest Bay (Blue geometry), where
it should not happen, and the second case (Figure 5.29) shows an appearance at the limit
of the coverage area (red geometry). As it can be expected, the first case (Table 5.12)
shows a sudden appearance flag for the point number 1, and the second case (Table 5.13)
shows no flag at all, as the remaining of the trajectory does not display any kinematic
problem.
Figure 5.28: Location of points in the unexpected appearance case
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Figure 5.29: Location of points in the expected appearance case
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
f suddenapp
√
Table 5.12: Table of flag raising in the unexpected appearance case
5.2.3.9 Case 3.1: Message 22 alert
Message number 22 can be addressed to given vessels or broadcast for all vessels within a
(spherical) rectangular area between longitude and latitude coordinates. It orders vessels
to change their VHF transmission channel to a given channel (other than 2087 and 2088
i.e. 87B and 88B if they want to quit the worldwide assigned channels, or 2087 and 2088
if they want to have the vessel back in those worldwide assigned channels) and change the
maritime situational picture of AIS stations. Indeed, the stations continue to emit but on
another channel, and if other receptors did not take it into consideration, those stations
are blind to them. Message 22 is used in some particular areas for traffic management,
and broadcast by competent authorities, for its use in an usual area could be a hint of
a spoofing case in order to lose the control of a proper monitoring of the system, force
several vessels to disappear from and AIS point of view (such vessels could then only
communicate with vessels and coastal stations using the same frequency as them). An
accidental broadcast of message 22 is also possible as it was demonstrated by (USCG,
2010). The peculiarity of the use of this message encouraged us to create a dedicated flag
in the flag assessment for the simple fact for this message to show up, and this flag has
been called f mess22alert.
Experimental Case (L):
This case deals with the handling of Message 22. As for now, as this message have been
highlighted as rare and its use judged dangerous, every single appearance of a message
number 22 will trigger an allocated flag, putting all risks to their maximum level, the
handling of such a message having to become a priority for any operator. Made-up
messages 22 (Figure 5.30) were created and underwent the treatment of the program,
successfully displaying the flag, as shown in Table 5.14, where the two messages are
named P1 and P2.
Figure 5.30: Made-up Messages 22 in the database
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
No Flag
Table 5.13: Table of flag raising in the expected appearance case
P1 P2
f mess22alert
√ √
Table 5.14: Table of flag raising in Message 22 case
5.2.3.10 Case 3.2: Message 23 alert
Message number 23 cannot be addressed and is only broadcast to all vessels within an
area, following the same pattern as message 22. This message orders vessels either to
change their regular rate of communication (as defined by their speed and course, as seen
in section 3.2.2.1) to a given rate of transmission, or to remain silent for a given amount
of time. This order can be directed towards all vessels in the area or only to some vessels
according to their type of station (Class B, Airborne station, Aid-to-navigation station
for instance). Its use is reserved to competent authorities as it changes the perception
of the maritime environment and can force vessel to remain permanently quiet (if sent
at a sufficient rate). It is extremely rarely used, and its reception shall raise a warning
on a spoofing case which would want to obstruct a proper view of the current marine
traffic within an area. As for the message 23, an accidental use of this message by the
authorities is still possible. The peculiarity of the use of this message encouraged us to
create a dedicated flag in the flag assessment for the simple fact for this message to show
up, and this flag has been called f mess23alert.
Experimental Case (M):
This case deals with the handling of Message 23. As for now, as this message have been
highlighted as rare and its use judged dangerous, every single appearance of a message
number 23 will trigger an allocated flag, putting all risks to their maximum level, the
handling of such a message having to become a priority for any operator. A made-
up message 23 (Figure 5.31) was created and underwent the treatment of the program,
successfully displaying the flag, as shown in Table 5.15, where the created message is
named P1.
Figure 5.31: Made-up Message 23 in the database
5.2.4 Program response
5.2.4.1 Computational time
The running time has its importance as we aim at using this program in a real-time frame.
In order to assess it for a reasonable amount of time, running time for all the messages
received during 30 minutes, 1, 2, 3, 6, 12 and 24 hours have been performed. The results
are shown in Table 5.16.
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P1
f mess23alert
√
Table 5.15: Table of flag raising in Message 23 case
Timespan of assessed data 30min 1h 2h 3h 6h 9h 12h 24h
Time in seconds 1800 3600 7200 10800 21600 32400 43200 86400
Running time in seconds 663 1352 2746 4154 8452 12856 17410 36375
Computing density (in %) 36.8 37.6 38.1 38.5 39.1 39.7 40.3 42.1
Table 5.16: Program running time for various timespan of AIS data
All computations have been made on a laptop running on Windows 10, Intel Core
i3-5005U CPU 2 GHz with 4 Go of RAM. The results tell us that we are at an occupation
rate of 40%, which means that there is still room for program features to be added. An
increase in the running time rate is observed as the time span of the study gets larger.
This can be explained by the increase of the tables in the database, forcing the program
to query bigger tables, therefore taking more time for getting a response.
This increase in time would let us think that eventually the program will meet the
100% mark. However this mark has not been assessed, given that is it technically easy
to cut an analysis into smaller successive analysis (instead of treating 30 days at once, to
treat 30 1-day analyses with consecutive mutually exclusive collectively exhaustive time
spans).
5.2.4.2 Flag raising rate
In this part the program response with the number of flags raised is shown for some of the
scenarios. From a small sample of data, the number of each flag raised for the scenario
identity (Figure 5.32), the scenarios consecutive points and temporal gap (Figure 5.33) and
the scenarios whereabouts spoofing and the vessel type flags (Figure 5.34) are presented.
It can be seen that 4 vessels have consistency issues between the AIS database and
the fleet register, 45 cannot be found in the register (which is not necessarily a problem,
unless the fleet register is expected to be exhaustive, which is not the case for us), one has
an ubiquity issue and quite a great amount (132, so 5%) have characteristics issues with
the length and the width of the vessel. In most case, it is due to fields with the default
value of 0 for them. No temporal gap issue have been spotted, but some trajectories are
not fully trustful. Nine sudden and unexpected appearances were highlighted, and the
vessel type distribution show a domination of vessels of the type “fishing, pleasure and
service”, out of which most are actually fishing vessels.
5.2.4.3 Cases of spotted integrity breaches in AIS dataset
This section shows the outcome of an analysis for four cases, namely the ubiquity, the
consistency with the database, the consistency between two consecutive points and the
unexpected appearance. In each case, the program line is highlighted, then the database
is queried in order to get the corresponding data and the location or the value of this data
is displayed in order to demonstrate that the indicated problem on the spotted message
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Figure 5.32: Program sum up of the identity scenario
Figure 5.33: Program sum up of the scenarios of consecutive points assessment and tem-
poral gap assessment
Figure 5.34: Program sum up of the whereabouts spoofing scenario and the vessel type
flag assessment
actually occurred.
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Figure 5.35: Verification of an ubiquity case
Ubiquity Case
In the ubiquity case, it was necessary to query the message in question and the last
message sent from the same vessel. It was shown that their time difference was 0 seconds
and their position difference was 29 meters, as shown in Figure 5.35. Whereas it is
supposed to be a unwanted and accidental glitch, it remains a positioning issue as a vessel
is not expected to move this much in less than one full second.
Fleet Register Consistency Case
In this case, as shown in Figure 5.36, two queries were performed, one on the AIS
database and one on the fleet register, showing that a same call sign was associated with
two distinct MMSI numbers.
Position with respect to kinematic values case
The Figure 5.37 proposes the case of two messages for which the spatial position are
not compatible with the kinematic values, as output of the item “01I05” presented in
section 4.1.3.2. The two positions are queried, as well as the course over ground, speed
over ground, rate of turn and the timestamps. Then the expected position is computed,
as well as an error buffer. In this case, the value of the second point is outside the buffer,
triggering the alert
Unexpected appearance
This last case we present deals with unexpected appearance of vessels, i.e. as presented
before the fact for a vessel to appear for the first time in a location that would not have
been expected for such a first appearance. The geometry of the bay of Brest to which is
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Figure 5.36: Verification of a fleet register consistency case
Figure 5.37: Verification of a spatio-temporal position case
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Figure 5.38: Verification of the case of an unexpected appearance
cut off the geometry of the Brest port is considered as an anomalous place for a vessel
appearance, as the vessel is either expected to appear outside the bay entrance or in the
port itself. The location of the given point is queried and displayed in the map, showing
that the position is effectively an unexpected place for its appearance. The program
output, the SQL query and the map in question are presented in Figure 5.38.
5.2.5 Discussion
The information system that was set enables the treatment of AIS messages on-the-fly,
as the running time of the program for k seconds of data is inferior to k seconds (by far,
which means that more treatments can easily be added), and it was tested on both real
AIS data and created AIS data for scenario modelling.
This system is based on a methodology presented in chapter 4, consisting of an integrity
assessment of AIS data and an associated risk assessment (which will be the subject of
the chapter 6). The program is based on integrity in order to discover issues in AIS
data demonstrating a data handling error, falsification or spoofing. The item lists have
been developed with the system specifications, using system settings, as well as field
comparison based on physics and coherence, with the help of maritime domain experts
for the definition of thresholds. Those items have been developed independently from
the scenario cases that emerged later in order to have data to formerly assess the system
without requiring real data for some cases for which such data is either not available or
nowhere to be found.
Another layer of this study is about the risk level determination, also in this case
expert knowledge have been used for vessel segmentation and risk level assignment.
As the program was running on data, it successfully pointed out the cases in which
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further investigation is needed, on real data with the massive treatment of AIS messages
and on data built on purpose, for which the system based on integrity assessment of mes-
sages displayed expected flags in the selected cases. In this scope, the first two hypotheses
presented in section 1.2 can be validated by our experimental approach.
Conclusion
This chapter showed the application of the methodology to AIS messages and more par-
ticularly to the dataset available and some made-up AIS messages through scenario as-
sessments that led to the raising of the proper flags, the triggering of the associated risks.
The architecture of a Python software querying and filling in a postgres/postgis relational
database in the several steps that are item assessment and scenario assessment was shown
to be efficient as it successfully triggered the flags and risks in relation with the expected
outcome, given the input data and given that the program was developed independently
from the application scenarios. Still, this program constitutes a proof of concept for AIS
data falsification discovery and the raising of situational flags, and must be adapted and
refined to become an operational tool for maritime surveillance for competent authorities,
and some other features might be added in this respect, particularly the risk and the risk
level assessment, which will be the topic of the next chapter.
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Chapter 6
From flags to risk assessment
Chapitre 6 : Vers une me´thode d’e´valuation des risques
base´e sur les fanions
Les risques maritimes sont varie´s et peuvent eˆtre classe´s en quatre grandes familles :
naturels, anthropiques, environnementaux ou maritimes. Les risques naturels peuvent eˆtre
pre´visibles telles les tempeˆtes ou impre´visibles tels que les raz-de-mare´e de les collisions
avec des ce´tace´s. Les risques anthropiques sont lie´s a` l’humain, notamment le fait qu’il
existe beaucoup de navires sous pavillon de complaisance, ou l’existence de munitions
immerge´es. Les risques environnementaux regroupent tous les types de maladies lie´es
a` la navigation et au fait d’eˆtre loin de la terre dans un environnement clos et isole´.
Les mare´es noires font e´galement partie des risques environnementaux de la navigation
maritime. Enfin, les risques dits maritimes sont directement lie´s a` la pre´sence d’autres
navires, telles que les collisions ou le risque terroriste.
Dans le cadre de notre e´tude, cinq familles de risques principales ont e´te´ retenues, du
fait de leur ade´quation avec les proble´matiques lie´es a` l’AIS : le risque de collision et
d’abordage, le risque d’e´chouement, le risque de peˆche ille´gale, le risque de piraterie et de
terrorisme, et enfin le risque de transport ille´gal de biens ou de personnes.
Dans l’objectif de lier les familles de risques qui ont e´te´ de´termine´es aux proces-
sus de de´couverte de la falsification de l’AIS, l’e´tablissement de typologies de´crivant
l’environnement du trafic maritime et un cadre ontologique liant les enjeux, les acteurs,
les anomalies et l’environnement maritime en ge´ne´ral est ne´cessaire. Ainsi, une typolo-
gie a e´te´ effectue´e pour chacun des domaines permettant la description de la situation
maritime telle que nous la de´sirons. Une typologie des anomalies (qu’elles soient de com-
portement, de contexte, le´gales ou de qualite´), une typologie des navires, une typologie
des comportements a` risque, une typologie des environnements (zones re´gule´es et condi-
tions de navigation), une typologie des enjeux et une typologie des acteurs sont propose´es,
comple´te´es par une typologie des mode`les de mouvement. Avec l’aide du logiciel Prote´ge´,
une architecture ontologique a e´te´ propose´e afin de lier les typologies et baˆtir les bases
d’un possible futur moteur d’infe´rence.
Afin de lier les fanions issus de l’analyse des messages AIS aux risques, il est ne´cessaire
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d’effectuer une analyse de risques sur la base des fanions, conside´re´s seuls ou en groupe.
Ainsi, une liste de sce´narios d’activation de fanions a e´te´ mise en place, chacun de ces
sce´narios consistant, pour un message, a` voir un ou plusieurs fanions s’activer. A chaque
sce´nario sont associe´ un ou plusieurs risques pre´sents dans la liste des cinq familles de
risques retenues, et quand tous les fanions d’un sce´nario sont active´s, le sce´nario est
conside´re´ re´alise´ et tous les risques affe´rents sont active´s, leur niveau de risque e´tant
e´value´ plus tard. Si plusieurs sce´narios sont active´s, leurs risques associe´s sont aggre´ge´s.
Une table de relation de type de´terministe est ne´cessaire pour cette e´tude.
Afin de de´terminer le niveau de risques, plusieurs e´le´ments ont duˆ eˆtre pris en compte :
le type du navire, les dimensions du risque et le niveau de risque. Les types de navire
conside´re´s sont : les navires de charge, les navires de charge transportant des matie`res
dangereuses, les navires de passagers et les navires de plaisance, peˆche ou service. Les
dimensions du risque prises en compte sont les dimensions humaines (risques lie´s a` la vie
humaine en mer), lie´s aux infrastructures (navires, plate-formes, ports) et environnemen-
tales. Les niveaux de risques sont au nombre de quatre : risque mineur, risque mode´re´,
risque majeur, risque extreˆme. Ainsi, pour chacune des familles de risques, une table a
e´te´ de´finie donnant le niveau de risque par rapport a` la dimension conside´re´e et au type
du navire en question. L’e´tude des fanions nous a fourni une liste de risques a` e´valuer,
et cette e´valuation est effectue´e avec ces tables, en prenant en conside´ration les e´le´ments
sus-nomme´s.
La principale limite de cette e´valuation du risque est le caracte`re de´terministe de
l’e´tude. En effet, une approche de´terministe a e´te´ pre´fe´re´e a` une approche probabiliste
pour son ade´quation avec une preuve de concept et sa complexite´ relative de mise en œuvre
au regard du temps disponible avant la fin du projet ANR au sein duquel cette the`se est
incluse. Cette approche, bien qu’imparfaite, permet ne´anmoins la de´tection de risques et
l’assignation de niveaux de risque, suivant strictement un ensemble de re`gles conside´re´es
comme e´tant de la connaissance d’experts. Cependant cette approche ne permet pas de
ge´rer le flou, qui est un facteur important de l’analyse de risques. Un moteur d’infe´rence
pourrait orienter cette e´tude vers une approche statistique, en prenant en conside´ration
les liens de´ja` effectue´s entre les typologies.
Introduction
This chapter focuses on the risks of maritime navigation which are assessed in this study.
The various flags, representing explicit issues about AIS, can then trigger scenarios and
associated risks if a given combination of flags is raised. Then, according to the risk in
question and according to vessel types, a risk level is assigned to each of the human,
infrastructural and environmental dimensions of the study, to be delivered and presented
properly to the rightful competent authorities.
In this chapter are first presented some risks of maritime navigation and more partic-
ularly those chosen in our study. Then the various maritime domain typologies that have
been constructed in order to build an ontology are presented. In the following section is
presented the deterministic link between the various flags assessed previously in the anal-
ysis and presented in section 4.2. The risk level assignment method is explained before
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the exemplification with the cases of section 5.2.3 and a special case made to show the
differences of risk levels according to the vessel type. Then, the way the risk is assessed
in the program is shown before a presentation of the limitations of our approach.
6.1 The risks of maritime navigation
6.1.1 Overview
At sea, people are exposed to several kinds of risks, some of them are considered here,
namely the natural, anthropic, environmental and maritime ones.
Natural risks include storms, that endanger mariners at sea, workers on shores and
harbour infrastructures. As some of them are predicable, thanks to weather forecast for
instance, others are unpredictable, such as tidal waves or a collision with a cetacean.
Anthropic risks include risks related to submerged mines and munitions, which are a
direct threat to fishermen and the environment, and an indirect threat to the consumers.
The fact that a great amount of vessels are under a flag of convenience is also a concern
for the security of navigation, as those states are less cautious about the health state of
the vessel.
Environmental risks include diseases linked to the fact to navigate (scurvy) and to be in
a confined and physically isolated place. However, the isolation has been reduced since the
introduction of the Internet and telemedicine is now possible. Amongst the environmental
risks, oil slicks are the one with the global best awareness, as the consequences are both
at sea and on shore. The breadth of oil slicks is reducing for the fifty last years. Today,
it is about 3 Mt per year. Notable oil slicks involve Amoco Cadiz, Exxon Valdez, Erika
ships and Deepwater Horizon platform.
Maritime risks are linked to the use of ships by humans. Collisions and boarding are
maritime risks, as they can be caused by carelessness, priority denial or bad visibility
when two vessels have secant trajectories. Another risk for a ship is to run aground, and
can be a result of bad manoeuvres, an erroneous estimation of the water depth or a bad
or not up-to-date documentation. Other risks are fires, waterways or terrorism.
The vulnerabilities are thus numerous, for instance for energy transportation, as it
has a geostrategic importance, it is particularly delicate and a particular care should be
taken to it, as some countries vitally require their energy income to be sufficient. All
transportation by the means of boats implies the risks associated with the goods trans-
portation. Moreover, some energy transportation is done via lines (between countries, or
between offshore platforms and the shore), laying themselves open to sabotage. Offshore
platforms themselves are vulnerable to pirate attacks because of their immobility and
isolation. Some ships such as freighters are subject to thefts, and all the ships are subject
to pirate attacks, for ransom of the crew and of the vessel itself. The vulnerability is
increased with the transportation of hazardous goods in fragile environment. The vulner-
ability of the global maritime traffic is particularly important in strategic points such as
straits or canals, or offshore weak states (piracy). One of the purposes of international
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cooperation is to reduce the danger linked to those vulnerabilities.
In our study, it was decided to concentrate around five main risk families, namely
collision and boarding, grounding, illegal fishing, piracy and terrorism, and illegal trans-
portation, all of them presented in the remaining of this section and in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: An overview of the studied maritime risks
This list is not exhaustive, as other risks do exist while at sea (such as illnesses that
can endanger people and bring diseases to new places). The choice was made to select
only the risks that could reasonably be spotted out by the study of AIS messages, as they
can be susceptible to be triggered by an error or a falsification of the AIS.
6.1.2 Collision and boarding
The boarding is the fact for two vessels to enter in physical contact, voluntarily or not.
As the repartition of vessels is uneven throughout the globe, boardings are more likely
to happen in crowded regions of the sea. Accidental boarding occurs when two vessels
having crossing trajectories cannot change their course quickly enough to prevent the
boarding to happen. In order to prevent boarding to happen, COLREGS (IMO, 2009)
(or International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea) have been written.
A collision is the fact for a vessel to enter in physical contact with a fixed body such
as in a port or with an off-shore infrastructure.
Figure 6.2: A vessel after a collision, from (The Maritime Executive, 2012a)
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6.1.3 Grounding
The grounding is, for a vessel, the fact to meet the shore and to lie on it, while sailing in
a too close proximity to the shore, such as there is no enough clearance behind the vessel
to that it can rely on water. Groundings can be voluntary or not, and can be dangerous
as they can lead in casualties.
Figure 6.3: Costa Concordia grounding disaster, from (The Telegraph, 2012)
6.1.4 Illegal fishing
Overfishing occurs when the amount of fish taken from the ocean is more important than
the reproduction ability of the species. It has serious consequences as it impacts both the
oceanic life balance and the economy of coastal communities. Today about 85% percent
of all fisheries are at or beyond their biological limits and some species like Albacore and
Bluefin tuna are particularly exposed to overfishing. The open access nature of the fishing
areas is one of the problems, alongside with the poor fisheries management, particularly in
developing countries that cannot ensure the enforcement of international laws. Moreover
illegal fishing is rampant, accounting for a global estimated figure of 20%, going up to
50% in some fisheries.
In order to prevent overfishing, laws sometimes limit the amount and the size of the
fish, as well as the location of the catches. Fishing laws are done at the national level,
with the addition of some international conventions and agreements.
6.1.5 Piracy and terrorism
Defined in the Convention on the High Seas (United Nations, 1958) as “any illegal acts
of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew
or the passengers of a private ship”, piracy has always existed at sea. The purpose is
mainly pecuniary, and marginally politic. Some pirate crews are trained on shore, with
a strong hierarchy and the involvement of local dignitaries, while others are completely
disorganised. The states deployed an important effort, and the number of attacks is
currently decreasing, especially in the Horn of Africa. For the year 2013, only five countries
observed more than 10 attacks in their neighbourhood: Indonesia (106), Nigeria (31),
Somalia (15), India (14) and Bangladesh (12).
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Figure 6.4: Map of 2014 maritime piracy attacks, from (The Maritime Executive, 2015)
Although maritime terrorism has not been demonstrated as of 2017, the fact to use a
vessel as a weapon against other vessels, ports, coastal facilities and off-shore infrastruc-
ture must be taken into consideration. Terrorism coming from inside the vessel, outside
the vessel or via electronic networks (cyberterrorism) is considered in our study as being
a rising threat.
6.1.6 Illegal transportation
Illegal transportation is about the illegal transportation of goods (smuggling) and the ille-
gal transportation of human beings, either voluntarily (human trafficking) or not (illegal
immigration).
Smuggling consists of the illegal trade of goods, which can be legal goods hidden
for tax purposes or illegal goods such as counterfeited goods, cigarettes or narcotics, as
defined in the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances (UNODC, 1988). The drug traffic generated over 320 milliards
of US Dollars as of 2003 (UNODC, 2005), and the counterfeited goods activities generate
over 250 milliards of US Dollars per year (UNODC, 2013), mainly dominated by clothing
goods, but also involving car parts, chemicals, electronics, food, drinks, pharmaceuticals,
household products and tobacco.
Illegal immigration and human trafficking is the fact to have on-board people who are
willing to reach illegally the territory of a foreign nation. It is a current problem (as the
migrant crisis is ongoing as of 2017, with over 360,000 illegal migrants arriving in the EU
soil for the 2016 year (IOM, 2017), and an expected 200 million to 1,000 million people
who could potentially try to escape by vessel the impacts of climate change (Nepal, 2014)
in the 2015-2055 period.
6.2 Domain typologies
In order to link the risks families that have been selected to the process of discovery of AIS
falsification, the establishment of typologies describing the environment of marine traffic
and an ontological frame linking the stakes, the actors, the anomalies and the maritime
environment is necessary. This section presents the various typologies that have been set
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(Iphar, Aldo Napoli, Ray, et al., 2016).
6.2.1 Typology of anomalies
Anomalies are not all the same of a kind, their spectrum is wide and a classification
in families and subfamilies is not trivial. In the scope of the study of AIS messages
and according to the research presented in (Roy and Davenport, 2010) and (Roy, 2008),
a classification in four main families has been chosen: the behaviour, the content, the
lawfulness and the quality, as presented in Figure 6.5.
By its size, the behavioural anomalies family is the largest. Kinematic anomalies are
the main sub-family, with on the one hand the position-based (about either the destination
or the area of location) and on the other hand the movement-based (about either the route
or the speed, with or without engine on) anomalies. The other subfamily is route-based
anomalies, including unexpected change of destination, illogical or non-understandable
behaviour.
As for the content anomalies, two subfamilies are distinguishable: the anomalies in
the content of the message itself that do not come under the vessel’s behaviour (such as
static data, data which usually do not change over time) and anomalies about the people
on board (crew or passengers). As for static information, are concerned the cargo (if it
does not match with the vessel type, or if two cargoes that are hazardous together are
nearby), the dimensions of the vessel (for instance when the declared width is higher than
the declared length, or with a draught incompatible with the vessel type) or the vessel
type (incompatibility with the declared activity or the dimensions of the vessel). As for
the people on board, the crew (for issues such as the number too high or too few, the fact
to belong to any criminal or terrorist organisation) and the passengers (the number on
board, the fact to be an illegal immigrant or to be a hazardous person) are distinguished.
The lawfulness anomalies can be split in two sub-families: criminal issues (terrorism
or organised crime) and breach-level issues, such as undeclared change of flag, undeclared
change of owner or an unauthorised seafaring behaviour (navigation in a forbidden area,
navigation in an area where restrictions of navigation are in force, or a forbidden behaviour
such as the failure to respect the right navigation direction in a TSS).
About data quality anomalies are distinguished the unexpectedly changing data (of
static information for instance), the impossible data so as the piece of information is out
of the possible scope for it, or impossible with respect to others pieces of information (when
a comparison is possible), and missing data due to poor signal reception or voluntary lack
of data providing.
6.2.2 Typology of vessels
The typology of vessels is presented in Figure 6.6. In the frame of the studies on the AIS,
a typology of vessels based on the classes of messages sent is possible. Two families of
vessels are then distinguishable: the ones for which the use of the system is compulsory
and which are equipped with a class A transceiver, and the ones for which the use of
179
Figure 6.5: Typology of anomalies
the system is not an obligation and which can be equipped with a class B transceiver, as
presented in section 3.2.1. Thus when a vessel enters in the first category it emits as a
class A vessel, and when it enters in the second category, it emits as a class B vessel if it
is equipped with the system or it does not emit any message.
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Figure 6.6: Typology of vessels
The diversity of navigating vessels enables us to build a typology of them according to
the domain it is fitted for and their applicative domain. Apart from the military vessels, a
vessel can be fitted for trade, for fishing or for professional yachting. In the first category
(trade-fitted vessels), several families of vessels are possible, such as passengers, cargoes,
service or specialised vessels.
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6.2.3 Typology of hazardous behaviours
Hazardous behaviours, as presented in Figure 6.7, are of various kinds and can cover
collision or boarding, as well as a falsification dimension such as the fact to cut the
telecommunication channel, to falsify navigation data by the modification of messages
or the input of wrong information of some data fields (including leaving blank fields on
purpose). In general, each infringement of the maritime code is a hazardous behaviour,
this can be related to the speed, the heading, the respect of navigation areas, the respect
of rules in force for the protection of environment or the respect of helm rules. In this
typology, the behaviours purely linked to navigation are separated from those linked to
the system (including the errors and the falsifications).
Figure 6.7: Typology of hazardous behaviours
6.2.4 Typology of environments
The environment can be assessed in different ways: one can be interested by the location
in or out of the regulated areas, by the meteorology and the diversity of the states of the
sea or by the oceanography in the case of a bathymetric study.
The two typologies relevant to this field are presented in Figure 6.8 for the regulated
areas and in Figure 6.9 for the conditions of navigation.
Regulated areas are of several kinds: linked to the sovereignty of the states, to the
security or to the safeguarding of the environment. Sovereignty areas are presented in
the Introduction. Beyond the EEZ are the international waters, out of jurisdiction from
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any coastal state. Regulated areas linked to the security can be anchorage areas, TSS or
navigation channels, storage areas, moistening areas or military zones, amongst others.
Limits that can be found in maritime maps (SHOM, 2016) show a wide spectrum of
kinds of limits, highlighting their diversity. Regulated areas linked to the environment
safeguarding include the protected marine areas or areas where fishing or underwater
hunting are forbidden or restricted.
Figure 6.8: Typology of regulated areas
The state of the sea is characterised by the conditions of navigation that include the
fact to navigate during the day or during the night, the visibility, the weather and the
height of the waves such as on the Douglas sea scale with 10 degrees: from 0 to 9 going
from calm to phenomenal. The discipline of oceanography that is interesting in the frame
of this study is bathymetry, with the local depth of the seabed that enables a vessel
knowing its draught to know if it can navigate. As the tidal phenomenon is observed and
quantified, the navigation on foreshore, the under keel clearance and the fact for a vessel
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to be hampered by its draught, which happens when the under keel clearance is poor.
Figure 6.9: Typology of navigation conditions
6.2.5 Typology of stakes
The stakes on the subject of navigation and its safety are numerous, and can be divided in
three main families: the human, the material and the environmental stakes. The human
stakes are related to the crew and the passengers of the vessels, whereas the material ones
concentrate on the structure of the vessel, their cargoes and the infrastructure, coastal
and off-shore. Environmental stakes form around the protection of the wildlife, of the
protected marine areas, of coasts and of the seabed to diverse kinds of pollution. A
typology of those stakes in presented in Figure 6.10.
6.2.6 Typology of actors
Besides the humans actors present on board such as the crew and the passengers, the
actors of the maritime world are also the companies for which the activity is linked to
the sea by their action (fishing), their goal (merchant navy) or their nature (ship-owners).
Moreover, ports as entities are actors, so are the states through their navy for the military
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Figure 6.10: Typology of stakes
side or through their action for their civil side. In France, the action of the state at sea
gathers all the civil actions that take place at sea and that come within the competency
of the state. It is coordinated by several ministries and several public administrations.
Alerts are triggered by the state towards the actors of the sea, aiming for the protection
of people and goods. A typology of such actors is displayed in Figure 6.11.
6.2.7 Typology of motion models
In the motion models, presented in typology in Figure 6.12, are distinguished the generic
models and the behaviour models according to the categorisation proposed by (Dodge
et al., 2008). Behaviours models include the prevention, the pursuit, the migration or the
fixation, amongst others. The generic models are themselves divided in composed spatio-
temporal models such as isolation, symmetry, repetition, convergence, separation or meet-
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Figure 6.11: Typology of actors
ing for instance, whereas primitive models are divided into spatial, spatio-temporal and
temporal models. Spatial primitive models include concentration or collocations, spatio-
temporal primitive models classify the consistency, sequences, periodicities and incidents
(simultaneity for instance). Eventually, temporal primitive models classify sequences,
periodicities, temporal relations and total or partial synchronisations.
6.3 Domain ontologies
Once all the typologies have been set, the ontological frame enables the creation of links
between the different typologies. Our ontology has been made in order to demonstrate the
relationships between the various elements of the typologies, in a spirit of representation,
and not in a spirit of interrogation as our ontology is not usable yet as an inference engine.
6.3.1 The Prote´ge´ software
The ontology software Prote´ge´ is one of the most renowned of its kind. Its development
began in 1995 in the Californian University of Stanford. Since its fourth version, Prote´ge´
is based on the open source programming interface OWL API and is widely used, in the
scientific community as well as in the developer community. The version used for ontology
creation in our case, presented in section 6.3.2, is the 5.0 version.
6.3.2 Ontology architecture
As presented in Figure 6.13, the ontology is structured around three main classes: Ves-
sel, Behaviour and Messages, the vessel having behaviour and sending messages. Eleven
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Figure 6.12: Typology of motion models
classes are directly associated with those three main classes: actors, vessels, stakes, con-
tent anomalies, quality anomalies, navigation conditions, motion models, regulated areas,
hazardous behaviours, behavioural anomalies and legal anomalies. The vessel involves
actors, has a particular type, with its own stakes. Messages are subject to content and
quality anomalies. The behaviour of the vessel is subject to behavioural and legal anoma-
lies, can produce risks, is regulated by areas, follows motion models and depends on
navigation conditions. Those fourteen classes are presented in the ontological diagram
presented below. Moreover, in each class are implemented sub-classes in order to refine
the concepts. Those sub-classes are often divided in additional sub-classes so as to have
the more refined description possible, according to the principles of ontology creation.
From the first eleven classes, the total number of sub-classes in our ontology is over three
hundred.
Moreover, in the Prote´ge´ interface, it is possible to watch the classes and sub-classes
tree view. In Figure 6.14 the main classes and the relations that link them in a non-
developed case.
In Figure 6.15, the classes Vessel and Regulated areas are developed and presented by
tree view in the left-hand side of the image and in a graphic way in the right-hand side
of the image, with the use of the Ontograf add-on, that enables the visualisation of the
relations between classes.
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Figure 6.13: Ontological Diagram
Figure 6.14: Ontological Architecture
Figure 6.15: Class development in the Prote´ge´ Software
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6.4 From the flags to the risk determination
A link between the flags and the risks must be set in order to link the facts that came
out of the flag analysis, taking into account both system and non-system data. Indeed,
it is necessary to link the outcome of the flag analysis and turn it into a risk assessment.
First, it is necessary to set a list of risks taken into consideration. This is done in order
to restrict the risk study to the risks actually relevant to the case studied, and in order to
remain in a closed world. Setting a fixed number of risks enables the computation of risk
levels (by making things enter into general foreseen cases) and prevents from a difficulty
to comprehend what is happening by restricting to risks known by users.
Then, it is necessary to make a match between any relevant combination of flags and
one or several associated risks. This means that when all the flags of a combination are
activated, the risks that are associated with this combination of flags will be triggered and
assessed. However, if a non-insignificant number of flags is activated, combinations will
appear, and it will be necessary to deal with several combinations. In such conditions,
only maximal combination are considered for computation, i.e. if a given combination
which is activated is a subpart of another activated combination, only the combination
with the greatest number of flags will be kept, as it will be considered as a particular
case of the other one. This is due to the fact that some general combination can trigger
several risks, a precision of this combination is likely to provide a focus on a particular,
more relevant risk.
Each one of the risks triggered by the analysis of the flag combination will later be
assessed in order to determine the level of the corresponding risk.
In the case of AIS system, different risks have been presented in section 6.1, and each
flag, as developed in section 4.2.3, carries on its own kind of information about maritime
traffic, either about falsification scenario cases with all-AIS data or non-AIS data, or MSI
assessment for the determination of the neighbourhood of the vessel. Thus, each flag
representing a given situation, it can be linked to one or several of the risks described
in section 6.1. But as several flags can occur on the same vessel, the notion of flag
combination must be treated. Indeed, the combination of several flags can be performed
and such a combination can highlight a given risk or group of risks. In the following of this
section, flag combination designates a finite whole of selected flags as their combination
demonstrates a given situation leading to a designated risk or a group of designated risks.
The different flag combinations set in the case of AIS messages that have been de-
termined in our study is presented in Figure 6.16. It is considered as expert data, and
any expert can modify, add or remove a column of this table (each column representing a
given case with all the flags that need to be arisen and the associated risks with this flag
combination). It is a result of the deterministic approach we chose, in which a fixed frame
must be used, filled with combinations of flags taking the role of rules which are set and
can be modified by an expert. In this Figure, each row represents a flag, and each column
has a number standing for the flag combination. When a X is put in a cell, it means that
the raising of the flag (on the corresponding row) is necessary to trigger the given flag
combination. The flag combination is only active when all the flags marked with an X in
the column have been raised by the analysis.
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Figure 6.16: Table of flags combination for risk determination
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6.5 Risk level assessment for maritime authorities
6.5.1 Levels, risks and domains
Once the determination of the risks has been performed, the level for each of the risks
can be computed. As it depends on the environment and the stakes, several cases must
be discriminated in order to provide to the relevant authorities trustworthy data. In the
case of the maritime domain, this environment covers the type of vessel involved, and the
type of dimension in which the risk expends, which will be presented hereafter. The risk
level is then computed for each one of the selected risks in each of the dimensions with
the help of tables, set by an expert of the domain.
Figure 6.17: Risks levels for the various risks
The risk level is given according to tables, each risk having its own table. For the risks
of grounding, illegal fishing, piracy and terrorism, as well as illegal transportation (Figure
6.17, lower part), four kinds of vessel types are discriminated:
• T/C which stands for all cargo vessel, including tankers, for which the variety of
goods carried in their tanks forces us to closely at it. In this section, no vessel carry
hazardous goods
• T/C - H which stands for the vessels that could belong to the T/C category but
which currently carry hazardous (after the definition given in the AIS specifications)
goods
• P, for passenger vessels
• Pl/F/S which stands for pleasure crafts, fishing vessels and service vessels
The risks are assessed according to three dimensions:
• H: Human, risk linked to the human life at sea
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• I: Infrastructure, risks linked to the structure of the vessel and the coastal and
off-shore infrastructures
• E: Environmental: all kinds of environmental risks
For the particular case of boarding and collision, the table is more complex (Figure
6.17, upper part), as it involves: the studied vessel on the left entry, the other vessel
involved (or the infrastructure: column I) on the top entry, each couple giving six risk
levels, still on the dimensions of human, infrastructure and environmental (columns) but
adding the dimension of damage inducted and damage undergone (lines).
The several risk levels have been defined after an extract from the CISE (which is a
EU Maritime Domain Cooperation Project for the Common Information Sharing Envi-
ronment1) as follow:
• 1: Minor risk
• 2: Moderate risk, injuries, light structure and infrastructure damages, small scale
pollution
• 3: Severe risk, major injuries, substantial structure and infrastructure damages,
substantial pollution
• 4: Extreme risk, death, structure and infrastructure destruction, environmental
disaster
In order to fill in the table with the proper values, this part of the work shall be done by
experts of the maritime environment. As it is expert data, it may evolve and be adapted
to a new situation.
6.5.2 Risk level assignment
As we saw in section 6.4, one or several combinations can be completed and can trigger one
or several risks. If only one risk is triggered, the corresponding values for H, I and E risks
are taken as a result. But if several risks are considered, for each dimension of assessment
(H, I and E), a result is computed which is the maximum value of the corresponding risk
level for the considered risks. With R being the whole of all risks, CR the whole of the
considered risks,
RiskH;I;E = max
r∈CR;CR∈R
RiskrH;I;E
Similarly, if the vessel type is not specified, by default the highest possible risk value
in all vessel types is assigned to the vessel in question, enabling further computations and
the assignment of a risk level despite the fact that the vessel type is missing.
1https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/news/sharing-data-modelling-knowle
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6.6 Implementation of risk assessment
The risk assessment in the program proceeds as presented in the Figure 6.18. Two main
files are used in the program, one for risk analysis and one for flag combination. As for the
database, the results of the flags are used, as well as the risk table and the information
which are useful for the whole analysis: the risk level tables and the working window
table.
Here, the program queries the working window in order to know what are the ids of the
messages that must be treated for each type of message. Then the program queries and
keeps in memory the risk level tables that will later be used for the risk level assessment.
Figure 6.18: Sequence Diagram of the Risk Assessment
Then a loop occurs, and for each message present in the scope of the working window,
the same procedure applies for the computation of risk levels. The main program calls
the function of flag combination. This function queries the various flags raised in the
previous analyses and stored in the database table, and stores them in one big vector.
Then it processes on the vector itself to determine if any of the various flag combination
defined in section 6.4 occurs. Once all the minimal combinations are determined (minimal
combinations being combinations not included in another combination, so consisting of a
more general case), the list of those selected combinations is returned by the function to
the main risk analysis function. The last step of computation is done there, where the
flag combinations are linked to the risks associated as determined in the Figure 6.16, and
the risk computed with respect to the vessel type with the tables returned by a previous
query. Once the levels determined, they are stored in an ad hoc database table. This loop
is repeated for each message in the working window until no one remains untreated.
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6.7 Risk displaying and analysis limitations
6.7.1 Program output
For each message having a risk issue, each of the raised risks will have its risk level in each
of the associated risk that are selected in accordance with the table in Figure 6.16. It is
presented in the program output as shown in Figure 6.19, and in parallel data is stored
in the database table, as a table useful for further cartographic display of the anomalies2.
Figure 6.19: Visible outcome of the program for the risks
6.7.2 Outcomes of the experimental cases
In this part, we assess the risks associated with the case studies proposed in part 5.2.3,
for which flags have been raised. In accordance with the method for linking the flags to
the risks and the table presented in Figure 6.16, the risks in question are presented in the
Table 6.1. As the risk level depends on the vessel type, it is not indicated in the table. In
the Table 6.1, the first level of rows represent the experiments as defined in section 5.2.3,
represented by their letter, and the second level of rows represent the risks that have
been selected ; and the columns represent the points number that are defined for each
experiment in the corresponding figure (which reference can be found on the left-hand
side of the table, below the experiment letter identifier). The section 6.7.3 will deal with
the importance of the vessel type for the risk level assessment.
6.7.3 Importance of the vessel type in the risk assessment
As explained before, so far in this section the vessel type was not taken into consideration,
only the selected risks were displayed. Here is an example to demonstrate the influence
of the vessel type on the assessment. In the example displayed we have a vessel demon-
strating a sudden appearance in an unexpected area whose navigational pattern shows
that he is coming from an area where fishing is prohibited, as shown in Figure 6.20. Table
2A web-based interface has been developed for the cartographic display of anomalous events with
respect to the location of the event, the type of event, the risk level triggered and the possibility for an
operator to see the surrounding traffic of the spotted anomalous vessel, as well as the possibility for the
operator to discard any alert according to his or her appreciation of the situation
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Experiment Risk Points
D 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Section 5.2.3.4 Collision
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Table 5.6 Grounding
Illegal Fishing
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Piracy/Terrorism
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Illegal Transportation
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
E 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Section 5.2.3.5 Collision
√ √ √
Table 5.7 Grounding
√
Illegal Fishing
√ √ √ √ √
Piracy/Terrorism
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Illegal Transportation
√ √ √ √ √
F 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Section 5.2.3.6 Collision
√ √
Table 5.8 Grounding
Illegal Fishing
√ √ √
Piracy/Terrorism
√ √ √
Illegal Transportation
√ √ √
G 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Section 5.2.3.6 Collision
Table 5.9 Grounding
Illegal Fishing
√ √ √ √ √
Piracy/Terrorism
√ √ √ √ √
Illegal Transportation
√ √ √ √ √
H 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Section 5.2.3.7 Collision
Table 5.10 Grounding
Illegal Fishing
√ √
Piracy/Terrorism
√ √
Illegal Transportation
√ √
I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Section 5.2.3.7 Collision
√ √ √ √
Table 5.11 Grounding
√ √ √ √ √
Illegal Fishing
√ √ √ √
Piracy/Terrorism
√ √ √ √
Illegal Transportation
√ √ √ √
J 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Section 5.2.3.8 Collision
Table 5.12 Grounding
Illegal Fishing
√
Piracy/Terrorism
√
Illegal Transportation
√
K 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Section 5.2.3.8 Collision
Table 5.13 Grounding
Illegal Fishing
Piracy/Terrorism
Illegal Transportation
L 1 2
Section 5.2.3.9 Collision
√ √
Table 5.14 Grounding
√ √
Illegal Fishing
√ √
Piracy/Terrorism
√ √
Illegal Transportation
√ √
M 1
Section 5.2.3.10 Collision
√
Table 5.15 Grounding
√
Illegal Fishing
√
Piracy/Terrorism
√
Illegal Transportation
√
Table 6.1: Table of flag raising and risks selection
6.2 shows the flags and risks raised, in accordance with what was demonstrated in this
section before.
Once the associated risks have been selected for each point, the risk levels are assessed
in accordance with risk tables presented in section 6.5.1. In our example we take the
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Figure 6.20: Location of points in the unexpected appearance outside a regulated area
case
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
f suddenapp
√
f comesFromProhibitedArea
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Collision
Grounding
Illegal Fishing
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Piracy/Terrorism
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Illegal Transportation
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
Table 6.2: Table of flag raising and risks selection for this case of unexpected appearance
outside a regulated area
four vessel types and present the risk levels for human, infrastructure and environmental
domains in Table 6.3.
Type of risk Human Infrastructure Environmental
T/C 4 3 2
T/C - H 4 3 4
P 4 1 1
Pl/S 4 1 1
F 1 1 3
Table 6.3: Table of risk levels according to type of vessel
The analysis of the results provided by the Table 6.3 shows that all vessels but the
fishing vessel display a high human risk level, whereas for the infrastructure risk only the
tanker and cargo raises a high level of alert, the other types of vessels displaying a minimal
risk level. For the environmental risks, the cargo and tanker vessels carrying hazardous
goods shows a maximal level because of the risks linked to the cargo itself, whereas the
risk is moderate for cargoes and tankers that are not carrying hazardous cargoes because
of the risks linked to the presence of hydrocarbons in large tanks. Fishing vessels have
high environmental risks because of the risks of illegal fishing in prohibited waters, over-
pressuring fish stocks. Other vessel have minimal risk levels.
6.7.4 Limitations
The main limitation of this risk determination is the deterministic aspect of the study.
Indeed, a deterministic approach was preferred over a statistical approach for its fit into a
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proof of concept case and its relative moderate complexity of implementation with respect
of the available remaining time, the De´AIS project coming to an end. This approach,
while being imperfect, enables nevertheless to trigger the risks and to assign them levels
with respect to the given situation, following a strict set of rules considered as expert
knowledge.
Such an approach cannot handle fuzziness, which is an important feature of risk analy-
sis. An inference engine should be able to turn this approach into a statistical one, taking
into consideration the links that have already been created with the ontology presented
in section 6.3.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
Chapitre 7 : Conclusion
Le travail de recherche pre´sente´ dans ce manuscrit se place dans le domaine de la recherche
sur la connaissance de la situation maritime, de la de´couverte de connaissances et de la
science des donne´es, avec une application ope´rationnelle en se´curite´ de la navigation mar-
itime. Cette proble´matique ope´rationnelle est une conse´quence des questions de recherches
leve´es apre`s la de´monstration de la falsification d’un syste`me de localisation mondial de
navires qui est suppose´ fournir des donne´es utiles a` la se´curite´ de la navigation aux
navires environnants. L’objectif a alors e´te´ de proposer une me´thode afin de mettre en
avant les cas ou` les donne´es semblent de´montrer un de´faut d’authenticite´, et de proposer
une e´valuation des risques associe´s a` ces cas.
A cette fin, une approche base´e sur les dimensions de la qualite´ de la donne´e a e´te´
e´tudie´e. En effet, des dimensions de qualite´ de la donne´e sont disponibles a` l’e´tude du
fait du caracte`re fondamentalement base´ sur la donne´e des syste`mes d’information. Plus
particulie`rement, au sein de la diversite´ des dimensions de qualite´ de la donne´e, l’inte´grite´
a e´te´ discrimine´e comme e´tant particulie`rement importante pour une e´valuation fiable des
syste`mes a` base de donne´e, et la me´thode d’e´valuation est base´e sur le de´veloppement
d’e´le´ments d’e´valuation de la donne´e base´s sur l’inte´grite´.
Etant donne´ qu’une e´valuation base´e sur l’inte´grite´ ne´cessite une compre´hension pro-
fonde des me´canismes qui re´gissent le syste`me en question, une analyse rigoureuse du
syste`me a e´te´ effectue´e, en prenant en compte l’usage premier du syste`me (l’anticollision)
et les usages apparus par la suite (la surveillance) pour comprendre les volonte´s des per-
sonnes ayant re´dige´ les spe´cifications techniques du syste`me. La partie technique du
syste`me a e´te´ e´tudie´ pour les informations pre´cieuses fournies sur la me´canique interne
de ce syste`me, et la partie donne´es du syste`me a e´te´ scrute´e afin de trouver toutes les
combinaisons d’information pouvant tenir lieu de source pour une faille d’inte´grite´.
La falsification d’un syste`me cre´e des risques lie´s a` son domaine d’utilisation. Notre
e´tude permet donc d’avoir des e´le´ments sur les risques maritimes, et ces risques peuvent
eˆtre e´nume´re´s afin que les diffe´rents cas de failles d’inte´grite´ aboutissent sur la mise en
avant d’un ou plusieurs de ces risques en relation directe avec la situation en question. Le
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type de risque en question est particulie`rement important pour les personnes en charge de
la surveillance de la navigation du fait des besoins diffe´rents pour une possible intervention
selon le risque en question.
La me´thode propose´e est ge´ne´rique, et peut eˆtre applique´e a` tous types de syste`mes
d’information transmettant un taux substantiel d’informations ge´olocalise´es. Certaines
ame´liorations sont envisageables, notamment dans le domaine de l’optimisation du code
du programme, de la comple´tude de la liste d’items propose´e et de leur imple´mentation,
de la diversification des sce´narios et des cas d’application, de la diversification des sources
de donne´es externes et de l’implication d’experts du domaine.
7.1 Overview
The work presented in this manuscript is part of the research in the fields of maritime
domain awareness, knowledge discovery and data science, with an operational purpose in
maritime safety. The operational issue is a consequence of research questions raised after
the demonstration that a global maritime location system which is intended to provide
additional safety to navigation as well as useful information to the surroundings vessels
and coastal stations was easily falsified. The objective is then to propose a methodology
in order to point out cases of non-genuine data and provide a risk assessment to those
cases.
In order to do so, an approach based on the data quality dimensions was studied.
Indeed, as information systems are data-based, they natively have data quality dimensions
available to assess them. More precisely in the diversity of data quality dimensions,
integrity was discriminated as particularly important for a reliable assessment of data-
based systems, and the assessment methodology is based on the development of integrity-
based features that are assessing data.
As such an integrity-based assessment requires a profound understanding of the mech-
anisms that rule the system in question, a thorough analysis of the system have been
performed, taking into consideration the primary purpose of the system and the uses that
have later appeared in order to understand the wills of the people which wrote the specifi-
cations. The technical part of the system was studied as it provides precious information
about the inner construction thereof, and the data part of the system was scrutinised in
order to find any kind of combination of pieces of information that could result in an
integrity breach.
The falsification of any system raises risks that are related to its field of use. As our
study is about a maritime system, its falsification raises maritime risks, and such risks
must be enumerated and discriminated so that the various kind of integrity breaches in
data will end up in the highlighting of the risks that are in direct relationship with the
breach in question. The matter of risks is particularly important for the people in charge
of the surveillance of the coast, monitoring of the activities and rallying of the various
intervention units.
From the initial study of data assessment methods and the thorough analysis of the
system, two axes give structure to this study. First, the modelling of system knowledge
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and environment, in conjunction with knowledge of the system, enabled the creation of
a methodology for the assessment of this system. Second, the implementation of this
methodology using actual system data and leading to usable useful information for opera-
tional purposes was performed. This concluding chapter presents the main contributions
and the taking stock of the proposed research approach before an opening on potential
perspectives.
7.2 Thesis evaluation
The stating hypotheses that sustained this research work were that (1) A data integrity
assessment, made possible by the existence of anomalies, allows for the assessment of a
message and of its data, (2) It is necessary to process analyses of all sorts on messages,
in order to detect anomalies of all sorts, without restricting oneself to spatial temporal
messages and spatial analyses, and (3) An anomaly detection of the system enables the
assessment of the risks associated to the field of study. This section shows our position
with respect to those hypotheses.
7.2.1 An all-encompassing integrity assessment of a system pro-
vides anomaly detection
For modelling purposes it is necessary to know perfectly the system studied and its char-
acteristics. In this scope, an all-encompassing analysis of a system would require a knowl-
edge about each part of this system, and more particularly in an integrity assessment
every single possibility for two or more elements, given their respective range of values,
to disagree and therefore create an integrity breach.
The exploitation of such integrity breach can be done by individually labelling each
possibly reported integrity issue, and assessing the available data with respect to those
issues, so that it would be possible, for each piece of information, to determine its status
in respect of every single integrity statement.
The gathering of the integrity issues under several uses cases brings to anomaly de-
tection, under several assessment distinctive features, such as the fact to consider those
issues individually or by group.
The purpose of this thesis was then to propose a methodology based on integrity for
the falsification discovery in a message-based system using the data quality dimension
of integrity and this approach was realised by the design of a program enabling such as
integrity analysis of this system leading to anomaly detection and risk level assessment.
7.2.2 Design of a model for maritime surveillance
This approach on all-encompassing assessment and knowledge discovery was confronted to
a real-case applicative domain which is the one of maritime surveillance. To this respect,
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each data field from every single message type was taken into consideration and included
into the analysis in order for it to encompass all possible cases of integrity problems. A
list of 935 of elementary integrity issues was determined after the profound study of the
system itself.
Such a problem necessitated the knowledge of maritime domain experts for the proper
set of rules that led to the determination of truth or falsehood for every of the integrity
items, those rules taking into consideration the system characteristics, the physics of
radio transmission, the system technical specifications, the rules of navigation and the
kinematics of vessels. The paradigm of a logical framework based on predicate logics was
chosen is this respect.
The adjunction of additional non-system pieces of information enables a much deeper
level of knowledge, by assigning to each message results from analysis of various kinds,
in direct relationship with the vessel location, kinematics, identity and the regulation or
environment such as specific geographical features (coasts, specific maritime zones).
The program for the integrity assessment of maritime Automatic Identification System
was put in place and successfully displayed the messages for which an integrity issue was
detected according to the data available in the dataset and outside the system.
7.2.3 Design of an analysis system linking anomaly detection
and risk assessment
Once the program modelled, it is possible to integrate it into a more sophisticated system
leading to risk analysis and aiming at helping decision making from the people in charge
of maritime traffic monitoring.
In this respect, a set of maritime risks have been chosen for their relationships with
actual demonstrated problems in maritime navigation, and for each situation, one or
several risks were assigned to a message, the risk level being computed according to the
vessel type.
In this scope anomaly detection is at the base of risk type and risk level determination
for competent authorities, and by extension integrity analysis is the stem of the whole
process of analyses which leads all the way to risk management in the dedicated centres.
Typologies have been set with the purpose of describing the maritime environment, and
link the flags to the risks. A part of this typology was implemented in the Prote´ge´ Software
for ontology building. The links between the flags and the risks have been formalised in
a table which is known not to be exhaustive as our approach is a proof of concept and
not a full risk assessment yet.
7.2.4 A generic method
This research applied to a maritime positioning system and encompasses a way to enumer-
ate, formalise and assess data of various kinds. A generic methodology has been proposed
and implemented for the assessment of data quality and the situation of data with respect
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to data quality dimensions. This assessment is based on predicates providing threshold-
assisted binary results. We do believe this approach is appropriate for the management
and assessment of many similar sensing and communicating devices. The nomenclature
that has been set is adaptable to the situations and the predicates must be set in order to
give a clear binary answer, as it is the way it has been designed in our analysis. Then ad
hoc scenarios and flags must be put in place for an appropriate application to the studied
domain.
This method had had the maritime domain as application domain. However other ap-
plicative models may fit for analysis, as it requires a message-based system that transmits
a substantial rate of geographic data. Thus, any kind of moving objects could fit this
definition, and for some of them such a system already exists.
As we noted in section 3.2.4.2, the aircrafts use ADS-B system, which is just as AIS
a message-based geotagged reporting system. Also the vessels use several other reporting
systems, such as LRIT.
In addition, a probabilistic approach could be proposed taking for instance into con-
sideration the fuzziness of both treated data and results, and it would not be necessary
to change the software altogether as the adding of some data coefficients linked to data
fuzziness would be enough.
7.3 Improvement prospects
7.3.1 Code optimisation
There are several ways to optimise the information system, and as of today, in the proof
of concept of the work, optimisation has not been a key point in the development thereof.
Today, as shown before in section 5.2.4.1, the computational time is not a blocking fac-
tor, however it might become such if more items are developed and more analyses are
computed. As this work has been designed for real-time analysis, the respect of the com-
puting time is of paramount importance, and the system must process the messages in
the allocated time frame, given that for a set of message received during a time span of x
minutes, the computing time must not exceed x minutes (as it would delay later analyses
and create a snowball effect in the analysis delays).
In our analysis, the database requests are particularly time-consuming, as the Python
program asks the database in SQL to provide some data. There are two ways to reduce
the time of the requests: act on the requests themselves or act on the number of requests
performed. As the requests involve datasets and tables with an important cardinality, the
number of entries in the table that will be assessed in the computation is important for
time saving. Some actions have already been done in this prospect, by assigning to the
SQL requests conditions limiting their research span and their number of returned data.
However those limits have been roughly set and it is possible to refine them, adapting
both the research span and the number of returned values to every single situation. For
the management of the number of requests, some actions can be taken such as the cen-
tralisation of database requests prior to the analyses, as the current information system
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makes a request at every single item, a single request before the concerned group of items
is possible, then several functions would take the outcome of this main request as an
entry parameter of their item analysis. This would be a scale reduction of computational
time, however it would require small changes in the program architecture, and as it is not
necessary for the proof of concept, has not been performed.
Optimisations should also been performed by factorising item analyses. As a matter
of fact, as it was mentioned in section 4.1.2.7, items can be gathered into families, and
the data in those items receive similar if not identical treatment. A centralisation of such
individual function into a unique function that would be called from all similar items
would be doable. It would reduce the total size of the code, reduce the risks of mistake
in the coding process but most importantly ensure a consistency between all items. As
for now those items, similar or perfectly identical, are computed in separate ways, they
are subject to differ in the case where one is modified for any reason. The fact to use a
centralised function would ensure the consistency of such computations throughout the
analyses.
The optimisation of the information system would also go through parallelism com-
putation, as for the items for instance, all items computation are not dependent on the
results of the other items and can be treated at the same time if possible.
7.3.2 Complete item list
The current number of implemented and fully functional items is 666. However, as all
the items for the most used messages have all been implemented due to the high number
of messages to be treated, some items concerning some of the least used messages in the
third and fourth order have not been implemented because of the lack thereof. Indeed, the
time being limited, the choice to focus on messages for which we received actual messages
made sense in our study, however, a complete study would require the completeness of the
implementation of items, including the remaining ones that have already been described,
the number of which is about two hundreds.
In addition to the items currently defined, a thorough study could be done in order
to check if any remaining items could be defined. Indeed, the complexity of the AIS
system makes it difficult to point out all the possible cases of data discrepancies, and
in addition to those which have been already described could be added some additional
items stemmed from an acute knowledge of maritime traffic or a precise understanding of
peculiarities of some data fields.
The binary field of some messages could also be used to produce additional items.
Actually, in addition to the regular data fields of the most common messages, there is
one family of messages that have not been intensively used during our study, which is the
binary messages family. In those messages, some data fields are the binary transmission
itself, and the study of it can be very complex as it can theoretically transmit very
complex and precise information. For instance, in the case of the message number 6,
“Binary Addressed Message”, has a data slot of up to 920 bits is set for the transmission
of binary data. Another field, namely the Functional ID field, is a integer which role is to
tell the nature of the data presented in the binary data field, which can be “Dangerous
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Cargo indication”, “Tidal window”, “Number of persons on board”, “Clearance time to
enter port” or “Berthing data”, amongst other. Every single of those binary data nature
has its own layout of the binary data field, providing information in direct relation with the
declared nature of data. All those data fields in all the possible cases of all binary messages
provide a tremendous amount of pieces of information that could present discrepancies and
be transformed into items to be assessed. However, due to the complexity and the number
of those pieces of information, this would require a great effort for possibly little result
as how scarcely any binary message is received, and the percentage of binary messages
received with respect to the total number of all messages is negligible, as seen in section
5.2.1.1.
7.3.3 Scenarios and application cases
At this point, some scenarios have been created, corresponding to the main identified
cases in which it was possible to handle the data and provide flags that would later be
used to point out different risks. However, with the development of new items, the fact
that all items are still not used in the scenarios, and the possible integration of new
databases, new scenarios corresponding to the use of both the new and unused items and
the database-related assessment could be designed and emerge. As those new scenarios
would produce new flags, new combinations could be done leading to a more precise risk
assessment.
As the number of scenarios would increase, application cases linked to those scenarios
could then emerge and complete the already existing application cases. Most application
cases in the case of AIS messages are linked to spatiotemporal patterns of the vessels,
because of the large domination of positioning messages
7.3.4 Diversification of the databases
As for now, the information system has been developed using a small variety of data
sources that were easily available. However, a diversification of the databases to as-
sess would produce beneficial effects as on the one hand it would offer several different
databases representing the same subject, enabling double-checking and allowing to keep
up-to-date on some information, and on the other hand offer a wider spectrum of analyses
to be performed, enabling additional analyses at the scenario level, and allowing new flags
to be created, as well as new flag combinations to be made, leading to the discovery of
new kinds of risks.
7.3.5 Involvement of domain experts
A greater involvement of some domain experts in several fields such as maritime knowl-
edge, risk management or risk level assessment would have been helpful to create a more
accurate model for risk analysis, particularly for enhancing the knowledge in maritime
domain, in behaviour understanding, in risk definition and in risk level assessment.
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Experts in maritime knowledge could help refining the program by inputting their
understanding of some maritime situation, maritime laws and good practices. Particularly
in the items in which a threshold has to be set, the knowledge of a maritime expert
is particularly valuable, as the expert will be in grade of deciding a proper threshold
separating what is possible or plausible from what is clearly not feasible. In addition,
their knowledge of the interactions in the maritime domain will provide information about
expected behaviours and possible new relationships between AIS data fields, leading to the
implementation of other items. Such experts in maritime domain could also set a proper
list of item combination, for an acute modelling based on actual mariners experience.
In this study, only five risks have been defined, gathered in families. Involving experts,
this number might go up, as it would be easier to distinguish between the various cases
that the families gather. By expending the number of different risk families, a more
accurate assessment of the ongoing situation would be given to the people in charge of
the monitoring of marine traffic.
In addition to the risk themselves, the risk levels could be adjusted by both maritime
domain experts and risk assessment experts, in order to have risk levels that would be
more adapted to a maritime danger situation and appealing to both mariners and people
in charge of the monitoring of the maritime situation. The risk levels presented in the
tables in section 6.5.1 have been evaluated and modified by a maritime expert, however
other points of views on those tables may induce a change in the values.
The needs in terms of maritime surveillance depend on the scale of the study. Indeed,
a person in charge for coastal surveillance in a MRCC will have different needs than a
person in charge of a worldwide fleet monitoring from a ship owner company. Even inside
authorities, MRCC, police, civilian or military authorities will not require similar needs.
The scalability of the analysis of AIS data (or any geotagged system) would require a whole
set of technical adjustments, but remain possible with the current program architecture.
In order to cover all the phases of the risk assessment process, the feedback from
operational workers shall be taken into consideration, particularly in the parts of the
information system where expert knowledge is required. Those parts shall be adaptable
so they can fit as much as possible to the given user. In addition, validation of the program
by users could enable this feedback and thus take part of a larger enhancement of the risk
management process.
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Résumé 
 
Il existe différents systèmes de localisation de 
navires en mer qui favorisent une aide à la 
navigation et une sécurisation du trafic 
maritime. Ces systèmes sont également 
utilisés en tant qu’outils de surveillance et 
d’aide à la décision par les centres de 
surveillance basés à terre. Le Système 
d’Identification Automatique (AIS) déployé par 
l’Organisation Maritime Internationale, bien 
qu’étant le système de localisation de navires 
le plus utilisé de nos jours, est faiblement 
sécurisé. Cette vulnérabilité est illustrée par 
des cas réels et détectés tels que des 
usurpations d’identité ou des disparitions 
volontaires de navires qui sont sources de 
risques pour les navires, les infrastructures 
offshores et côtières et l’environnement.  
 
Nous proposons dans cette thèse une 
démarche méthodologique d’analyse et 
d’évaluation des messages AIS fondée sur 
les dimensions de la qualité de la donnée, 
dont l’intégrité considérée comme la plus 
importante de ces dimensions. Du fait de la 
structure complexe de l’AIS, une liste 
d'indicateurs a été établie, afin d’évaluer 
l'intégrité de la donnée, sa conformité avec 
les spécifications techniques du système et la 
cohérence des champs des messages entre 
eux et au sein d’un seul ou plusieurs 
messages. Notre démarche repose 
également sur l’usage d’informations 
additionnelles telles que des données 
géographiques ou des registres de navires 
afin d’évaluer la véracité et l’authenticité d’un 
message AIS et de son expéditeur. 
  
Enfin, une évaluation des risques associés 
est proposée, permettant une meilleure 
compréhension de la situation maritime ainsi 
que l’établissement de liens de causalité 
entre les vulnérabilités du système et les 
risques relevant de la sécurité et sûreté de la 
navigation maritime. 
 
Mots Clés 
 
Système de géolocalisation, Système 
d’identification Automatique, évaluation de 
l’intégrité, risques maritimes, falsification de 
données, système d’aide à la décision 
 
Abstract 
 
At sea, various localisation systems enable 
vessels to be aware of their environment, 
fostering aid to navigation and the securing of 
maritime traffic. Those systems are also used 
as surveillance and decision support tools by 
coastal authorities. The Automatic 
Identification System (AIS), created by the 
International Maritime Organisation, albeit 
being the most used system for vessel 
localisation, is weakly secured. This 
vulnerability is illustrated by real and detected 
cases of identity theft or voluntary vessel 
disappearances, which are a threat to the 
vessels, the offshore and coastal 
infrastructures and the environment. 
 
In this thesis, we propose a methodological 
approach for the analysis and assessment of 
AIS messages based on data quality 
dimensions, including integrity which has 
been discriminated as the most important of 
those dimensions in our study. As the 
structure of AIS data is complex, a list of 
integrity items have been established, their 
purpose being to assess the consistency of 
the data within the data fields with the 
technical specifications of the system and the 
consistency of the data fields within 
themselves in a message and between the 
different messages. Our method also relies 
on the use of additional data (such as 
geographical data or fleet registers), 
providing additional information to assess the 
truthfulness and the genuineness of an AIS 
message and its sender. 
 
Last, an assessment of associated risks is 
proposed, allowing a better comprehension of 
the maritime situation and the establishment 
of links between the vulnerabilities caused by 
the weaknesses of the system and the 
maritime risks related to the safety and 
security of maritime navigation. 
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